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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary determinant of sentence length for federal eco-
nomic criminals is the amount of "loss" resulting from an offender's
conduct.' The idea of basing sentences for economic crimes primarily
on "loss" has become the source of ongoing, complex, and proliferating
disputes about what the term "loss" really means and how it should
be interpreted in particular cases. The "loss" calculation is one of the
most frequently litigated issues in federal sentencing law.2 There are
at present splits of opinion between the federal circuits on at least
eleven analytically distinct issues concerning the meaning and appli-
cation of the "loss" concept.3 Even more significant than the identifi-
able circuit splits is the overall sense of uncertainty, confusion, and
sheer aggravation that emerges whenever lawyers and judges who
deal with federal economic crime discuss "loss."4
1. As described below in more detail, sentence length for both theft-like and fraud-like
crimes is determined largely by reference to "loss tables" appearing at U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BL.1(b)(1) (1997) (Theft) and § 2F1.l(b)(1) (Fraud) [hereinafter USSG].
See infra notes 110-32 and accompanying text.
2. An informal computer search of the Westlaw database for all federal appellate cases
(excluding the U.S. Supreme Court), conducted on August 15, 1997, revealed that the concept of
"loss" in either USSG section 2B1.1 or section 2F1.1 was discussed in 894 federal appellate
opinions dating from November 1987 to August 1997 (search result on file with author).
3. Describing each of these circuit splits in detail would consume more space than appro-
priate for a footnote. Among those discussed in this Article are differences of opinion over:
(1) whether "loss" is to be defined differently in theft and fraud cases, see infra notes 148-71 and
accompanying text; (2) whether "loss" can ever include so-called "consequential damages," see
infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text; (3) what "consequential damages" means in the loss
context, see infra notes 251-81 and accompanying text; (4) whether lost interest should be
included in "loss," see infra Part IV.B.2.f, (5) when "loss" should be measured, see infra notes
342-54, and accompanying text; (6) whether assets pledged as collateral must be credited
against "loss," see infra Part IV.C.2.a; (7) whether assets available to pay or paid as restitution
but not pledged as collateral by a defendant should be deducted from "loss," see infra notes 362-
74 and accompanying text; (8) whether money repaid before detection of the crime should be
deducted from "loss," see infra Part IV.C.2.b; (9) whether factual impossibility reduces "loss" to
zero, see infra notes 406-10 and accompanying text; (10) whether a defendant's criminal inten-
tions must have been realistic to be counted as "intended loss," see infra Part V.C.2; and (11)
whether intended loss can only be calculated by applying the attempt guideline, section 2X1.1,
see infra Part V.D.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F. Supp. 1176, 1182 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
affd, 114 F.3d 1173 (3d Cir. 1997) (Judge Dalzell referred with obvious exasperation to the task
of "construing the vaporous word loss"). The Second Circuit has described loss more circum-
spectly as "a flexible, fact-driven concept." United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 825 (3d. Cir. 1995)).
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As Special Counsel to the Sentencing Commission in 1995-96, I
was asked to examine the Federal Sentencing Guidelines relating to
economic crimes, as well as the cases and materials construing the
term "loss," for the purpose of identifying the problem areas and de-
termining whether some adjustments or definitional changes ought to
be considered.5 Since leaving the Commission, I have continued to
grapple with "loss." In the course of more than two years of reading
"loss" opinions penned by puzzled federal judges, and talking with
equally puzzled practitioners, several points have become clear.
First, the United States Sentencing Commission was undoubt-
edly correct in the basic judgment that the sentences of economic
criminals should be determined in significant part by the magnitude
and nature of the economic deprivation caused by their crimes. 6
Where the original Commission fell short of the ideal was in the
translation of a sound fundamental intuition into a just, doctrinally
coherent, reasonably easy-to-interpret set of rules. Since the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") first went into effect in 1987, the
Commission has amended guidelines provisions regarding property
crimes and "loss" many times.7 Regrettably, each amendment in the
series has been a patch designed to fix one small component of a
vehicle for sentencing economic criminals that was unwieldy and
imperfectly designed to begin with.
Second, although it is possible to view the many problems with
the existing economic crime guidelines as a collection of particular
technical difficulties to be addressed individually, this approach has
been tried and has proven the equivalent of trying to subdue an octo-
pus one tentacle at a time. No patchwork fix will suffice. Only a
virtually complete rewrite of the guidelines and application notes
regarding theft and fraud offers any hope of significantly ameliorating
5. The memorandum that resulted from my review was distilled into a request for
comment on 12 particular issues published by the Sentencing Commission in January 1997. See
Federal Register Notice BAC2210-4-, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 171-74 (1997) (identifying as issues for
comment: (1) changes in the loss tables of section 2B1.1 and section 2F1.1; (2) consolidation of
section 2B1.1 and section 2F1.1; (3) standard of causation; (4) market value as measurement of
loss; (5) consequential damages and administrative costs as components of loss; (6) inclusion of
interest in loss; (7) credit for benefits received by victims against the loss amount; (8) diversion
of government benefits; (9) whether pledged collateral should be credited against the loss
amount; (10) gain as an alternative measure of loss; (11) intended loss; (12) risk of loss; and
(13) loss amounts that over- or understate offense seriousness). This Article addresses all these
issues except changes in the loss tables.
6. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
7. The theft guideline, section 2B1.1, has been amended 13 times. See USSG App. C,
amends. 7, 99-101, 303, 312, 317, 361, 364, 481, 482, and 512. The fraud guidelines have also
been amended 13 times. See USSG App. C, amends. 30, 154-56, 303, 317, 364, 393, 470, 481,
482, and 513. In both cases, single amendments often effected multiple changes.
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the many problems of both substance and interpretation the current
guidelines spawn so regularly.
This Article has three objectives. First, it attempts to rethink
the sentencing of federal economic criminals in light of the basic pur-
poses of sentencing and of the Guidelines' particular structure and
objectives. Second, it examines the deficiencies in the current
sentencing guidelines regarding theft, fraud, and other economic
crimes, and the problem areas in the case law construing those guide-
lines. Third, it proposes and analyzes a consolidated guideline, to-
gether with accompanying application notes, for sentencing virtually
all theft and fraud cases (a draft of which follows the text of this
Article as Appendix A).8
The economic harm resulting from a defendant's crime is an
important factor in assessing offense seriousness, and therefore in
assigning just punishments. The proposed consolidated guideline
thus retains as a central component the concept of "loss." In addition,
however, it identifies and accounts separately for other sentencing
considerations that "loss" does not satisfactorily measure. In particu-
lar, the proposed guideline gives more attention to differences in
mental state among defendants and attempts to place greater weight
on harms not entirely captured in monetary measurements, such as
the number of victims and the fact that identical monetary losses may
have dramatically different effects on different victims.
The centerpiece of the reform proposed here is a redefinition of
"loss." The current "definition" of loss is in truth no definition at all,
but a hodgepodge of ill-fitting concepts drawn from such diverse
sources as the elements of common law larceny and the remedies
provisions of the law of contracts. Consistent with long-accepted
principles of criminal liability and with the principles that animate
the Guidelines themselves, loss should be redefined in terms of the
required causal relationship between the defendant's criminal conduct
and the pecuniary harms that result. A defendant should be held
responsible at sentencing for economic harms that were caused in fact
by his criminal conduct, and that were reasonably foreseeable by him.
In addition, because of the complex character of many federal eco-
nomic crimes, establishing a doctrinally coherent core definition of
loss is necessary but not sufficient to meet the practical needs of sen-
8. As is true of the current theft and fraud guidelines, many of the significant aspects of
the proposed consolidated guideline appear in the application notes, rather than in the guideline
text. For ease of reference, and unless otherwise specified, in this Article any reference to the
proposed consolidated economic crimes guideline should be understood to embrace both the
proposed guideline and the proposed application notes.
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tencing courts. Consequently, the proposed consolidated guideline
goes further and sets out specific rules applying the core definition to
particular problems such as the identity of the "victim(s)" of economic
crime, the inclusion of interest, the time at which loss should be
measured, the issue of a defendant's gain, and the question of net
versus gross loss. Finally, the Article-and the proposed guideline-
address the most common difficulties posed by the concept of
"intended loss."
I have no illusions that the proposals made here will be the
last word on the punishment of federal economic crime, or even on the
conundrum of "loss." The problem is too complicated and my powers
too modest. However, there is good reason to believe that the
Sentencing Commission is moving toward meaningful change. On
October 15, 1997, and March 5, 1998, the Commission held public
hearings on economic crime sentencing and the definition of loss.9
Representatives of the judiciary, the defense bar, probation officers,
and the Department of Justice testified, and the proposals in this
Article were placed before the Commission. Since the October hear-
ing, Commission staff members have been working actively in collabo-
ration with prosecutors, judges, probation officers, and the defense
bar to develop a revised theft/fraud guideline for the Commission's
consideration. Although as this Article goes to press the outcome of
that process remains uncertain, I hope the suggestions contained in
this Article will assist in producing an improved set of rules for sen-
tencing the economic criminal.
9. Witnesses at the October 15, 1997 hearing were Judge Gerald E. Rosen, on behalf of
the Judicial Conference's Committee on Criminal Law, James E. Felman, on behalf of the
Practitioners' Advisory Group, Gregory A. Hunt, on behalf of the Probation Officers' Advisory
Group, and Frank 0. Bowman, I. See 66 U.S.L.W. 2278 (Nov. 11, 1997) (summary of hearing
testimony); 10 FED. SFNTENCING REP. 157 (NOV.-DEC. 1997) (edited transcript of hearing).
Written statements from the witnesses are available at <<http://www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm>>,
under "Hearing Transcripts and Testimony Regarding Sentencing Guideline Amendments."
Witnesses at the March 5, 1998, hearing included Katrina Pflaumer, U.S. Attorney; W.D.
Washington; Mary Spearing, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S. Department of Justice; defense attor-
neys Mark Flanagan, David Axelrod, Gerald Goldstein, and Ephraim Margolin, as well as Frank
0. Bowman, m. For a transcript of the hearing and written statements of the witnesses, see
<<http/www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm>>. The hearing testimony is summarized in 8 Fed.
Sentencing Guide, No. 24, at 1 (Roger W. Haines, Jr., and Jennifer Woll, eds. Mar. 30, 1998).
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II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND ECONOMIc CRIME:
A PRIMER
A. The Role of Sentencing Purpose in Sentencing the
Economic Criminal
A purely theoretical discussion about the punishment of crimes
of dishonest acquisition might devote considerable space to the claims
of competing philosophies of punishment, considering, for example,
the relative merits of rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, incapaci-
tation, reprobation, and restitution. Likewise, an abstract discussion
might compare the relative virtues and demerits of determinate and
indeterminate sentencing systems as vehicles for passing judgment on
the economic criminal. However, the object here is not to write on a
blank slate, but to analyze and propose improvements to an existing
system. The analysis here works within the fundamental philosophi-
cal approach taken by the Guidelines, which is to say a virtual aban-
donment of the rehabilitative or medical model of sentencing0 in favor
of a designedly imprecise amalgam of "just deserts" retributivism and
utilitarian "crime control" theories of deterrence and incapacitation. 11
This is not, however, to suggest that considerations of purpose
in sentencing must be abandoned except at the level of gross general-
10. For a general discussion of the federal sentence reform movement that, in general, re-
jected the rehabilitative model of sentencing and produced the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
see Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680-92; Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988); and Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223
(1993).
11. In the section of the Guidelines Manual headed "The Basic Approach," the Sentencing
Commission states:
A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the
differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment. Most observers of the
criminal law agree that the ultimate aim of the law itself, and of punishment in particu-
lar, is the control of crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus seems to break
down. Some argue that appropriate punishment should be defined primarily on the ba-
sis of the principle of 'just deserts,"... Others argue that punishment should be im-
posed primarily on the basis of practical "crime control" considerations. This theory
calls for sentences that most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime, either by
deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.
Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to choose between
them and accord one primacy over the other. As a practical matter, this choice was un-
necessary because in most sentencing decisions the application of either philosophy will
produce the same or similar results.
USSG ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1995).
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ity contained in Chapter One of the Guidelines.12 Professor Marc
Miller correctly insists that "[p]urposes ought to play a dominant role
in shaping the sentence in each case."13 In developing a guidelines
system, this sensible admonition should manifest itself in two ways.
First, the Commission should carefully and explicitly consider sen-
tencing purposes in creating the guidelines for each category of of-
fense. Second, sentencing judges should consider purpose when set-
ting an individual criminal's sentence within the range prescribed by
the Guidelines. 14
It is here that the Commission can sensibly be criticized for its
work in creating (and repeatedly amending) the guidelines for the
sentencing of economic crime. As we will see, the Guidelines account
for a surprisingly large number of the factors one would want to see
considered in sentencing of the economic criminal. The difficulty is
that a failure to think through and articulate those sentencing pur-
poses peculiar to economic crime has produced a package of sentenc-
ing provisions that is excellent in parts, but overall rather like
Winston Churchill's description of an inferior pudding--"it has no
theme."15
This Article proceeds from the following postulates, which are
at the least consistent with the Sentencing Reform Act and the under-
standings of the framers of the Guidelines: (1) A criminal sentence
should be no longer than morally justifiable by principles of just de-
serts; (2) the precise sentence below that maximum should be set by
considering the utilitarian goals of deterrence, incapacitation, reha-
bilitation, restitution, and reprobation; and (3) which utilitarian goal
will predominate will vary depending on the type of crime (and some-
times on the category of offender within crime type). The objective is
not a universally applicable hierarchy of sentencing values. It is the
12. See id.
13. Marc Miller, Purposes At Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 463 (1992).
14. Professor Miller has proposed a gradualist approach to an increasing integration of
purpose into the Guidelines sentencing process. He suggests that the Commission develop
"purpose-based guidelines" which would encourage judges to begin the development of a
"common law of purposes," upon which the Commission might then rely to develop more
detailed purpose-based guidelines for particular offenses and offenders. Id. at 477-78. I confess
to some skepticism that such a sophisticated feedback loop could be created or sustained be-
tween the judges and the Commission. The tone of Professor Miller's article suggests that he
was sadly conscious even in 1992 that his proposals would require more of the participants in
the federal sentencing system than they were likely to provide. See id. at 478-80.
15. "Take away that pudding-it has no theme." Attributed to Winston S. Churchill, in
LORD HOME, WAY THE WIND BLows Ch. 16 (1976), quoted in, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF QUOTATIONS 100 (Angela Partington, ed. 1994).
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articulation of sentencing rules with a rational connection to those
sentencing purposes which predominate in each category of offense.'6
B. The Centrality of Offense Seriousness to the Guidelines Regime
In describing its basic approach to drafting the Guidelines, the
original Sentencing Commission emphasized the importance of retri-
bution and crime control, but refused to "accord one primacy over the
other" because, in the Commission's view, in most cases the two ap-
proaches produce roughly equal sentencing results.17 The Commission
was correct to this extent at least-both retributive and crime control
sentencing theories ordinarily prescribe more stringent penalties for
more serious crimes. 8 The retributivist says that one who commits a
serious crime "deserves" a serious penalty. Likewise, the more seri-
ous the crime, the greater society's need to deter it. And by the logic
of deterrence, the more severe the punishment, the greater the deter-
rent effect, both general and specific. Similarly, where there is a risk
of recidivism, the more serious the crime, the more acute is the need
to incapacitate the criminal and thereby protect the public from
future transgressions. Finally, if one considers reprobation a separate
justification for punishment (rather than merely a description of a
type of general deterrence or an explanation of why the public sham-
ing component of punishment is deserved), a scheme that gives pow-
erful object lessons in the community's shared values by imposing
stern penalties for notably reprehensible crimes also serves reprobat-
ive ends. 9 Thus, a prerequisite to implementation of all these objec-
16. This approach derives in part from H.L.A. Hart's distinction between the general justi-
fying aim of punishment (which he considered to be crime control) and the rationale for
allocation of punishments of differing severity among convicted offenders. See H.L.A. Hart,
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (1968). It owes a good deal to the work of Andrew von Hirsch and the
members of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration reported in ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). It is closely related to the approach
described by Professor Ashworth of "declar[ing] a primary rationale [for punishment],
and ... provid[ing] that in certain types of case[s] one or another rationale might be given
priority." ANDREw ASHWoRTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 59 (1994).
17. See USSG ch. 1, pt. A(2) (1996).
18. Whether the Commission was correct that retributive and crime control approaches
would produce equivalent outcomes in "most sentencing decisions," id. ch. 1, pt. A(3), is debat-
able. For example, one might conclude that the moral seriousness of high volume drug traffick-
ing crimes, as measured by the social harms they cause, is so great that very long sentences are
"deserved" in all such cases. On the other hand, one might also conclude that the objective of
crime control would be best served by imposing somewhat shorter sentences than have now
become the norm in such cases. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 740-45.
19. The "reprobative" or "expressive" function of punishment is described in VON HIRSCH,
supra note 16, at 48-49, and sources cited therein. See also Bowman, supra note 10, at 742-43
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tives in a guidelines regime is the creation of a means of measuring
the seriousness of offenses. 20
A crime occurs when there is a volitional act attended by a
culpable mental state which causes, or at least risks causing, a
harm.21 All these concepts-act, mental state, cause, and harm-are
relevant both to the threshold question of the existence of criminal
liability and to the assessment of offense seriousness. 22  When we
rank the severity of crimes, we focus not on any one of these elements,
but on their interaction. Likewise, the relative importance of the
basic components of criminal liability to judgments about offense
seriousness varies among different categories of crime. For example,
all grades of homicide are directed at the same harm, the death of a
human being.2 The difference between the statutory degrees of homi-
cide is almost purely a question of culpable mental state. By contrast,
the mental state of all larcenies (and indeed of most simple property
crimes) is some variant of an intent to permanently deprive an owner
of his property; historically, statutory grades of the offense differ
according to the value of the property stolen, a factor predominantly
related to harm.24
Both when discussing the imposition of criminal liability and
when ranking offense seriousness, we tend to lump the first three
components of a crime-act, mental state, and cause--into the single
concept of fault or blameworthiness.25 The idea of fault often em-
braces still another consideration-those circumstances or character-
istics of the individual defendant relevant to his capacity or disposi-
(discussing the reprobative function of punishment in connection with drug offenses sentenced
under the Guidelines).
20. The goal of rehabilitation, by contrast, does not necessarily dictate an invariable pro-
portionality between severity of crime and severity of sentence.
21. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 16-19, 185-90 (2d ed. 1960).
22. "[Tlhe assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime charged
has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both in determining the ele-
ments of the offense and in determining the appropriate punishment." Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
23. This analysis excludes the special case of capital murder where harms other than the
decedents death may be aggravating factors, proof of which is necessary for imposition of the
death sentence. See id. at 820, 824-25; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1976).
24. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing the multiple functions of the
loss measurement).
25. For example, if A, by pure inadvertence unattended by negligence, acts and sets in
train a sequence of events that causes B's death, we say the harm to B that indisputably re-
sulted from A's conduct is "not A's fault." Similarly, ifA passionately desires to kill B and lays a
deadly snare, but B dies in a motor accident before reaching the trap, we also say that B's death
is "not A's fault." In the first case, we really mean that, despite the fact that A's act caused B's
death, no fault or blame attaches to A because he lacked a guilty mind. In the second case, we
mean that, despite A's guilty mind, his actions did not cause the death.
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tion to make culpable choices. The question of individual capacities
and circumstances arises both in determining the existence of any
criminal liability (as in the case of insanity26) and in assessing offense
seriousness and appropriate punishment (as with diminished mental
capacity 27 and voluntary intoxication, 28 which often mitigate offense
severity even where they are not complete defenses to liability).
Moreover, judges have historically considered many of a defendant's
personal characteristics-age, family history, socioeconomic back-
ground, mental condition short of insanity, alcohol or drug addiction,
physical condition, educational level, employment history, family
responsibilities, and the like-that are relevant to the choice of sen-
tence within the legally allowable range because these characteristics
have been thought to render a defendant more or less blameworthy
for his bad choices and the resultant harms.29
A guidelines sentencing system whose philosophical underpin-
nings confer pivotal importance on offense seriousness must, there-
fore, contain mechanisms to account for harm (including risk of harm)
and the four components of fault (act, mental state, cause, and re-
sponsibility) as they manifest themselves and interact in different
categories of crime.30
C. The General Structure of the Guidelines
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, in a sense, nothing
more than a set of instructions for one chart-the Sentencing Table.31
26. See M1Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) (holding defendant not criminally re-
sponsible if insane).
27. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTI W. ScOrr, Ji., CRMINAL LAw § 4.7, at 368-76 (2d ed.
1986) (noting that diminished capacity can exonerate a defendant from criminal responsibility
in some jurisdictions where defendant's mental condition is admissible as to all types and
grades of offenses on the question of whether the defendant had the mental state that is an
element of the crime charged, but may only mitigate the seriousness of the offense of conviction
in other jurisdictions where defendant's mental condition is admissible only as to certain more
serious offenses).
28. See id. at 387-92 (noting that voluntary intoxication is often permitted as a defense to
negate so-called "specific" culpable mental states requiring knowledge or intent, but not the
"general" mental states of negligence or recklessness required of lesser grades of the same
crime).
29. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 684-85 (discussing individualized sentencing before the
Guidelines); id. at 707-14 (discussing permissible uses of individualizing factors under the
Guidelines).
30. For a stimulating critique of the idea that sentences should be based primarily on
offense seriousness, see Russell M. Coombs, Perfecting a Blunder: Redefining Loss as the Main
Gauge of Federal Sentences for Theft and Fraud, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 152 (Nov.-Dec. 1997)
(arguing that to maximize crime control, sentences should be based primarily on offender
characteristics).
31. See USSG ch. 5, pt. A.
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The goal of guidelines calculations is to arrive at numbers for the
vertical (offense level) and horizontal (criminal history category) axes
on the Sentencing Table grid, which in turn generate an intersection
in the body of the grid. Each such intersection designates a sentenc-
ing range expressed in months. For example, a defendant whose of-
fense level is 26 and whose criminal history category is I would be
subject to a sentencing range of 63-78 months.32
The criminal history calculation reflected on the horizontal
axis of the Sentencing Table is a rough effort to determine a defen-
dant's disposition to criminality, as indicated by the number and na-
ture of his prior contacts with the criminal law. The basic unit of
measurement in this calculation is prior sentences imposed for mis-
demeanors and felonies.33
The offense level reflected on the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table is a measurement of the seriousness of the present
crime. In general, the offense level calculation begins with the crime
of which the defendant was actually convicted. The court must de-
termine, primarily by reference to the "Statutory Index," 4 which
guideline in Chapter Two ("Offense Conduct") applies to that crime.
Most Chapter Two offense conduct guidelines contain two basic com-
ponents: a "base offense level'--a seriousness ranking based purely
on the fact of conviction for a particular statutory violation-and a set
of "specific offense characteristics." The "specific offense characteris-
tics" represent an effort to categorize and account for commonly oc-
curring factors that cause us to think of one crime as worse than an-
other. They "customize" the crime. For example, the Guidelines dif-
ferentiate between a theft of $1,000 and a theft of $1,000,000, 35 or be-
tween a bank robbery where the robber hands the teller a note, and a
robbery where the robber pistol whips the teller and shoots the bank
guard.36
Once the court determines an offense level by applying the
offense conduct rules from Chapter Two, it considers a series of other
possible adjustments contained in Chapter Three. These include
increases in the offense level based on factors such as the defendant's
32. See id. By statute, the top end of the range can be no more than 25% higher than the
bottom end. For discussion of the "25% rule," see Bowman, supra note 10, at 691 n.49, 712-13.
33. See USSG chapter 4 for the rules regarding calculation of criminal history category.
34. See USSG App. A (Statutory Index).
35. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (reflecting an increase in offense level of 2 for a theft of more than
$1,000 and increase of 13 for a theft of more than $800,000).
36. See id. § 2B3.1(bX3) (reflecting possible increases of up to 11 offense levels for the use
of a weapon and causing injuries in the course of a robbery).
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role in the offense, 37 whether the defendant engaged in obstruction of
justice,38 commission of an offense against a government official39 or a
particularly vulnerable victim, 40 and the existence of multiple counts
of conviction.41 The court may also reduce the offense level based on a
defendant's "mitigating role" in the offense42 or on his so-called
"acceptance of responsibility."43
Once the court has determined the offense level on the vertical
axis and the criminal history category on the horizontal axis, it can
determine the sentencing range. The judge retains largely unfettered
discretion to sentence within that range. 4 However, in order to go
above or below the range, to "depart," the judge must explain why,
and must couch the explanation in terms of factors for which the
Guidelines do not adequately account already.45 Moreover, except in
unusual circumstances, the Guidelines specifically exclude from con-
sideration, for purposes of departing outside the guideline range, most
of those factors, such as age, employment record, or family ties, that
judges formerly used to individualize sentences. 46
37. See id. § 3BI.1 (the defendant's offense level can be enhanced by either 2, 3, or 4 levels
depending on the degree of control he exercised over the criminal enterprise and on the size of
that enterprise).
38. See id. § 3C1.1, application note 3 (obstruction of justice includes conduct such as
threatening witnesses, suborning perjury, producing false exculpatory documents, destroying
evidence, and failing to appear as ordered for trial).
39. See id. § 3A1.2.
40. See id. § 3AI.1 (creating an enhancement where a victim was selected on the basis of
"race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation" and in
the case of a victim "unusually vulnerable due to age, [or] physical or mental condition").
41. See id. ch. 3, pt. D.
42. See id. § 3B1.2 (allowing 2 or 4 level decreases in offense level if defendant found to be
a "minor participant" or "minimal participant" in the criminal activity).
43. Id. § 3E1.1 (allowing reduction of 2 offense levels where defendant "clearly demon-
strates acceptance of responsibility," and an additional offense level if otherwise applicable
offense level is a least 16 and defendant has "assisted authorities in the investigation or prose-
cution of his own misconduct" by taking certain steps). Despite the euphemism "acceptance of
responsibility," section 3E1.1 is simply an institutionalized incentive for guilty pleas.
44. See id. § 5Cl.l(a) (stating that "[a] sentence conforms with the guidelines for imprison-
ment if it is within the minimum and maximum terms of the applicable guideline range").
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); USSG § 5K2.0.
46. Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines lists factors that the Commission determined to be
"not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the
applicable guideline range." USSG ch. 5, pt. H commentary. These include age, see id. § 5H1.1
(1995), educational and vocational skills, see id. § 5H1.2, mental and emotional conditions, see
id. § 5H1.3, physical condition, see id. § 5H1.4, history of substance abuse, see id. § 5H1.4,
employment record, see id. § 5H1.5, family or community ties, see id. § 5H1.6, socioeconomic
status, see id. § 5H1.10, military record, see id. § 5H1.11, history of charitable good works, see
id., and "[l]ack of guidance as a youth," id. § 5H1.12. In theory, most of these factors nonethe-
less can justify a departure, but such a departure is permissible only where the excluded factor
is present to a degree so unusual that the Commission would not have anticipated its impact




Finally, the Sentencing Commission created "relevant con-
duct."47 A thorough discussion of relevant conduct is beyond the scope
of this Article, but the essence of the concept is that the court can,
indeed must, sentence each defendant based on what he really did as
part of the same transaction or series of related transactions that
resulted in the count of conviction, regardless of the specific offense of
which a defendant is convicted after trial or as a result of a plea.
The inclusion in the Guidelines of the relevant conduct con-
cept, the customization of sentences through "specific offense charac-
teristics" not included in the elements of the offense of conviction, and
the rules governing sentences for multiple counts of conviction, when
taken together, transformed what would otherwise have been a pre-
dominantly "charge of conviction" system into a "modified real of-
fense" system.48 The "modified real offense" character of the system is
of considerable importance in understanding the Guidelines' approach
to sentencing economic crimes.
In general, therefore, and consistent with their philosophical
premises, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines focus pervasively on
offense seriousness. The explicit numerical yardstick of offense seri-
ousness, the vertical "Offense Level" axis of the sentencing grid, has
forty-three levels, while the horizontal "Criminal History" axis has
only six. Because the sentencing range increases by equal increments
along either axis, offense level customarily has a far greater effect on
sentence than does criminal history.
D. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Economic Offender
1. Sentencing the Economic Criminal: Some History
Creating a sentencing scheme for economic criminals prose-
cuted in federal courts presents greater difficulties than assigning
47. The term "relevant conduct" and its applications to guideline calculations are enumer-
ated in USSG § 1B1.3. For a general discussion of relevant conduct and its function in the
guidelines system, see William W. Wilkins Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1990); see also Bowman,
supra note 10, at 702-03.
48. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sears, Defense Practice Under the Bail Reform Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines-A Shifting Focus, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 38, 40 (categorizing
the sentencing process under the Guidelines as a process based on "'real offense' behavior
rather than the offense of conviction"). But see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1505-12 (1993) (asserting that the Guidelines are
actually a charged offense system).
1998] 475
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:461
sentences to those who commit crimes against persons. The first of
these difficulties might be termed "historical." The common law, and
more particularly the body of Anglo-American statutory law that
evolved from it, created a plethora of legal categories for crimes
against persons that assigned offense seriousness rankings based
primarily on only two of the factors previously discussed: the culpable
mental state of the defendant and the degree of harm caused to the
victim. For example, if A strikes B, the statutory law of most states
stands ready to receive A into one of nine or more pre-defined catego-
ries ranging from capital murder to misdemeanor assault. If B dies
from the blow, there are as many as six kinds of homicide, distin-
guished from each other primarily by different culpable mental
states.49 If B lives, there will generally be at least three types of as-
sault charges available, usually differentiated by the degree of
physical harm caused (or sometimes merely risked) to the victim and
by the type of weapon employed.0
By contrast, in early law there were several different crimes of
dishonest acquisition, but little or no difference in degree between
them. Many historians believe that at earliest common law, all larce-
nies (the only property crime recognized for many years in England)
were felonies and punishable by death.51 By 1275, larceny was
49. First degree murder generally involves both an intentional killing and some form of
premeditation. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1Xa) (1997). Second degree murder,
where it exists, is usually either a "knowing" killing, see, e.g., id. § 18-3-103(1), or one carried
out purposefully, but without premeditation, see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050(1)(a)
(1995). Manslaughter is usually of two types, voluntary, which customarily denotes some form
of "heat of passion," see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-35 (1995); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(lXb)
(1980), or involuntary, which usually means "reckless," see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36 (1995);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(a) (1980). Many states also have some form of criminally
negligent homicide. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-105 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.32.070 (West Supp. 1997-1998) (defining manslaughter in the second degree as causing the
death of another person "with criminal negligence"). In states with the death penalty, the state
is required to prove the highest form of culpable homicide plus one or more aggravating factors.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1997).
50. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West Supp. 1997-1998) (first degree
assault committed where defendant "with intent to inflict great bodily harm" assaults victim
with deadly weapon, administers poison, or inflicts great bodily harm); id. § 9A.36.021 (defining
second degree assault as assault committed where defendant administers poison with intent to
inflict bodily harm, inflicts substantial bodily harm, or assaults victim with a deadly weapon);
id. § 9A-36.030 (defining third degree assault as involving less harm and less dangerous weap-
ons than required in first and second degree assaults). Because the presence or dangerousness
of a weapon is considered to demonstrate a willingness to inflict the sort of harm that can be
caused by dangerous or deadly weapons, it functions as a proxy for measuring blameworthiness.
51. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD M. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 290 (3d ed. 1982)
("Under the early law felonies were punishable by death, and larceny was a common law
felony."). Professor Roger Groot, one of the leading authorities on 12th and 13th century
English criminal practice, see, e.g., Roger D. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1982), tells me that his study of English plea rolls from the thirteenth century
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divided into grand and petit larceny depending on the value of the
goods stolen; both crimes were felonies, but only the former was
punished with death.52  In the 1700s, Parliament enacted statutes
creating the crimes of false pretenses 53 and embezzlement, both of
which were "misdemeanors" though punishable by penalties we would
now consider appropriate to "felonies."55 Modern codes generally
consolidate the various types of property crimes into the single crime
of "theft," each of the old familiar categories becoming now but a
different method of committing the same offense.56  There are
generally only two or three degrees of theft, with the primary
distinction between the degrees being the value of the thing stolen.57
In addition, modern state penal codes include crimes such as
robbery, burglary, or extortion that customarily involve stealing in
reveals a de facto division of larceny cases into offenses meriting hanging and those that did not,
predating the formal creation of grand and petit larceny categories in the Statute of
Westminster of 1275. Professor Groot says that, as early as the 1240s, defendants often were
not subjected to the normal criminal process when they stole "petty things." Telephone
Interview with Roger D. Groot (October 1997).
52. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 51, at 335 nn.4 & 5.
53. See 30 Geo. U, c. 24, § 1 (1757), reprinted in 8 UK Stat. 73 (1948).
54. See 39 Geo. IlI, c. 85 (1799), reprinted in 18 UJK Stat. 175 (1948).
55. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 51, at 363-64 (describing the history of the law of
false pretenses and quoting the first false pretenses statute as imposing penalties of fine,
imprisonment, the pillory, or transportation for seven years); id. at 352 n.6 (noting that the
punishment for embezzlement under the 1799 statute was transportation not to exceed 14
years).
56. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 27, § 8.8(c), at 760-61 (noting that the American
criminal system merged crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses into a single
category, usually referred to as "theft"); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 51, at 390-91 (discussing
the merger phenomenon as it occurred in California and New York).
57. For example, in Delaware, theft is generally either a Class G felony or a Class A
misdemeanor, depending on whether the property taken is worth more or less than $500. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 841 (1995). Washington divides theft into three degrees based pri-
marily on the value of the thing taken. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.030(1)(a) (West
Supp. 1997-1998); id. § 9A.56.040(l)(a); id. § 9A.56.050(1) (West 1988). Also in Washington, first
and second degree theft are felonies; third degree theft is a gross misdemeanor. Colorado
divides theft into four degrees based on the value of the thing taken; there are two felony and
two misdemeanor classifications. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401(2) (1997).
Some states have special laws dealing with bad checks, receiving stolen property, and other
variants of simple thievery. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.060 (West 1988) (stating
that the crime of unlawful issuance of bank checks is a Class C felony when the amount of the
check or checks exceeds $250, but a misdemeanor if the amount is $250 or less); id.
§§ 9A.56.150-9A.56.170 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997-1998) (the crimes of possession of stolen
property in the first, second, and third degree are divided into same degrees as theft based on
same dollar amounts). However, such offenses are customarily divided into the same number of
degrees as is theft itself based on the amount of the bad check or the value of the stolen prop-
erty. See id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4410 (1997) (stating that theft by receiving is
divided into the same degrees as theft, based on value of stolen property received).
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some form.58 Statutes often divide these crimes into degrees, but the
focus of the offenses is less on economic harm than on invasions of
other interests59-the sanctity of the home, the risk of physical vio-
lence, the threat to people, property, or reputation implicit in extor-
tion. Accordingly, the factors establishing the relative seriousness of
the statutory degrees of burglary, robbery, and extortion are almost
exclusively noneconomic. The difference between simple and aggra-
vated robbery is the presence or absence of a weapon.60 The difference
between first and second degree burglary is most often the presence of
a weapon or the commission of an assault during the crime.6'
Notably absent from the traditional ranking calculus of eco-
nomic crimes is any consideration of mental state or of the nature and
quality of the acts which make up the crime. Of course, imposition of
liability requires proof of both a culpable mental state and some vol-
untary act. However, the mental state necessary to almost all simple
theft-type crimes is some variant of an intent to steal, defraud, or
otherwise deprive the owner of the use or benefit of his property.62 No
statutes distinguish between more and less reprehensible degrees of
larcenous intentionality. Similarly, theft-type statutes prohibit a host
58. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.52.020 (West 1988) (burglary); id. § 9A.56.110
(extortion).
59. See, e.g., id. §§ 9A.52.020 (defining burglary to include illegal entry made for the
purpose of committing a nonproperty crime); id. § 9A.56.110 (defining extortion to include
obtaining by threat either property or services, including sexual favors); see also United States
v. Couch, 65 F.3d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1995) (observing that the guideline for burglary has a
higher base offense level than the theft guideline because "criminal activity that takes place in a
dwelling or structure carries with it an increased risk of encountering innocent people and
causing physical and psychological injuries").
60. Compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.200(1) (West 1988) (stating that first
degree robbery is defined as robbery in which defendant is armed with or displays a deadly
weapon or inflicts bodily injury), with id. § 9A.56.210(1) ("A person is guilty of robbery in the
second degree if he commits robbery.").
61. Compare, e.g., id. § 9A.52.020 (stating that first degree burglary is committed where
the defendant enters a dwelling and is armed with a deadly weapon or assaults any person
therein), with id. § 9A.56.030 (stating that second degree burglary is committed where the
defendant unlawfully enters building with intent to commit a crime therein); COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-4-202(1) (1997) (stating that first degree burglary is committed when the defendant enters a
building or occupied structure with intent to commit a crime therein and assaults or menaces
another person or is armed with a deadly weapon), with id. § 18-4-203 (stating that second
degree burglary is committed when the defendant breaks into, enters, or remains unlawfully in
a building with intent to commit a crime therein).
62. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMNAL LAw § 32.07, at 518-19 (2d ed.
1995) (stating that the required mental state for larceny is intent to steal); id. § 32.09[B], at 524
(describing the required mental state for embezzlement); id. §32.10[A], at 525 (describing the
required mental state for false pretenses as intent to defraud).
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of means by which victims may be relieved of their property, but
method is not a factor in ranking such crimes. 63
This pattern of historical development has produced a variety
of well-developed, long-recognized statutory guideposts for distin-
guishing between more and less serious crimes against persons, but
only one recognized, commonly codified determinant of the degree of
seriousness of economic crimes-the value of the thing stolen. Why
has this simple, and seemingly simplistic, approach to categorizing
economic crimes persisted? The probable answer is that it suited the
theft cases that predominated in the developing law of England before
very recent times, and that continue to predominate in most
American state courts. As George Fletcher has observed, early theft
law, both in England and on the European continent, concerned itself
largely with cases of "manifest thievery," that is, cases that look and
feel like the paradigm of a thief seizing one's goods by stealth and
carrying them away.6 Despite being the source of endless headaches
to generations of judges, lawyers, and law students, the common law
and early statutory crimes like larceny by trick, embezzlement, and
false pretenses that developed to fill perceived gaps in the early law of
larceny65 were nonetheless directed at conduct instinctively identifi-
able as stealing. Even today, the vast majority of economic crimes
adjudicated in state courts remain very close to the classic model of
manifest thievery or its early offshoots: The defendant stole a car,
picked a pocket, tapped a till, wrote a dud check, or doctored the
books, and it is easy to figure out what was stolen, from whom, and
how much it was worth.66 The defendant's methods were unremark-
63. For instance, the consolidated Colorado theft statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-401
(1997), prohibits direct taking of property from another, obtaining control over property by
threat or by deception, knowing use, concealment, or abandonment of the property of another,
and unlawfully demanding compensation for the return of another's property, all within the
same statute.
64. See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 476-81
(1976) (describing the concepts of manifest thievery in Roman, biblical, early English, and other
Indo-European legal traditions).
65. See id, at 502-20 (describing the evolution of statutory law with respect to larceny); see
also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 2.1 to 2.4, at 59-113 (1978) (tracing
the history and development of modern larceny).
66. Of the 989,007 inmates in the custody of State correctional authorities in 1995,
230,300 prisoners (23.3% of the total population) were incarcerated for property offenses.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 9-
10 tbls. 1.11, 1.12 (1997). Of this total, 10.9% were incarcerated for burglary, 4.8% for larceny,
2.6% for fraud, 2.2% for vehicle theft, and 2.7% for miscellaneous property crimes such as
receiving stolen property, destruction of property, etc. Of the crimes reported to state police,
larceny-theft offenses constitute over 50% of all the crimes in the following categories: murder,
forcible rape, robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 3.116 (1993), Table 3.103
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able, and his state of mind was patent and effectively indistinguish-
able from that of virtually all other such offenders. In these simple
circumstances, the value of the thing taken is not a bad proxy for the
extent of the injury caused or threatened by the defendant's behavior,
and is thus a good indicator of the relative seriousness of the crime.
By contrast, there are hundreds of federal economic crimes. Of
the roughly 970 criminal statutes listed in the Statutory Index to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, s7 some 250 of them are sentenced
using either the theft guideline, section 2B1.1, or the fraud guideline,
section 2F1.1.68 This total does not include the federal versions of
crimes such as burglary,6 9 robbery,70 extortion,71 blackmail,72 bribery,73
or criminal copyright infringement,74 all of which are also crimes of
dishonest acquisition. 75
Federal economic crimes also cover an immense range of dis-
parate conduct and implicate an array of interests beyond those of
easily identifiable victims in readily quantifiable amounts of money,
goods, or services. Federal criminal laws protect the integrity of
commodities markets7s and prohibit the sale of unregistered securities
through the mail.77 They punish removal, disturbance, or destruction
of the "graves, relics, or other evidences of an ancient civilization,"78
and the removal of documents relating to claims against the United
States.79 They prohibit counterfeiting United States currency,8° the
obligations of foreign countries,8' and the papers of ships.8 2 More
(1994), and Table 3.119 (1995). The average property loss (in dollars) incurred for larceny-theft
excluding motor vehicle theft ranged from $483 (1993) to $505 (1995). Id.
67. The Statutory Index to the Guidelines lists almost all the federal statutory provisions
prescribing criminal penalties. See USSG app. A (1997). It contains a separate entry for each
separately chargeable statutory subsection. The list "specifies the guideline section or sections
ordinarily applicable to the statute of conviction." Id. at 417.
68. See id. app. A.
69. See id. § 2B2.1.
70. See id. § 2B3.1.
71. See id. § 2133.2.
72. See id. § 2B3.3.
73. See id. § 2B4.1.
74. See id. § 2B5.3.
75. The Guidelines provisions for all of these crimes incorporate enhancements for loss.
76. See 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (restricting commodities futures trading and foreign transac-
tions).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 114 (1994).
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 285 (1994).
80. See id. § 471.
81. See id. § 479 (prohibiting making, altering, or counterfeiting with intent to defraud
obligations of foreign governments).
82. See id. § 507 (prohibiting falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, or altering registries,
licenses, passes, permits, and other ship's papers).
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familiarly, federal law punishes theft and embezzlement from
federally insured banks," and criminalizes every "scheme or artifice
to defraud" carried out by means of either the U.S. Mail 4 or interstate
wire communications, 5 or directed at any health care benefit
program.6
Moreover, penalty levels for federal economic crimes vary
widely and conform to no discernible pattern. The maximum penal-
ties for federal economic crimes range from misdemeanor levels of a
year or less,87 to five years per count of conviction for wire and mail
fraud,88 to thirty years for bank fraud,89 to life imprisonment for con-
ducting a "continuing financial crimes enterprise."90 These penalties
are not tied to an overall ranking scheme, such as those nearly uni-
versal in state systems, where the legislature creates a limited set of
offense categories (e.g., "Class 1," "Class 2," "Class 3") and assigns
every crime in the criminal code to one of the categories.91 Such a
scheme embraces all types of crime and incorporates legislative judg-
ments about the relative seriousness of different offenses. By com-
parison, penalty ranges for federal economic offenses seem almost
whimsical, owing more to the political enthusiasms of the moment
they were enacted than to any reasoned effort to compare the relative
seriousness of different crimes.92
83. See id. § 656 (regarding theft, embezzlement or misapplication by bank officers and
employees).
84. See id § 1341.
85. See id. § 1343.
86. See id. § 1347.
87. See, e.g., id. § 656 (providing that the penalty for embezzlement of less than $1000 by
a bank employee or officer shall be a fine, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both).
88. Id. §§ 1341, 1343 (providing that the penalty for wire or mail fraud shall not exceed
five years).
89. See id. § 1344 (providing that penalty for bank fraud shall be a $1 million fine, or 30
years imprisonment, or both).
90. Id. § 225(a).
91. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (1997) (categorizing felonies into six classes); id.§ 18-1-106 (classifying misdemeanors into three classes); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.010
(West 1988) (categorizing felonies into three classes and misdemeanors into two classes).
92. A notable recent example of the overweening effect of current events on federal
criminal sentences is the fourfold, then sixfold, increase in the maximum penalty for bank
embezzlement, from five years to 20 years in 1989, and from 20 years to 30 years in 1990,
enacted by a Congress in the grip of the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s. Compare 18
U.S.C. § 656 (1988) (setting maximum sentence for theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by
bank officer or employee at five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine), with Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(1989) (increasing maximum fine for violation of section 656 from $5,000 to $1 million, and
maximum term of imprisonment from five years to 20 years), and Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1797 (1994) (increasing maximum
term of imprisonment for violation of section 656 from 20 years to 30 years).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The void created by the absence of meaningful congressional
guidance on questions of relative offense seriousness is enlarged by
yet another condition common in federal economic crime prosecutions.
Statutory structures, state and federal, for crimes against persons
have a marked cabining effect on sentences largely because a convic-
tion for such offenses is likely to be of a single count-one murder, one
assault, one rape, one robbery. Multiple counts of conviction for
crimes against persons have a tendency to merge for sentencing pur-
poses; when they do not, distinctly different harms are likely being
punished-two dead victims if there are two counts of homicide, two
robbed stores if there are two counts of robbery. The relationship
between the number of counts of conviction and the number of dis-
cretely identifiable harms is much more blurred in federal white
collar cases. The most notable examples are wire and mail fraud,
offenses in which every separate mailing or interstate wire communi-
cation in furtherance of the criminal scheme is a separately indictable
and punishable offense.93
By way of illustration, if a state legislature decides that the
appropriate penalty range for one second degree murder is twelve to
twenty-four years, the sentencing judge will probably be precluded
from sentencing the defendant to more than twenty-four years (a
penalty range the legislature thought it was reserving for first degree
murder). The judge will be equally constrained from sentencing the
defendant to less than twelve years, a range the legislature thought
appropriate for various forms of manslaughter.94 In contrast, until
the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the length of
possible sentence faced by a federal white collar offender ran from a
minimum of probation to a maximum term of imprisonment calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of counts of conviction times the
maximum statutory sentence for each such count.95 Thus, legislative
judgment about offense seriousness implicit in the decision to set five
years as the maximum sentence for one count of a crime such as wire
fraud disintegrated in the face of untrammeled prosecutorial
93. See United States v. Clevenger, 458 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (holding that
separate counts for separate mailings in furtherance of the same scheme to defraud is not
multiplicitous); United States v. Brodbeck, 430 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (same); see
also United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 914 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding each separate use of
wire communication in order to aid the same scheme to defraud to be a separate offense).
94. This illustration assumes a sentencing structure employing statutory ranges with
minima and maxima. If there were no minima, the top-end constraints would still exist.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming the
power of a district court to impose consecutive sentences for convictions of burglary and theft
arising from the same transaction).
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discretion to charge one count or twenty arising from the same
scheme, and the equally unlimited power of a judge to sentence
anywhere within a legally permissible range of zero to 100 years.
Thus, when the United States Sentencing Commission set out to
create guidelines for sentencing economic criminals, it faced an array
of difficulties greater than that presented by virtually any other
category of offender.
2. The Guidelines' Approach to Economic Crimes
The issues addressed by the Guidelines fall broadly into two
categories: first, issues common to all offenders regardless of their
particular offense; and second, issues specific to particular offenses.
Into the first category fall treatment of criminal history, 6 the multiple
count rules s7 relevant conduct,98 adjustments for the defendant's role99
and for vulnerable victims,' °° and the virtual exclusion of the defen-
dant's personal circumstances and characteristics from the calculation
of guideline range. 10 The second category contains all the rules
concerning the offenses for which the defendant is being sentenced.
These are found in Chapter Two, "Offense Conduct."0 2
The Commission's approach to drafting Chapter Two guide-
lines was empirical and historical, rather than normative or philo-
sophical. That is, with a few notable exceptions, the Commissioners
did not attempt to determine what the penalty for any given offense
should be; rather, they set out to reproduce the sentencing patterns in
existence before the Guidelines.10 3 The Commission studied a sample
of 10,000 past cases in order to identify the characteristics of both
offenders and offenses that judges had historically deemed important
in making sentencing choices.'04 In effect, the Commission attempted
to discover and codify the federal common law of sentencing.
96. See USSG ch. 4.
97. See id. ch. 3, pt. D.
98. See id. § 1B1.3.
99. See id. ch. 3, pt. B.
100. See id. ch. 3, pt. A.
101. See id. ch. 5, pt. H.
102. See id. ch. 2.
103. Narcotics sentences are the most prominent exception to the general approach of
attempting to reproduce pre-Guidelines sentence levels; largely in response to statutory man-
dates, the Commission created a structure which dramatically increased drug sentences. See
generally Bowman, supra note 10, at 733-34, 740-47 (discussing drug sentences under the
Guidelines and arguing that they are, in many cases, too long).
104. See Breyer, supra note 10, at 7 n.50 (analyzing the basic principles behind the
Guidelines' enactment).
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In the case of economic crimes, the Commission adhered to its
historical approach in some respects, but diverged from it in others.
On the one hand, the Commission attempted to ascertain the factors
that had historically been important in sentencing economic crimes,
and to incorporate their findings in the Chapter Two offense conduct
guidelines. On the other hand, the Commission consciously chose to
raise sentencing levels for crimes against property over pre-
Guidelines levels.15 The commissioners were plainly concerned that
probationary sentences had been too common in economic crimes,106
and were convinced that the Guidelines' objectives would be better
served by the imposition of "short but certain terms of confinement for
many white collar offenders." 07
Although the Commission was correct to raise sentences for
economic crimes above their de minimis historical levels, 06 its effort
to identify sentencing factors federal judges had in the past found
determinative for economic crimes produced rather lean results.
Indeed, the Commission mentions only two such factors in the com-
mentary to the guidelines governing theft and fraud: the amount of
loss, and the amount and sophistication of planning activity involved
in the crime.10 9
105. See id. at 20-21 (discussing the Commission's decision to increase the severity of pun-
ishment for white collar crimes); Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2047 (1992) ("[Tlhe Commission produced guidelines that
actually increase the overall severity [of federal sentences]--taking particular aim at so-called
white-collar offenders whom the Commission found (perhaps correctly) to have been treated
with undue solicitude.").
106. As Justice Breyer, then a member of the Sentencing Commission, said in 1988, "A pre-
Guidelines sentence imposed on these criminals would likely take the form of straight proba-
tionary sentences." Breyer, supra note 10, at 7 n.49; see also John Hagan & laene Nagel
Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld Crime in Ten Federal
District Courts, 13 L. & SOc'Y REV. 467, 475 (1979) (quoting a U.S. Attorney regarding office
policy of vigorous advocacy in white collar sentencing hearings "because unless we did [advocate
strongly for imprisonment] almost everybody would walk out on probation").
107. Breyer, supra note 10, at 20; see also United States v. Weaver, 126 F.3d 789, 792-93
(6th Cir. 1997) (loss table reflects seriousness with which Sentencing Commission took low-level
white-collar crime; district court erred in departing down based on dissatisfaction with guideline
range).
108. See Bowman, supra note 10, at 734-40 (supporting the Commission's choice to increase
economic crime sentences, and arguing that, even under the Guidelines, federal white collar
sentences are often too low). The Commission is presently considering raising economic crime
sentences further by amending the loss tables in section 2B1.1 and section 2F1.1 to raise the
sentences associated with amounts of loss in the middle and upper ranges of the tables. For
discussions of these proposed changes, see Frank 0. Bowman, m, Back to Basics: Helping the
Commission Solve the "Loss" Mess with Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 115, 115-
16 (Nov.-Dec. 1997); and Barry Boss, Do We Need To Incresase the Sentences in "White Collar"
Cases? A View from the Trenches, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. (Nov.-Dec. 1997).
109. In the commentary to the fraud guideline, the Commission observes:
Empirical analyses of pre-guidelines practice showed that the most important factors
that determined sentence length were the amount of loss and whether the offense was
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For the purpose of drafting guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission divided federal economic crimes into two basic types:
(1) crimes involving "the most basic forms of property offenses-theft,
embezzlement, transactions in stolen goods, and simple property
damage or destruction,"110 " sentenced under section 2B1.1;' and
(2) fraud crimes, sentenced under section 2F1.1. 2 Then, having gone
to the trouble of creating this "great gulf fixed""3 between theft on the
one hand and fraud on the other, the Commission drafted two virtu-
ally identical guidelines. (The theft guideline, section 2B1.1 is repro-
duced as Table 1. The fraud guideline appears as Table 2).
an isolated crime of opportunity or was sophisticated or repeated. Accordingly, although
they are imperfect, these are the primary factors upon which the guideline has been
based.
USSG § 2F1.1 background commentary.
The commentary to the theft guideline states:
The value of the property stolen plays an important role in determining sentences for
theft and other offenses involving stolen property because it is an indicator of both the
harm to the victim and the gain to the defendant.... The guidelines provide an en-
hancement for more than minimal planning, which includes most offense behavior in-
volving affirmative acts on multiple occasions. Planning and repeated acts are indica-
tive of an intention and potential to do considerable harm. Also, planning is often re-
lated to increased difficulties of detection and proof.
Id. § 2B1.1 background commentary.
110. Id. at ch. 2, pt. B(1), introductory commentary. Property damage cases are nominally
sentenced under section 2B1.3, but the core of that guideline is a cross-reference to section
2B1.1 incorporating the loss table of section 2B1.1(b)(1).
111. Id. § 2B1.1 (omitting subsec. 2B1.1(c) concerning cross-references and application
notes).
112. See id. § 2Fl.1 (omitting application notes).
113. LUKE 16:26.
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TABLE 111
§ 2B1.1. Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Receiving, Transporting,
Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Property
(a) Base Offense Level: 4
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $100, increase the offense level as follows:












































(2) If the theft was from the person of another, increase by 2 levels.
(3) If (A) undelivered U.S. Mail was taken, or the taking of such item was an
object of the offense; or (B) the stolen property received, transported, transferred, transmitted,
or possessed was undelivered U.S. Mail, and the offense level as determined above is less than
level 6, increase to level 6.
(4) (A) If the offense involved more than minimal planning, increase by 2 levels;
or
(B) If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the defendant was
a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property, increase by 4 levels.
(5) If the offense involved an organized scheme to steal vehicles or vehicle parts,
and the offense level as determined above is less than level 14, increase to level 14.
(6) If the offense-
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial insti-
tution; or
(B) affected a financial institution and the defendant derived more than
$1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense, increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level
is less than level 24, increase to level 24.
114. USSG § 2B1.1 (omitting application notes and subsection 2B1.1(c) (concerning cross-
references)).
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TABLE 2115
§ 2F1.1. Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments
Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States
(a) Base Offense Level: 6
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $2,000, increase the offense level as follows:








































(2) If the offense involved (A) more than minimal planning, or (B) a scheme to
defraud more than one victim, increase by 2 levels.
(3) If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting
on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a government
agency, or (B) violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not
addressed elsewhere in the guidelines, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less
than level 10, increase to level 10.
(4) If the offense involved (A) the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily
injury, or (B) possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the
offense, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 13, increase to level
13.
(5) If the offense involved the use of foreign bank accounts or transactions to
conceal the true nature or extent of the fraudulent conduct, and the offense level as determined
above is less than level 12, increase to level 12.
(6) If the offense-
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial
institution; or
(B) affected a financial institution and the defendant derived more than
$1,000,000 in gross receipts from the offense, increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense level
is less than level 24, increase to level 24.
115. Id. § 2F1.1 (omitting application notes).
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The term "loss" is not defined in the text of the Guidelines. 116
The primary definition appears in Application Note 2 to the theft
guideline. The heart of the definition is this: "'Loss' means the value
of the property taken, damaged or destroyed."117 The fraud guideline
explicitly incorporates this definition, 118 and Application Note 7 to
section 2F1.1 goes on to state: "Frequently, loss in a fraud case will be
the same as in a theft case."1" 9 This language raises but does not an-
swer the question of when loss in theft cases will be the same as loss
in fraud cases.
The fraud commentary sets out a number of special rules for
particular cases, such as procurement fraud,120 diversion of govern-
ment program benefits,'121 and Davis-Bacon Act cases. 2 2 Under both
the theft and fraud guidelines, "the loss need not be determined with
precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the
loss, given the available information."123 Finally, the general rule for
both theft and fraud cases is said to be that courts should use the
greater of actual or intended loss, if the intended loss is different from
the actual loss and can be determined.'2
116. The word "loss" appears in guideline text only as a description of the monetary incre-
ments in two tables (section 2B1.1(b)(1) and section 2F1.l(b)(1)) which give rise to increases in
offense level. See, e.g., id. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (1997) (stating that "[i]f the loss exceeded $100, increase
the offense level as follows: [followed by a loss table]").
117. Id. § 2B1.1 application note 2. Application Note 2 goes on to say:
Ordinarily, when property is taken or destroyed the loss is the fair market value of the
particular property at issue. Where the market value is difficult to ascertain or inade-
quate to measure harm to the victim, the court may measure loss in some other way,
such as reasonable replacement cost to the victim. Loss does not include the interest
that could have been earned had the funds not been stolen. When property is damaged,
the loss is the cost of repairs, not to exceed the loss had the property been destroyed.
Id.
118. Id. § 2F1.1 application note 7 ("Valuation of loss is discussed in the Commentary to
section 2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft). As in theft cases, loss is the
value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken .... ").
119. Id. (emphasis added). For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 147-71 and
accompanying text.
120. See id. § 2F1.1 application note 7(c).
121. See id. § 2Fl.1 application note 7(d).
122. See id. § 2F1.1 application note 7(e).
123. Id. § 2B1.1 application note 3; id. § 2Fl.1, application note 8.
124. This rule is plainly stated only in the fraud guideline: "Consistent with the provisions
of section 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy), if an intended loss that the defendant was
attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual
loss." Id. § 2Fl.1 application note 7. Nonetheless, the same principle is implicit in the examples
used for illustration in the theft guideline:
(1) In the case of a theft of a check or money order,; the loss is the loss that would have
occurred if the check or money order had been cashed. (2) In the case of a defendant ap-
prehended taking a vehicle, the loss is the value of the vehicle even if the vehicle is re-
covered immediately.
Id. § 2B1.1 application note 2.
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A court would sentence a defendant convicted of a theft-like
crime as follows. The base offense level for all theft crimes is 4.12 If
the defendant stole $1,000,000, the court would consider the "specific
offense characteristic" of an amount of loss between $800,000 and
$1,500,000, and would add another 13 levels.126 If the defendant took
the money from his victim's person, the court would add yet another 2
offense levels.127 Thus, a million-dollar purse snatch or jewelry grab
would yield a total Chapter Two offense level of 19 (4+13+2=19).
If the defendant defrauded the same victim of $1,000,000, his
base offense level would be 6,128 and the court would add 11 levels for
a loss of between $800,000 and $1,500,000.129 If the crime involved
"more than minimal planning," the court would add another 2 offense
levels. A million-dollar fraud would therefore also produce a total
offense level of 19 (6+11+2=19).
This simple comparison should not be taken to suggest that
the theft and fraud guidelines will always produce identical offense
levels for crimes with the same loss amount.130 However, three points
should be apparent. First, the theft and fraud guidelines are virtu-
ally, though not absolutely, identical. Second, despite identifying the
amount and sophistication of planning activity as one of the two tradi-
tionally determinative sentencing factors in economic crimes, the
Commission's only effort to account for this factor is the two-level
However, it may be that these examples are best seen as efforts to deal with the problem of
when loss should be measured, rather than as illustrations of the principle of intended loss. See
infra Part IV.C.1 for discussion of the "when" problem.
The concept of intended loss is explicitly imported into the theft guideline only in cases of
attempt:
In the case of a partially completed offense (e.g., an offense involving a completed theft
that is part of a larger, attempted theft), the offense level is to be determined in accor-
dance with the provisions of section 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) whether
the conviction is for the substantive offense, the inchoate offense (attempt, solicitation,
or conspiracy), or both; see Application Note 4 in the Commentary to section 2X1.1.
USSG § 2B1.1 application note 2. The base offense level for an attempted theft is determined by
adding to the base offense level of the substantive offense "any adjustments from such guideline
for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty." Id.
§ 2X1.1(a).
125. See USSG § 2B1.1(a).
126. See id. § 2BI.1(b)(1)(N).
127. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
128. See id. § 2FL.1(a).
129. See id. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(L).
130. For example, frauds of less than $2,000 receive no upward adjustment from the loss
table, see id. § 2F1.1(b)(1XA) (1997), while thefts of between $100 and $1,000 receive a one-level
upward adjustment, see id. § 2BI.I(bXl)(B). Therefore, because the base offense level for frauds
is 6, and the base level for thefts only 4, a theft of $500 would have an offense level of 5, while a
fraud in the same amount would produce an offense level of 6. For any loss amount greater
than $1,000, this effect disappears.
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increase for "more than minimal planning."131 By contrast, the loss
amount can change the final offense level by 18 levels in fraud cases
and 20 levels in theft cases. 1 2 Third, and consequently, the opera-
tional core of both guidelines is the loss table; more than any other
factor, loss will drive the sentencing range under either guideline.
Having sketched the basic structure of the Guidelines' provi-
sions for sentencing economic criminals, this Article now turns to a
critique of that structure and offers a series of concrete proposals for
revision.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC CRIME GUIDELINES AND A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
A. The Theft and Fraud Guidelines Should Be Consolidated
There is no good reason to have separate guidelines for theft
and fraud. At least three compelling reasons support consolidating
the fraud and theft guidelines: (1) The distinction between theft and
fraud is illusory; (2) application of either guideline to the same facts
produces nearly identical sentences; and (3) separate guidelines pro-
duce needless confusion. I will examine each of these contentions in
turn.
1. The Distinction Between Theft and Fraud Is Illusory
The Commission's reasons for dividing economic offenses into
theft-like crimes and fraud-like crimes remain obscure. Whatever the
reasons, the distinction is both doctrinally and practically meaning-
less. Although not all theft crimes are frauds, virtually every fraud
could be charged as one of the common law property crimes, or under
one of the modern consolidated theft statutes. Consider, for example,
a variation on the classic illustration of the difference between the
traditional property crimes of larceny, larceny by trick, false pre-
tenses, and embezzlement:
V owns four horses. A sneaks into the corral where the horses
are kept and rides away on one of the horses. B approaches V and
asks to rent a horse, promising to pay $10 and to return the horse
tomorrow. B has no intention of keeping either promise and rides off
131. Id. §§ 2BI.1(b)(4)(A), 2F1.l(b)(2).
132. See id. § 2B1.1(b) (theft); id. § 2F1.l(b) (fraud).
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with the horse, never to be seen again. C comes to V and says that
she is acting on behalf of a charitable organization that runs a riding
stable for mentally handicapped children and asks V to donate a
horse. V does so and transfers title to a horse to C. In fact, C is a
crook who takes the horse around the corner and sells it for a profit.
D rents V's last horse, fully intending to return it as promised, but the
next morning decides otherwise, keeps the horse for himself, and
leaves V a message falsely stating that he, too, has donated a horse to
the children's stable. In this scenario, A has committed larceny,1 3 B
larceny by trick,'3 C false pretenses, 135 and D embezzlement.16 Yet, if
B, C, and D happened to make their false statements on the telephone
across a state line, they could just as easily be charged under federal
law with wire fraud.137  In each case their conduct could be
characterized as a "scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses."3s
Indeed, "fraud," meaning some false statement intended to induce the
victim to part quietly with either possession or title to property, is an
element of both larceny by trick and false pretenses. Similarly, even
though fraud is not an element of embezzlement,3 9 it is usually
present at some point in most embezzlement cases. 40
133. Common law larceny is the taking and carrying away of the personal property of an-
other with the intent to permanently deprive the possessor of the property. See DRESSLER,
supra note 62, § 32.02[A], at 508.
134. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 27, at 711 n.33 (citing Rex v. Pear, 168 Eng. Rep.
208 (1779) (holding that leasing a horse for part of a day and then selling it under pretense of
ownership is forgery)). Larceny by trick is merely one means of committing the crime of
larceny. It is a rule that extends the reach of larceny to cases in which the defendant "obtains
possession of, but not title to, another's property by lies, then intending fraudulently to convert
the property and later doing so." Id. at 711.
135. "The primary difference between larceny and false pretenses is that a thief who uses
trickery to secure title, and not simply possession, of property, is guilty of false pretenses; one
who merely secures possession through fraud is guilty of larceny by trick." DRESSLER, supra
note 62, § 32.10[B], at 525.
136. "The most significant distinction between larceny and embezzlement is that [iln
embezzlement, the property comes lawfully into possession of the taker and is fraudulently or
unlawfully appropriated by him; in larceny, there is a trespass in the unlawful taking of the
property.'" Id. § 32.09[C], at 524 (citation omitted).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
138. See id. § 1341.
139. In fact, one of the traditional elements of embezzlement is fraudulent conversion of
property; however, "fraudulent" in this sense does not require the making of any false statement
upon which a victim relied. Rather, it simply means that the defendant "performed some act
that demonstrated his intent to deprive another of the property permanently." DRESSLER, supra
note 62, § 32.09[B], at 524.
140. For example, in most employee embezzlement cases, the defendant will be obliged at
some stage to make some false oral statement or bookkeeping entry to cover up or account for
the shortfall in property or funds.
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The convergence of theft and fraud crimes is even more pro-
nounced in the codes of states that followed the Model Penal Code and
consolidated previously distinct property crimes under the single
rubric of "theft."'4 ' Such statutes customarily define theft in a way
that reaches most, if not all, commonly encountered frauds. The
reach of these statutes is so broad that some states feel no need for
separate fraud laws.42
The overlap between theft and fraud is not confined to state
criminal law. Where many states have consolidated all property
offenses, including those involving fraud, into unitary theft statutes, 43
federal law abounds with instances in which the same course of
thievery is chargeable under multiple statutes, some of which are
called "frauds" and some of which appear to be traditional theft-like
offenses. For example, if an employee of a federally insured bank
steals some of the bank's money, he can be charged under 18 U.S.C.
§ 656 with theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by a bank officer or
employee. If in carrying out the defalcation he uses means much
more complex than lifting cash out of a drawer and walking out the
back door, he can also be charged with bank fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344. If he then employs the U.S. Mail or an interstate wire
communication, he might also be charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341, or with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
In sum, the Guidelines' division of property offenses into theft
and fraud crimes is analytically meaningless because it rests on a
distinction that has no sound basis in either common or statutory
criminal law, and is valueless as a practical matter because identical
facts can so often be charged as either a "theft" or a "fraud."
2. Application of Either Guideline to the Same Facts Produces Nearly
Identical Sentences
Even if it were possible to draw a meaningful distinction be-
tween theft and fraud, it would be useful to do so only if the objective
were to generate different sentencing outcomes for the two categories
141. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.1-223.8 (1980).
142. For example, Washington state's consolidated theft statute specifies that theft, mean-
ing "to wrongfully obtain or exert control over the property or services of another... with intent
to deprive him of such property or services," may be committed "[bly color or aid of deception."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.020(1) (West 1988).
143. Federal law has made more of an effort than the states to keep theft and fraud stat-
utes separate. However, all of the state property crime statutes may become a part of federal
law under the Assimilative Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994) (assimilating state law into
federal law for offenses committed in federal enclaves).
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of cases. However, as noted above,144 the sentencing range under both
guidelines is driven almost entirely by loss amount. Because loss
apparently means the same thing in both guidelines (the fraud guide-
line adopts the theft guideline's definition of loss'45), application of
either section 2B1.1 or section 2F1.1 to the same set of facts usually
produces either identical sentencing ranges, or a pair of ranges so
close that the top of one will approach or overlap the bottom of the
other. 46 Thus, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the existence of
separate fraud and theft guidelines is pointless duplication.
3. Separate Theft and Fraud Guidelines Create Needless Confusion
In a guidelines scheme often criticized for its length and com-
plexity, the mere fact that two guidelines are duplicative should be a
sufficient argument for consolidation.147 An even more compelling
argument arises from the fact that ingenious judges and lawyers have
sought to impute meaning into the theft/fraud distinction, and in
doing so have created only confusion.
A series of cases from the Third Circuit graphically illustrates
the potential for such difficulties. In United States v. Kopp, the de-
fendant obtained a $13.75 million loan by fraud.' 48 He argued at sen-
tencing that the loss was zero because the bank liquidated the collat-
eral for more than the loan amount. The Third Circuit addressed the
problem by attempting to reconcile the differing approaches to theft
and fraud cases suggested by the text and commentary of section
2B1.1 and section 2F1.1. The court noted that "calculations under the
two guidelines are essentially consistent," but that slight differences
led them to "decline to impose an identical analysis for theft and
fraud crimes in all cases." 149 The court concluded, "In both theft and
fraud cases, the guideline 'loss' turns out to be the higher of the actual
144. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text; see also USSG § 2Fl.1 cmt. 1 (1997).
146. The Sentencing Table is constructed so that the top of one sentencing range will
overlap the bottom of the range two offense levels higher. See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (1997).
147. See, e.g., Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78
JUDICATURE 180 (1995); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Cure Worse Than
the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 902 (1992) ("The problem of sentencing disparity is not
unique to the federal criminal justice system. Only the federal system has produced a solution
which outweighs the Manhattan telephone directory, however."); Jose A. Cabranes, Editorial,
Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at All (referring to the
Guidelines as "a byzantine system of rules").
148. 951 F.2d 521, 523-24 (3d Cir. 1991).
149. Id. at 529.
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loss and the intended loss."10 Application Note 7 to section 2F1.1
specifies the intended loss measurement as to fraud; no such specifi-
cation exists in the theft guideline, section 2B1.1, or in its accompa-
nying commentary., The Third Circuit nonetheless concluded that
intended loss, if higher than actual loss, was the proper measure in
theft cases. In its view,
[I]n a theft case, the thief intends to steal whatever he or she takes; the
amount taken is the loss the defendant intended to inflict.... In a theft case,
unlike a fraud case, the amount taken (the intended loss) is always as high or
higher than the amount the victim actually lost (which may be reduced due to
fortuitous recovery of the stolen property).152
Even at this point in its analysis, the Third Circuit had strayed
onto shaky ground. First, the court erroneously assumed that there
was a clear demarcation in federal law between "theft" and "fraud"
crimes. 53 Further, the court implicitly assumed that the culpable
mental state in theft-like crimes sentenced under section 2B1.1 is
"intent to steal," which the court seemed to equate with intent to
permanently deprive. However, the required culpable mental state in
embezzlement, misapplication of funds, and other similar crimes is
merely an intent to convert the property of another to one's own use
or benefit, perhaps for a short period.1M The Kopp court recognized
this difficulty, suggesting in a footnote that "embezzlement, unlike
ordinary theft or fraud, involves not only a taking but also an action
akin to a breach of a fiduciary duty, which might justify always using
the amount taken as 'loss.' "155
The Third Circuit explored the section 2Bl.1/section 2F1.1
distinction in detail a year after Kopp in United States v.
Badaracco.1s The defendant, a bank insider, had interests in his
150. Id.
151. See supra note 124 for discussion of the differences between section 2B1.1 and section
2F1.1 regarding intended loss.
152. Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529-530.
153. See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
154. See United States v. Titus, 64 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1946) (holding that intent to repay
and actual reimbursement was no defense to embezzlement where army post exchange em-
ployee took cigarettes, sold them to a civilian at a high price, and deposited an amount equal to
the low post exchange price in the cash register while pocketing the rest). See generally LAFAVE
& SCo"r, JR., supra note 27, at 736-38.
155. Kopp, 951 F.2d at 530 n.13. The court stated in footnote 13, "We can imagine one
situation where our reconciliation of USSG §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1 might fail, how-
ever[,] ... embezzlement crimes." Id. One difficulty with this rather dismissive characteriza-
tion is that embezzlement crimes are a common fixture of the federal criminal landscape, and
are regularly sentenced under section 2Bl.1.
156. 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1992).
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family's electrical contracting businesses. He coerced a devel-
oper/borrower into dealing with the family contractors at prices
higher than competing bidders. The defendant banker was convicted
of bank fraud for misrepresenting to the bank his relationship with
the family companies. The court found that the "loss" was the gross
amount of three contracts awarded to the family electrical contractors
with no offset either for the market price at which the contracts could
have been let or for the value of work actually performed by the fam-
ily contractors.
The Third Circuit distinguished these facts from fraud, where
the measure of loss is the actual economic harm caused or intended.
Citing Kopp,157 the court analogized the case of Badaracco to embez-
zlement because it involved a breach of trust; hence, said the court,
the proper measure of loss was "gross" gain to the defendant, with no
deduction for benefits conferred on the victim after the "taking."158 In
both Kopp and Badaracco, the version of Application Note 8 to section
2F1.1 in effect at sentencing referred to "offender's gross gain" as an
alternate measure of "loss." In both cases, the court noted that the
language was amended after sentencing, but before decision on ap-
peal, to omit the word "gross."159 In neither case did the court think
the amendment affected the outcome.
Three years after Badaracco, the Third Circuit decided United
States v. Coyle. 60 The defendant was a health care plan administra-
tor for Hospital Corporation of American ("HCA") who overstated
administrative costs and provider charges in order to justify a reten-
tion of larger premiums. At sentencing, the district court based "loss"
on the gross economic gain to HCA. The defendant argued on appeal
that this measure of gain overstated the victim's losses. The Third
Circuit avoided the issue of the victim's real economic loss by arguing
that "this scheme ha[s] a strong resemblance to embezzlement" and
therefore that "gross gain" (i.e., what was "taken" with no deductions
for any benefit conferred in return) was an appropriate measure of
loss.161 Coyle appeared to confirm that the Third Circuit's use of
"gross gain" to measure loss in embezzlement-like cases would survive
157. See id. at 938.
158. See id.
159. See id.; Kopp, 951 F.2d at 530 n.15.
160. 63 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995).
161. Id. at 1251. Another marked peculiarity of this approach is that gross gain, which the
Third Circuit views as especially appropriate to theft-like offenses sentenced under section
2BI.1, has never been mentioned in the commentary to section 2B1.1.
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the 1991 amendment to Application Note 8 to section 2F1.1, which
changed "offender's gross gain" to "offender's gain."162
This reading of Coyle was cast into question by the Third
Circuit's 1995 decision in United States v. Dickler. 16 There the court
"explained" its previous holdings by observing that where fraud is
"similar to theft," in that the defendant "takes" something from the
victim without giving anything in return, the gross gain measurement
is appropriate.'6 By contrast, where "value flows in both directions,"
then the value flowing to the victim should be subtracted.165 This
"explanation" of the earlier holdings amounts to a finding that "loss"
equals net economic loss. It ignores the facts of Badaracco and Coyle,
in which the loss attributed by the court clearly exceeded the actual
economic loss to the victims. In both cases, the presence of a breach of
trust was made to override considerations of economics.
The 1996 case of United States v. Maurello rendered the state
of the law in the Third Circuit still more uncertain. 166 The defendant
in Maurello was a disbarred lawyer convicted of mail fraud for
practicing law without a license. The district court, noting the defen-
dant's breach of fiduciary duty, calculated the amount of loss as the
total amount of fees charged to unsuspecting clients.167 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the value of services successfully ren-
dered to the clients should be deducted from the total amount of the
fees.168 In the course of reaching this result, the court cast the entire
Kopp-Badaracco-Coyle line of analysis into doubt. It attempted to
distinguish Badaracco by arguing that the crime in that case was
more like an embezzlement than the offense in Maurello. Recall that
Badaracco was a bank officer who was found guilty of coercing certain
borrowers of the bank to use contracting companies in which
Badaracco had an interest, and misrepresenting to the bank his con-
nection to those contractors. The Third Circuit contended that be-
cause Maurello was convicted of mail fraud for inducing his clients to
part with fees based on lies about his licensure as an attorney, and
therefore "did not fraudulently convert money over which he had
possession or control" his crime was less like embezzlement than
Badaracco's conduct.169 The distinction is not compelling.170 If the
162. See USSG App. C., amend. 393, at 221 (Nov. 1, 1991).
163. 64 F.3d 818 (3d Cir. 1995).
164. Id. at 825.
165. Id. at 826.
166. 76 F.3d 1304 (3d. Cir. 1996).
167. See id. at 1308.
168. See id. at 1312.
169. See id. at 1310-11.
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comparison illustrates anything, it is the potential for confusion that
flows from the existence of two guidelines which differ only slightly,
yet cover overlapping groups of offenses. 1 '
B. Retaining the "Loss" Concept, While Identifying and Accounting for
Other Sentencing Considerations "Loss" Does Not Measure Well
A consolidated economic crimes guideline should retain as a
central component a measurement akin to the current "loss" concept.
All else being equal, stealing more is worse than stealing less. This
intuitive judgment has been at work among Anglo-American lawmak-
ers since the division of larceny into grand and petit varieties in
1275.172 The basic principle remains sound, but its incorporation into
the Guidelines through the concept of "loss" in section 2B1.1 and
section 2F1.1 has proven problematic. As currently defined, loss
functions as an imperfect proxy for too many sentencing factors. The
first of these is mental state.
1. Accounting for Differences in Economic Criminals' Mental State
As noted above, offense seriousness rankings are the product of
the interaction among the fundamental components of criminal liabil-
ity-act, mental state, cause, and harm.173 "Loss" is plainly intended
to measure harm, but under the present regime it also serves by de-
fault as a gauge of the defendant's guilty mind. Recall that the men-
tal element of virtually all economic crimes is some variant of an
170. Perhaps in recognition of the difficulties Kopp, Badaracco, and Coyle had created, the
Third Circuit in Maurello went on to say:
The mere fact that defendant's scheme involved a breach of fiduciary duty does not
bring it under the penumbra of Badaracco....
[E]ven if we agreed with the governments analogy [to Badaracco], we would reject
their argument that "gross gain" to the defendant is the appropriate measure of loss un-
der Badaracco because the portion of the fraud guideline on which that holding was
based has been amended. In Badaracco, we held that the analogy to embezzlement jus-
tified our using the "gross gain" alternative to estimate 'loss," expressly authorized in
Application Note 8. In 1991, however, Application Note 8 was amended.... Although
we do not need to reach this issue in this case, it seems clear that the guidelines no
longer endorse "gross gain" to the defendant as an alternative measure of loss.
Id. at 1311.
171. For another example of confusion over whether section 2B1.1 or section 2F1.1 applies
to a case, compare United States v. Dion, 32 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding section
2F1.1 inapplicable to 18 U.S.C. § 656, misapplication of bank funds), with United States v.
Lucas, 99 F.3d 1290, 1294 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 2F1.1 does apply to 18 U.S.C. §
656, and characterizing Dion as a "questionable case").
172. See Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (Eng.).
173. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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intent to steal, defraud, or otherwise deprive the victim of the benefit
of his property. Thus, under statutory law, all convicted thieves,
embezzlers, and con artists are effectively indistinguishable as re-
gards mens rea. Nonetheless, we instinctively recognize more and
less blameworthy conditions of mind in economic criminals, just as we
do with murderers. The challenge for a drafter of sentencing guide-
lines is to identify those factors relating to mental state that should
matter in the imposition of economic crime sentences, and then to
account for them in the guideline scheme.
The persistent historical impulse to rank property crimes by
the value of property stolen surely rests on a judgment about mental
state, as well as on the more obvious assessment that size of loss re-
lates to harm. Stealing more is worse than stealing less because one
who desires to inflict a large harm is customarily thought to have a
more reprehensible condition of mind than one who desires to inflict a
smaller harm. To this extent, "loss" is not a bad proxy for mental
state.
Nonetheless, our thinking about the relative blameworthiness
of thieves is more complex than a measurement of the amount of the
loot. The problem is to tease out the nonmonetary considerations.
The authors of a systematic study of federal sentencing practices for
white-collar offenders conducted in 1988, before the Guidelines, sur-
veyed federal judges about the sentences they gave economic crimi-
nals and the reasons for giving them.174 Although not rigorously em-
pirical, the study confirms many common sense expectations about
sentencing practices. The study results confirm the original
Sentencing Commission's finding175 that sentencing judges consider
important the amount of planning and the complexity of the criminal
scheme. 7 6 This conclusion is unsurprising. In all types of crime, a
defendant who plots, plans, and schemes to achieve an evil end is
thought more culpable than one who causes the same harm on im-
pulse. The study also identified other factors that entered into judges'
sentencing decisions, such as leadership role within the criminal
undertaking, 77 whether the defendant betrayed a position of trust, 78
174. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRUAINALS (1988).
175. See supra note 109.
176. See WHEELERET AL., supra note 174, at 93-94.




indications of genuine contrition,179 and cooperation with authori-
ties.1'o.
All of these considerations relate to mental state, and the cur-
rent Guidelines contain provisions dealing with all of them. The two-
level upward adjustment for "more than minimal planning" included
in both the theft and fraud guidelines accounts for complexity of
scheme and extent of planning activity.'8' The defendant's role, as
leader or follower, can generate upward or downward adjustments of
up to four offense levels.82 A two-level upward adjustment penalizes
abuse of a position of trust.'8 Contrition is at least the ostensible
subject of the "acceptance of responsibility" guideline.1M And defen-
dants who provide "substantial assistance" to the government in in-
vestigating and prosecuting others receive the biggest potential sen-
tencing rewards. 85
With one notable exception-the "more than minimal plan-
ning" adjustment-these offense level adjustments probably do about
as good a job as can be done in a determinate guidelines system of
accounting for identifiable factors in assessing a financial felon's state
of mind. Nonetheless, the failure of "more than minimal planning" is
significant and ought to be remedied. Because courts have applied
the language of the provision quite literally, nearly every convicted
defendant whose crime was not one of pure impulse receives the
upward adjustment. More than eighty percent of all defendants
sentenced under the fraud guideline and nearly sixty percent of those
sentenced under the theft guideline are assessed the two additional
levels for more than minimal planning. 86 Hence, the theft and fraud
guidelines do not winnow out the minority of really sophisticated
schemers from the mass of ordinary thieves; rather, they separate the
minority of simpleminded crooks from the vast majority of felons with
even modest claims to cleverness. Moreover, by providing only a
uniform two-level adjustment to all qualifying defendants, the guide-
179. See id. at 120-21.
180. See id.
181. See USSG § 2B1.1(b(4X(A); id. § 2FI.1(b)(2)(A).
182. See id. §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2.
183. See id. § 3B1.3.
184. See id. § 3E1.1 (conferring two- or three-level offense level reductions where a defen-
dant "demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense"). Of course, realists with some
experience of federal sentencing would doubtless say that the "acceptance of responsibility"
credit has more to do with rewarding early guilty pleas and the resultant saving in governmen-
tal resources than it does with an assessment of contrition.
185. See id. § 5KL.1; see also Bowman, supra note 10, at 722-24 (discussing sentence reduc-
tions for substantial assistance under section 5K1.1).
186. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1995 Datafile MONFY 95.
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lines prevent sentencing judges from making distinctions among com-
plex, moderately complex, and truly inspired criminal schemes.
The Commission is presently considering abolishing the "more
than minimal planning" adjustment, building the two-level increase
into the sentencing table, and adding a section that adjusts for com-
plex planning by analogy to the "sophisticated means" enhancement
now available in tax cases under section 2T1.1(b)(2). 187  The
Commission should adopt this proposal, with one addition. It should
include a section permitting a two-level downward adjustment for
defendants whose crimes did not involve even minimal planning.
Having both an upward and a downward adjustment for sophistica-
tion of scheme would create a three-tier system with the simple, im-
pulsive crimes at the bottom, the offenses of average complexity in the
middle, and truly sophisticated offenses at the top. Under such a
scheme, sentences would vary by up to four offense levels based on
degree of planning activity. Such an arrangement would yield both
structure and some flexibility for sentencing judges.18
2. Accounting for Noneconomic Harms
Although pecuniary loss may seem a somewhat unnatural
proxy measurement of mental state, it is the universally accepted
measurement of harm in economic crimes. However, even this more
intuitively obvious equivalency is not without problems. The difficul-
ties are illustrated by comparison with the other important proxy
value in the Guidelines, the weight of narcotics. 189 Leaving to one side
187. See 63 Fed. Reg. No. 3, pt. H (Jan. 6, 1998); Memorandum from John R. Steer, General
Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, to U.S. Sentencing Commission (June 26, 1997) (on file
with author). For discussion of the pros and cons of this proposal, see Hearing before U.S.
Sentencing Commission, March 5, 1998, testimony of Mary Spearing, Chief, Fraud Section, U.S.
Department of Justice and defense attorney David Axelrod, written statements and transcripts
of testimony available at <<http'//www.ussc.gov/hearings.htm>>. Section 2T1.1(b)(2) (1997)
imposes a two-level increase in offense level where "sophisticated means were used to impede
discovery of the existence or extent of the offense."
188. A proposed sophisticated means adjustment appears at section 2Z1.1(b)(8) in the pro-
posed consolidated economic crimes guideline in Appendix A- The proposed guideline defines
"sophisticated means" in virtually the same language used in section 2T1.1:
"Sophisticated means," as used in subsection (b)(1O), includes conduct that is more com-
plex or demonstrates greater intricacy or planning than a routine economic crime of the
same type. An enhancement would be applied, for example, where the defendant used
offshore bank accounts, multiple transactions through domestic financial institutions,
transactions through corporate shells or fictitious entities, or sophisticated technical
means.
Appendix A, Proposed § 2Z1.1 n.16. (I confess that I do not find this language entirely satisfac-
tory.)
189. Sentence length in narcotics cases is determined almost entirely by the weight of the
drugs possessed, sold, and distributed. See USSG § 2D1.1.
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problems with comparisons of gross weight versus dosage units and
similar technical matters,190 narcotics weight is a decent proxy for
social harm. Ingestion of banned substances by end users creates
direct psychological and physical effects and risks of a host of collat-
eral harms, such as job loss, family breakup, addicted infants, in-
creased crime by addicts to support their habits, etc. One can argue
about the degree to which drugs are actually responsible for these
harms (and whether incarceration effectively reduces them).
However, whatever harms are in truth attributable to the narcotics
trade are pretty directly proportional to the amount sold.
By contrast, both the type and degree of harm caused by a
dollar's worth of economic crime will vary from crime to crime. A
dollar stolen from a millionaire means less than a dollar stolen from a
pauper. Stealing from Donald Trump is different than stealing from
Mother Teresa. Ten thousand dollars lost from a parent's savings on
the eve of a child's entry into college has a vastly different significance
than the same amount lost while there is still time to plan for that
child's education. Stealing a fifty dollar coffeemaker from an airplane
is different than stealing a fifty dollar component of the landing gear.
The Guidelines should identify regularly occurring non-monetary
harms resulting from economic crimes and account for them outside of
the "loss" proxy.
a. Number of Victims
The Guidelines presently take inadequate account of cases
involving multiple victims. When a defendant steals from several
people, he inflicts losses on a wider segment of the community than if
he steals from only one person. The fact that a defendant stole from
several people is unquestionably relevant to the amount of planning
required and thus to mental state, even where the defendant merely
committed the same simple crime against a sequence of new victims.
However, the presence of multiple victims is also, and more funda-
mentally, a factor related to harm.
At present, the Guidelines consider the number of victims only
as an alternative means of qualifying for the two-level "more than
minimal planning" adjustment.19 The consolidated economic crimes
190. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (discussing whether weight of
"mixture and substance" containing a controlled substance includes weight of the carrier me-
dium, e.g., blotter paper in the case of LSD).
191. See USSG §§ 2B1.1(b)(4)(A), 2F1.1(bX2)(A).
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guideline proposed here provides a separate enhancement that in-
creases offense level with the number of victims. 192 The number of
victims used in the proposed guideline (2-4, 5-20, 21+) is concededly
arbitrary. The Commission should research the distribution of low,
medium, and high numbers of victims among existing cases and make
appropriate adjustments.
b. Significant Financial Hardship
The Guidelines already account in section 3A1.1 for situations
in which a defendant preys upon a victim who is peculiarly suscepti-
ble to the crime at issue.193 However, the Guidelines provide no ad-
justment for unusually severe effects of crime. Application Note 10(f)
does suggest an upward departure where the offense "involved the
knowing endangerment of the solvency of one or more victims." 194
This seems rather anemic. "Endangerment of solvency" is a phrase
both too vague and too restrictive. On the one hand, it is unclear
when a victim becomes insolvent (must he file for bankruptcy protec-
tion?), and even more unclear when he is in danger of becoming so.
On the other hand, insolvency, however defined, is only one of the
unusually severe effects of economic crime that ought to affect sen-
tencing outcomes. When a defendant causes a victim to lose a home,
a job, a pension, health benefits, or other components of financial
security, the court should account for the nature of those losses as
well as their quantity.
As a solution to this problem, the Commission should adopt a
two-level upward adjustment for cases in which a defendant causes
"significant financial hardship" to one or more victims. A proposed
definition of "significant financial hardship" appears as Application
Note 5 to section 2Z1.1 in the Proposed Consolidated Economic
Crimes Guideline (Appendix A).
192. The proposed enhancement for number of victims reads:
If the offense involved more than one victim, increase the offense level as follows:
(A) If the offense involved 2-4 victims, increase by 1 level.
(B) If the offense involved 5-20 victims, increase by 2 levels.
(C) If the offense involved 21 or more victims, increase by 3 levels.
Appendix A, Proposed § 2Z1.1(b)(10).
193. See USSG § 3AL.1.
194. Id. § 2F1.1 n.10(f), construed in United States v. Hogan, 121 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir.
1997) (approving upward departure for knowingly endangering solvency of defrauded victims).
502 [Vol. 51:461
COPING WITH "LOSS"
IV. "LOSS": WHAT SHOULD IT MEAN, AND How SHOULD
IT BE MEASURED?
A. The Problem of Inclusion: Redefining Loss in Terms of
Cause-in-Fact and Foreseeability
Although "loss" serves other functions as well, it is first and
foremost a measurement of economic harm. Any attempt to rank
economic crimes using the concept of loss faces two basic definitional
problems: the problem of inclusion, that is, deciding which harms to
include and which to exclude from the ambit of loss and the problem
of measurement, that is, creating rules that assist courts in calculat-
ing the monetary value of the included categories of economic harm.
The Guidelines are singularly uninformative on the subject of
which pecuniary harms should be included in "loss." They leave two
fundamental questions largely unanswered. First, who are the vic-
tims whose losses are to be counted? Second, which pecuniary harms
suffered by those victims are to be included in the loss calculation? As
we will see, fundamental principles of criminal liability regarding
fault and causation can resolve these questions. But before proposing
a solution, we should examine the difficulties the Commission and the
courts have encountered in addressing causation and the problem of
inclusion.
At the root of the problem of inclusion is the Guidelines' at-
tempt to embrace two distinct, and inconsistent, conceptions of loss.
The theft guideline sets forth the basic definition of loss-"the value
of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed"'195-which was plainly
drafted with the model of simple common law property crimes in
mind. The word "taken" is close to a term of art, denoting to any
Anglo-American lawyer the "taking" element of common law larceny,
with its insistence on a transfer of possession of moveable person-
alty.196 Read on its face, therefore, the basic definition of loss ap-
parently includes only what might be termed the corpus delicti of
basic property crimes, the "thing of value" of which the victim was
deprived. Because the fraud guideline adopts this strikingly limited
definition virtually verbatim,197 it has become the primary measure-
ment of offense seriousness for all federal economic crimes.
195. Id. § 2B1.1.
196. See DRESSLER, supra note 62, § 32.04, at 510.
197. See USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7.
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Grafting larceny terminology onto the sentencing procedures of
every economic crime has created problems beyond the inevitable
definitional confusion. 198 The more fundamental difficulty is that a
very narrow definition of loss is at odds with a conception of loss as a
broad proxy measurement of offense seriousness in general, and of
harm in particular. This basic conceptual conflict is patent both in
the Guidelines themselves and in the cases construing them.
1. Who is the "Victim"?
The Guidelines blithely refer to "the victim," yet nowhere do
they define the term.199 This surprising omission is surely an inciden-
tal consequence of the Commission's choice to define "loss" with the
model of simple common law or statutory theft crimes in mind. In
such cases, the identity of the victim is usually obvious and undis-
puted, both because the transactions are simple, and because the
victim is usually identified in the indictment or information.
Sentencing federal economic crimes differs from sentencing simple
property crimes in two critical respects. First, the nature of federal
economic offenses is such that, even as to the counts of conviction, it is
often unclear who ultimately suffered financial harm as a result of the
defendant's conduct, and even less clear whether those who were
harmed in fact ought to be considered "victims" in law. Second, be-
cause the Guidelines are a modified real offense system, the class of
victims is not limited to those who were injured by the conduct cov-
ered by the counts of conviction, but extends to all the victims of a
defendant's "relevant conduct."2°° We will consider these problems
seriatim.
a. Who Is the Victim of the Offense of Conviction?
Should the Guidelines count the losses only of those with
whom a defendant dealt directly, or should loss measure financial
harm caused by the defendant's crime but suffered by persons or enti-
ties with whom the defendant did not have direct dealings? The
198. For example, if "taken" retains some vestige of its common law meaning, then what
does it mean to speak of "taking" in the context of wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, or an insider
trading case?
199. So far as I can determine, neither has any court of appeals. See, e.g., United States v.
Barrett, 51 F.3d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1995) ("This court has not previously defined the scope of the
term 'victim' under [section] 2F1.1 of the Guidelines."). Nor did the Barrett court hazard a
comprehensive definition of the term "victim."
200. See USSG § 1B1.3.
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Ninth Circuit grappled with this question in United States v.
Harper.20 The defendant obtained possession of heavily encumbered
residences for no money by promising the owners that he would as-
sume their mortgages. In fact, the defendant neither assumed the
mortgages nor made mortgage payments. Instead, he rented out the
premises to tenants and kept the rent. Upon discovery of the scheme,
the banks foreclosed on the properties. The defendant pled guilty to
mail fraud, equity skimming, and conspiracy.20 2 The district court
decided that the "loss" was the fair market value of the houses plus
the rents paid to the defendant by the tenants.20 3 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, apparently because the owner-occupants did not control
equity equal to the fair market value and thus were not deprived of
that amount,2 4 and because the banks holding the mortgages did not
lose their right to foreclose and thus were not deprived of the entire
market value of the property.205
Despite rejecting the district court's loss calculation, the Ninth
Circuit did not actually decide what the proper measure of loss should
have been. The court discussed the possibility that the defendant
caused financial injury to the homeowners, the renters, the banks,
and the federal treasury. The homeowners suffered damage to their
credit ratings and perhaps deficiency judgments resulting from the
foreclosures. But since these particular homeowners were on the
verge of foreclosure anyway, the portion of such losses attributable to
the defendant's scheme was likely to have been small.26 The renters
obtained what they paid for, at least until the fraud was discovered
and they were evicted.207 The real losers were the banks and, poten-
tially, the U.S. Treasury. The banks, though secured to the extent of
the foreclosure value of the homes, lost any uncollectible deficiency, as
201. 32 F.3d 1387 (9th Cir. 1994).
202. See id. at 1388. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994) (mail fraud); 12 U.S.C. § 1709-2
(equity skimming); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy).
203. See Harper, 32 F.3d at 1388. In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the
Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991). See
Harper, 32 F.3d at 1390.
204. See Harper, 32 F.3d at 1392.
205. See id.
206. The court in Harper rejected the idea that the amount of deficiency judgments entered
against the original owners following foreclosure would necessarily be the measure of"loss." Id.
The court said that, "[i]f it can be shown that a portion or all of the deficiency was brought about
by Harper's actions, that loss could be considered a part of the actual loss inflicted by him." Id.
Presumably, the court agreed that the deficiency should be a component of loss if the defen-
dant's actions which caused an owner to vacate his home and suspend mortgage payments led




well as mortgage payments not made between the transfer of posses-
sion from the owners to the defendant and discovery of the fraud. The
Treasury lost money to the degree the government was obliged to
make good on loan guarantees for homeowners who would not have
defaulted but for the defendant's conduct.
The defect in the Ninth Circuit's Harper opinion is that it
never squarely addressed the question of which of these losers were
"victims" whose losses should count under the Guidelines. Because
the defendant dealt directly with, made misrepresentations directly
to, and obtained something of value directly from both the homeown-
ers and the renters, it is fairly obvious that both these groups should
be considered victims for the purpose of sentencing. However, the
banks and the Treasury present more difficult problems. The defen-
dant neither dealt with nor deceived the banks or the government,
nor did he receive anything of value from either. One possible argu-
ment for considering them victims is that the defendant pleaded
guilty to violating the equity skimming statute, which is clearly de-
signed to protect the interests of lenders participating in federally
guaranteed loan programs, and of the government itself as guaran-
tor.208 Thus, it might be argued that the banks and the government
should be victims in this case because Congress passed the statute of
conviction for the purpose of protecting banks and the government
from exactly the kind of loss inflicted by this defendant.
Although congressional intent is certainly relevant to a deter-
mination of the proper scope of "loss" (including the identity of the
"victims")29 exclusive reliance on that factor is problematic, as can be
illustrated by assuming slight modifications of the events in Harper.
If, based on the same facts, Harper had been charged only with mail
fraud and not with equity skimming, congressional intent to protect
either banks or the U.S. Treasury would not be relevant, and thus
pecuniary harms to the banks and the government would not be
counted as loss, despite the defendant's identical conduct.210 Such a
result would be contrary to the "modified real offense" design of the
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1709-2 makes it a felony for any person, with the intent to defraud, to will-
fully engage in a pattern or practice of (1) "purchasing one- to four-family dwellings" owned by
persons whose loans are in or near default and are secured by mortgages or deeds of trust held
or insured by HUD or the Veterans Administration, (2) failing to make payments on the loans,
and (3) collecting rent and appropriating it to his own use. 12 U.S.C. § 1709-2.
209. See infra Part IV.B.2.e.
210. Similarly, even if the equity skimming charges remained, but some of the homes
involved in the scheme to defraud were not purchased with federally insured loans, a congres-
sional intent approach to loss would presumably exclude losses suffered by the lenders on those
homes even though they were a part of the same overall scheme.
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Guidelines which aims to sentence on the basis of the defendant's
actual conduct and resultant harms regardless of how the case is
charged or pled.211
The most coherent explanation for the Harper court's implicit
acceptance of homeowners, renters, banks, and the government as
legitimate victims for purposes of determining loss is that all four
groups suffered economic losses which were caused in fact by the
defendant's criminal conduct. On the facts of Harper, the inclusion of
all four groups seems unexceptional. Other cases raise more acutely
the issue of the necessary causal connection between the defendant's
wrong and the harms of putative victims. For example, the Third
Circuit raised, but did not resolve, this question in United States v.
Maurello.212 The court found that the loss caused by Maurello's unli-
censed legal practice should be calculated by deducting the value of
legal services satisfactorily rendered from the amount of fees charged
because clients who received satisfactory legal services had suffered
no real harm.213 The government contended that the total fees should
nonetheless be counted because that money "was diverted from defen-
dant's legitimate competitors" (i.e., licensed attorneys).214 The court
rejected that argument, saying that only loss to the "direct victims of
defendant's conduct" would be counted.25 Regrettably, the court nei-
ther defined the difference between direct and indirect victims, nor
explained why losses to the first but not the second should be
counted. 216
So who is the "victim" of an economic crime? Do the pleadings
control the identity of the victim? Is the dominant consideration
whether the defendant had direct dealings with the putative victim?
Is legislative intent relevant? Or is victim identity a fluid concept
determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the causal con-
211. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing relevant conduct and modified
real offense sentencing).
212. 76 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1996). Maurello is discussed above in connection with the con-
solidation of section 2B1.1 and section 2F1.1. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
213. SeeMaurello, 76 F.3d at 1311-12.
214. Id. at 1313.
215. Id.
216. Indeed, the court's explanation of its result is entirely circular. It said that it dis-
agreed with the governments argument because that argument would compel use of the total
amount of fees in all such cases, and that this "would render the degree of harm caused by a
defendant's acts irrelevant to Guidelines sentencing-a result that is contrary to the policy of
the Guidelines." Id. But the result argued for by the government only renders the degree of
harm "irrelevant to Guidelines sentencing" if harms to "remote victims" do not count. The court




nection between a defendant's conduct and a victim's injury? Neither
the Guidelines nor the cases construing them offer satisfactory an-
swers to any of these questions.
b. "Gain" and the Problem of Identifying the Victim
The term "loss" necessarily connotes a focus on the extent to
which the victim (once identified) has been deprived of something.
Nonetheless, the fraud guideline permits use of the gain garnered by
the defendant as an alternative measure of loss. 217 The inclination to
use a defendant's gain as the measure of loss often arises when the
defendant seems to have gotten more out of his fraudulent behavior
than the victims appear to have lost. For example, in a fraudulent
loan case where the loan is properly collateralized or the bank has
other readily available sources of repayment in the event of default,
the defendant may profit considerably from his deception, but the
lender may ultimately suffer negligible economic harm. Similarly, in
cases of government contract fraud where the defendant secures the
contract through misrepresentation but performs all or part of the
contract, the loss to the government may be small. Nonetheless,
courts and the Commissioners have been reluctant to forego all loss-
based enhancement in such cases, though neither group has been very
successful in articulating why.
Some courts seem to view gain as a mechanism for penalizing
defendants based on the magnitude of the unjustifiable risk they cre-
ate for their victims, and on the severity of the ultimate harm actually
inflicted.218 What has gone largely unrecognized is that "gain" to the
defendant seems more attractive as a measure of offense seriousness
where the true victim of the defendant's crime may not be the puta-
tive victim named in the indictment. 219 The Commissioners, however,
did recognize this possibility when they amended section 2F1.1,
217. See USSG § 2Fl.1 application note 8 ("The offender's gain from committing the fraud
is an alternative estimate that ordinarily will underestimate the loss."). The background com-
mentary to the theft guideline states: "The value of the property stolen plays an important role
in determining sentences for theft and other offenses involving stolen property because it is an
indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the defendant." USSG § 2B1.1 back-
ground commentary. "Gain" is also used to set the sentence for insider trading offenses. See id.
§ 2F1.2(b)(1).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding it
"proper to calculate loss based on the risk engendered by the defendant's criminal conduct even
where the actual loss was lower").
219. Compare United States v. Marcus, 82 F.3d 606, 610 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding "gross
sales were the appropriate measure of the actual loss"), with United States v. Chatterji, 46 F.3d
1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding "gain 'may not support an enhancement'" under section
2Fl.l(b)(1) of the Guidelines).
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Application Note 7, to add subsection (d), redefining loss in cases
involving the diversion of government program benefits to mean "the
value of the benefits diverted from intended recipients or uses."220 In
making this change, the Commission recognized that the federal go-
vernment may suffer no economic loss if, for example, it guarantees a
loan or awards a grant to someone not entitled to it,221 but that for
each fraudulently obtained grant or loan guarantee some other de-
serving person may be deprived of a benefit the government had in-
tended to bestow on that person. In effect, Application Note 7(d) sim-
ply says that the intended beneficiaries of government programs are
"victims" when the defendant's gain was a benefit intended for them.
This approach is markedly inconsistent with the idea ex-
pressed by the Third Circuit in United States v. Maurello that loss
embraces only economic harm to "direct victims of the defendant's
conduct."22 2 The harm to potential government program beneficiaries
treated as victims by Application Note 7(d) could scarcely be more
"indirect," and is hard to distinguish from the harm to licensed attor-
ney competitors deprived of legal business by Mr. Maurello. However,
Application Note 7(d) makes perfect sense if loss is supposed to in-
clude a broad range of economic harms caused by the defendant, in-
cluding harms to program beneficiaries whose interests the legisla-
ture sought to protect in passing the law violated by the defendant.
Considered carefully, therefore, many cases that superficially involve
the question of gain are really "who's the victim?" problems.
2. Victims, Relevant Conduct, and Causation
Identifying the victims even of the federal economic crimes of
which a defendant was convicted can be challenging. An additional
layer of complexity arises because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are
a "modified real offense" system which requires the sentencing court
to consider "relevant conduct," a concept that embraces not only a
defendant's own conduct charged in the counts of conviction, but also
conduct described in dismissed counts or never charged at all, as well
as the conduct of the defendant's criminal partners.
220. 1991 amendment of § 2F1.1 application note 7, to add subsection (d). See USSG App.
C, amend. 393 (Nov. 1, 1991).
221. Assuming, of course, that the loan is repaid.
222. 76 F.3d 1304, 1313 (3d Cir. 1996).
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a. Defendant's Unconvicted or Uncharged Conduct
The relevant conduct guideline obligates the sentencing court
to consider "all harm that resulted from"2 3 the defendant's "acts and
omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."224 The court must thus
determine the identities of all those who suffered loss resulting from
the defendant's actions during the entire scheme or set of transactions
that led to his conviction.
The Tenth Circuit applied this concept in United States v.
Sapp22 to find a loan fraud defendant responsible for losses to Lender
#1 (not the named victim), who had discounted a loan in response to
an uncharged misrepresentation by the defendant that funding could
be obtained from Lender #2 (the named victim) if the first lender
discounted its loan. The defendant could have been charged with the
falsehoods to Lender #1 which, upon conviction, would have been
grouped for sentencing purposes with the false statements to Lender
#2. The lies to Lender #1 were part of the same scheme as the crime
of conviction involving Lender #2, therefore the defendant was held
accountable for the total loss he inflicted on both lenders.
226
b. Acts of Defendant's Criminal Partners
The relevant conduct guideline also says that sentencing calcu-
lations "shall be determined on the basis of... all harm that resulted
from.., reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in fur-
therance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity."227 As applied to
the theft and fraud guidelines, the effect of the relevant conduct rules
should be to hold the defendant responsible for all losses to all victims
that "resulted from" his own conduct, as well as for the foreseeable
losses to the foreseeable victims of his criminal partners.
228
223. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(3).
224. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2), construed in United States v. O'Brien, 119 F.3d 523, 535 n.9 (7th Cir.
1997) (relevant conduct rules allow judges to include in loss calculation losses not mentioned in
indictment).
225. 53 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
226. See id. at 1104-05; see also United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that amounts of fraudulently obtained loans from transactions not charged in the
indictment, and from a transaction for which defendant was acquitted, properly included in loss
calculation), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 781 (1996).
227. USSG §§ 1B1.3(a)(3), 1B1.3 (a)(1XB).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Zaragoza-Barajas, 123 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 1997)
(defendant responsible for all losses in unemployment compensation fraud because, given her
"absolutely integral and essential" role in the scheme, the entire loss was foreseeable to her);
United States v. Dolan, 120 F.3d 856, 871 (8th Cir. 1997) (attorney liable for all losses from
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However, section 1B1.3 somewhat incongruously imposes a
foreseeability limitation on harms caused by a defendant's co-con-
spirators and co-schemers, but no such limitation on harms that
"resulted from" the defendant's own behavior.229 In short, it appears
that the relevant conduct guideline contemplates a pure "but for"
causal relationship between the defendant's acts and the harms that
result. Apparently, section 1B1.3 permits, or perhaps requires, a
sentencing judge to count all the victims and all the harms they
suffered as a result of defendant's own acts, regardless of how
attenuated the causal link between the acts and the harms, and
regardless of whether the defendant could have foreseen the existence
of such victims or the nature and extent of their injuries.
3. Causation and "Consequential Damages"
The tension between the sweeping language of the relevant
conduct guideline and the cramped primary definition of "loss" is
patent. Is loss to be a broad measure of "all" economic harm caused
by the defendant consonant with the reach of section 1B1.3, or a nar-
row accounting of property "taken" by the defendant? The uncer-
tainty is rendered still more acute by the Guidelines' treatment of
"consequential damages." Application Note 7(c) to section 2F1.1
states: "In contrast to other types of cases, loss in a procurement
fraud or product substitution case includes not only direct damages,
but also consequential damages that were reasonably foreseeable."230
The plain implication of this sentence is that, except in pro-
curement fraud and product substitution cases, loss includes "only
client's bankruptcy fraud scheme); United States v. ONeil, 118 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1997)
(defendant responsible for all loss caused by fraudulent telemarketing firms of which he was
part-owner because misrepresentations by sales staff were foreseeable); United States v.
LaCroix, 28 F.3d 223, 231 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding defendant responsible for 90 or more homes
sold fraudulently by the conspiracy); United States v. Jackson, 25 F.3d 327, 330 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding defendant responsible for all losses caused by his associates in an insurance and credit
card fraud scheme).
229. USSG § 11.3, Application Note 2, states: The requirement of reasonable foreseeabil-
ity applies only in respect to the conduct.., of others under subsection (a)(1)(B). It does not
apply to conduct that the defendant personally undertakes, aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces, procures, or willfully causes; such conduct is addresed under subsection (a)(1)(A)."
Much of the quoted language is, of course, internally contradictory. The Application Note
says reasonable foreseeabiity applies to the conduct of others but not to conduct the defendant
"aids, abets.. .[etc.]" But "others" are the only people whose conduct a defendant can aid, abet,
counsel, command, induce or procure. So when does the reasonable foreseeability apply?
230. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(c).
19981 511
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
direct damages."231 Thus, the Commission appears to endorse, almost
as an aside and with no effort at elaboration, a general rule about
causation: Except in procurement fraud and product substitution
cases, "direct damages" are included in loss, but "consequential dam-
ages" are not.232
The choice of the phrase "consequential damages" as the linch-
pin of a rule about sentencing causation could scarcely have been less
fortunate. "Consequential damages" is a term of art drawn from the
law of contracts.23 Other than in the Guidelines, it is used nowhere
else in the criminal law. The attempt to translate the term from con-
tract to sentencing law creates numerous problems. First, the law of
contracts concerns agreements, principally commercial agreements.2 4
It presupposes identifiable promises between known contracting
parties.235 Its purpose is to protect and enforce, so far as is reasonable
and desirable as a matter of policy, the expectations arising from the
promise or promises which make up the contract. 236 In consequence,
the law of remedies for breach of contract is primarily concerned with
ascertaining the scope of the agreement and securing to the non-
breaching party, as far as possible, the benefit of his bargain,237 or,
where that is not possible or desirable, restoring the injured promisee
to the position he was in before the agreement was made.2ss
By contrast, economic crimes need not involve any promise at
all, much less a legally enforceable agreement. Crimes in the larceny
family are customarily crimes of stealth and require no acquaintance
231. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1058 (1996) (stating that by adopting USSG § 2F1.1, Application Note 7(c), "[the
Commission... expressly considered and rejected consequential damages as a factor in
determining offense levels under the Sentencing Guidelines, except for government procure-
ment and product substitution cases").
232. In concluding that Application Note 7(c) states a general rule of causation, I assume
that "damages" is intended to mean the same thing as "loss." If not, and if there is supposed to
be some difference between "loss" and "damage," the matter becomes even more obscure.
233. See generally JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 10-4 (Damages for Breach of Warranty-Consequential Damages) (4th ed. 1995).
234. "The law of contracts is concerned with the securing and protection of those economic
interests which result from assurances." JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS
§ 1, at 2 (1974).
235. "We... describe a contract as a promise, or a group of promises, which the law will
enforce, or the performance of which it in some way recognizes as a duty." Id § 2, at 3.
236. See id. § 2, at 3.
237. Murray states:
The purpose of contract law is often stated as the fulfillment of those expectations which
have been induced by the making of a promise. If the promise is breached the legal sys-
tem protects the expectations by attempting to place the injured promisee in the position
he would have been in had the promise been performed.
Id. § 219, at 438.
238. See id. § 219, at 439.
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between thief and victim, much less an agreement. The same is true
of crimes involving receipt of stolen goods and destruction of property.
Other basic crimes of dishonesty like embezzlement may arise in the
context of a contractual relationship, as for example, an employment
contract incident to which the defendant obtains lawful possession of
property later embezzled. But an embezzler need not be party to an
employment contract, and in any case the purpose of prosecuting and
perhaps imprisoning an embezzling employee is not to protect the
employer's expectation interest in the fulfillment of an express or
implied promise not to convert certain goods.239
Fraud cases often do arise in contractual settings. Obvious
instances include loan fraud and procurement fraud.20 But just as
often there is either no contract in the case,21 or the person who suf-
fers an economic loss is not a party to any contract with the defendant.
A good example of the latter situation is the Harper equity skimming
case discussed above, 2 in which the defendant entered into contracts
with the homeowners to assume their mortgages, and contracts with
the renters to provide housing. He breached both sets of contracts.
Yet the major economic losers in the case were not the homeowners or
renters who contracted with the defendant; those parties either lost
little or received most of what they bargained for. The true losers
were the banks and the federal government, neither of which
contracted with the defendant at all.
Thus, in economic crime cases in which there is no readily
identifiable contract, or in which the loss was inflicted on someone not
party to any contract breached by the defendant, the distinction be-
tween direct and consequential damages provides a sentencing court
no useful guidance. How does one decide which economic harms are
the direct, and which the consequential, results of the breach of a
contract that never existed? In United States v. Marlatt ,23 the
Seventh Circuit suggested that the Sentencing Commission adopted
239. See id. § 219, at 438.
240. In loan fraud, a defendant makes misrepresentations to induce a bank to enter into a
loan contract. In procurement fraud, a contractor agrees to provide goods of a certain type to
the government, but fails to do so and conceals the failure by fraud.
241. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbrough, No. 96-2816, 1997 WL 73828 (7th Cir. Feb. 14,
1997) (unpublished disposition), in which the defendant committed telecommunications fraud
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(5), (b)(2) (1994), by manufacturing and selling cloned cellular
telephones. The economic harm was incurred by cellular telephone companies who provided air
time free to those who purchased the cloned phones from the defendant, but the defendant had
no contractual relationship, or indeed any contact whatever, with the telephone company
victims.
242. Discussed supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
243. 24 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1994).
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the prohibition on consequential damages in order "to prevent the
sentencing hearing from turning into a tort or contract suit."2"
Unfortunately, the court got it backwards. Regardless of what the
Commission's intent may have been, the unavoidable effect of using a
contracts term in criminal sentencing is precisely to transform the
sentencing process into a piece of contract litigation.
More troubling than the general analytical conundrums occa-
sioned by injecting contracts terminology into criminal sentencing law
are problems specific to the phrase "consequential damages." Modern
law on consequential damages is generally conceded to be a refine-
ment of the holding in the classic English case of Hadley v.
Baxendale. 5 (For those who recall from first year Contracts class the
brain-twisting holding of Hadley, this historical fact alone should
create some reluctance to bring "consequential damages" into the
criminal law.) Foreseeability is the modern test of whether some
alleged economic harm caused by a breach of contract is recoverable
as a "consequential damage."24 6 If the harm to the plaintiff was rea-
sonably foreseeable to the breaching defendant then it is ordinarily
recoverable by the plaintiff absent some special contractual provision
excluding such recovery.2 7
The distinction between direct and consequential damages is
routinely litigated in contract cases. However, in contract cases in
which damages become an issue there is, by definition, an agreement
consisting of particular promises, at least one of which has been
broken. In that context, it makes sense to speak of direct damages as
the monetary value of the broken promise-the cost to the buyer of
replacing an undelivered shipment of wheat or to the seller of produc-
ing a shipment of shoes for a shop that refuses delivery-and of
recoverable consequential damages as the foreseeable additional
consequences flowing from the breach. In economic crime cases where
there is no contract to serve as a frame of reference, the contract
terms "direct damages" and "consequential damages" are stripped of
their particular meaning and become, not an actual distinction, but,
at best, a sort of metaphor or illustration of the kind of distinction the
244. Id. at 1007.
245. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 233, § 10-4, at 314
("Most of the law regarding consequential damages can be traced back to ... Hadley v.
Baxendale.").
246. See WITE & SUMMERS, supra note 233, § 10-4, at 564; 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1010, at 79 (1964); see also U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1995) (stating that a defendant
would be liable for "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know. ..
247. See U.C.C. § 2-715 & cmt. 3.
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Commission had in mind. In this view, Application Note 7(c) means
something like, "Sentencing courts should not consider harms of the
general sort described in contracts cases as 'consequential damages.'"
It will come as no surprise that courts have experienced con-
siderable difficulty in applying the consequential damages concept to
sentencing. The Sixth Circuit has held unequivocally that loss does
include "incidental and consequential damages."248 Other circuits
routinely intone that loss does not include consequential "damages.249
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has found that the Sentencing
Commission's intention to exclude consequential damages from the
loss calculation is so clear that such damages may not generally be
taken into account even in justifying a departure.20 Nonetheless, it is
extraordinarily difficult to discern from the cases any principled
dividing line between "loss" and "consequential damages."
248. See United States v. King, 915 F.2d 269, 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (construing section
2B2.2(bX2), which incorporates the loss table of section 2B1.1, to include in loss "incidental or
consequential damages," such as the cost of hiring security guards while bank vault damaged by
defendant was repaired); United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 353, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
King to hold that interest accrued on purchases made with fraudulently obtained credit cards is
a component of loss under section 2F1.1). The continued validity of these holdings is in some
doubt, however, because both predate the November 1, 1991, addition of section 2F1.1,
Application Note 7(c), excluding "consequential damages" from loss in all but product substitu-
tion and procurement fraud matters. See USSG App. C, amend. 393, at 223 (Nov. 1, 1991). On
the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has never expressly overruled King, and indeed cited it ap-
provingly in an unpublished opinion after the addition of Application Note 7(c). See United
States v. Majszak, No. 91-2179, 1992 WL 188114, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 1992) (unpublished
disposition) ("We have interpreted [section 2B1.1 n.2] to mean the amount of the victims' 'net
out of pocket loss,' including all incidental and consequential damages, as well as accrued
interest."); see also United States v. Hoffman, No. 95-3445, 1995 WL 465799, at *3-4 (6th Cir.
Aug. 4, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (including consequential damages in loss in procurement
fraud case, citing section 2FL.1 application note 7(c)).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that
consequential and incidental damages are not included in loss); United States v. Marlatt, 24
F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that consequential and incidental damages "are not to
be counted in computing loss"); United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that loss does not include consequential damages); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d
214, 217 (11th Cir. 1993) ("The phrase 'property taken, damaged, or destroyed' does not allow for
inclusion of incidental or consequential injury ... ."); United States v. Santiago, 977 F.2d 517,
525-26 (10th Cir. 1992).
250. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1346 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1058 (1996) (citing United States v. LNU, 16 F.3d 1168, 1170 (11th Cir. 1994), modified,
United States u. Omar, 24 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 1994)). The court considered the express inclu-
sion of consequential damages as part of the loss measurement for product substitution and
government procurement cases in USSG section 2F1.1, application note 7(c), and concluded
that, "[tihe fact that the Commission deliberately allowed an increase for consequential dam-
ages in some but not all types of frauds indicates that 'the absence of an increase.. . is a result
of design rather than inadvertence.'" The court left room for a departure based on consequen-
tial damages "outside the heartland" considered by the Commission, id. at 1347, but did not
suggest the factors which might make consequential damages sufficiently extraordinary to
warrant departure.
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An examination of the case law reveals how confused courts
are on this issue. In United States v. Wilson, the Eleventh'Circuit
vacated the sentence imposed by the district court judge assessing
against the defendant the full amount of loans promised in an ad-
vance fee scheme, even though no loans were ever made.251 To justify
including the full amount of the promised loans, the district court
relied on skimpy testimony from individual victims regarding feelings
of embarrassment and actions such as quitting jobs taken in detri-
mental reliance on the expectation of a loan. 2
In the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Mende, the defen-
dant's company guaranteed large loans and obtained advance fees for
channeling loans to banks.253 The district court charged the defendant
with a loss including $3 million for the advance fees, $13 million for
defaulted loans guaranteed by the defendant's companies, stock losses
of $647,000, and additional actual losses of $500,000.2-4 The
defendant, relying on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Wilson,
claimed that all losses except the advance fees should be excluded as
incidental and consequential damages.255
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and upheld the district court. The
court distinguished Wilson by pointing to a closer causal connection
between the losses and the fraud in the present case than had ob-
tained in Wilson: "Unlike Wilson, there can be no doubt that Mende's
fraud cost his victims more than just advance fees. In this case the
district court found the victim banks' losses to be the direct result of
the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations, rather than mere
consequential and incidental damages."256 The Mende court was un-
doubtedly correct in finding Wilson factually distinguishable; the
causal connection between the losses and Mende's conduct was more
direct than in Wilson, and it rested on less speculative evidence. The
interesting part of the decision, however, is that Mende defined the
difference between "loss" and "consequential damages" purely in
terms of causation. For the Mende court, economic harms that have a
close causal relationship to the crime are "loss." Harms that are more
causally remote or are connected to the crime by speculation are
"consequential damages" and therefore not "loss."27 Although as a
251. 993 F.2d 214 (11th Cir. 1993).
252. See id. at 216, 218.
253. 43 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1995).
254. See id. at 1302.
255. Id. at 1302-03.
256. Id. at 1303.
257. In United States v. Ortland, the Ninth Circuit apparently relaxed the "direct causa-
tion" requirement when it characterized Mende as having "rejected a claim that all somewhat
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matter of policy this is not a bad rule (or at least portion of a rule) for
defining "loss," it requires distorting the customary meaning of
"consequential damages."258 In contracts, if consequential damages
are directly caused by the defendant's misconduct, as they often are,
and if they were foreseeable, the defendant is responsible for paying
them.
The Seventh Circuit's decisions on consequential damages are
particularly challenging. In United States v. Marlatt, the defendant,
the owner of a local title company, bought a resort property and
secured title insurance policies on time-share units at the resort by
lying to the national title insurance company (for which he was the
local agent) about the existence of extensive liens and other encum-
brances.259 He sold the units to individuals who agreed to buy in reli-
ance on assurances of clear title (as well as on assurances of the re-
sort's overall sound financial condition implicit in the title docu-
ments). When the defendant's fraud was discovered, the insurer had
to pay over $476,000 to clear the titles. The resort went bankrupt and
closed, rendering the time-share units virtually worthless. The in-
surer, under threat of suit from the individual owners,260 spent an
additional $565,000 to purchase the units from them and forestall the
suit.
Judge Posner, writing for the panel, concluded that the
$476,000 paid by the insurer to remove the encumbrances and fulfill
the terms of its policies was "loss," but that the costs incurred to buy
the resort and forestall a lawsuit were not. The Marlatt opinion has
been cited frequently,261 and deserves careful examination.
indirect fraud losses are a type of 'consequential' damages that cannot be considered under
[section] 2F1.1." 109 F.3d 539, 548 (9th Cir. 1997). Cf United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865,
870 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that certain personnel costs incurred by the victim bank during
the investigation of defendant's computer fraud, though a foreseeable result of the fraud, might
not be includable as loss because they were consequential damages).
258. Moreover, several components of the economic harm the Mende court included in loss,
notably the stock losses and $500,000 in other actual losses, would clearly be considered conse-
quential damages in a contracts case, and therefore should be excluded from "loss" if the phrase
"consequential damages" is to retain any vestige of its meaning as a term of art.
259. 24 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 1994).
260. Although the opinion is vague on the point, the presumable ground for such an action
was that the defendant was an agent of the title insurer who inveigled the buyers into purchas-
ing soon-to-be worthless property in part in reliance on assurances of clear title bearing the
imprimatur of the title insurer.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 114 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1997) ("consequential or
incidental damages" not to be included in loss calculation); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d
1151, 1173 (7th Cir. 1996) (although a defendant's fraud may be a "but for" cause of such dam-
ages, such damages are not included as loss under section 2F1.1); Creek v. Village of
Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Causation in the law is not to be equated to 'but
for' causation."); United States v. Barrett, 51 F.3d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1995) (money spent by title
1998]
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The court began by getting the "who's the victim?" question
wrong. Judge Posner identified only the title company as the victim,
and emphasized that the company made a business decision to reim-
burse the time-share owners, a decision which was in his view neither
legally required nor caused by the defendant's fraud. He apparently
thought that, because the company volunteered to assume this ex-
pense, the sentencing court could not then charge it to the defendant.
The defect in this reasoning is that the economic harm represented by
the $565,000 the company paid to purchase the worthless apartments
would have been suffered by the individual owners had the company
not acted. The defendant's scheme was never directed at the title
company, except incidentally. The true object of the scheme was to
obtain money from time-share buyers by misrepresenting the condi-
tion of the titles to individual units, and more importantly by explic-
itly or implicitly misrepresenting the overall financial soundness of
the entire resort. The individual buyers were induced to part with
$565,000 in. reliance on the defendant's falsehoods and forgeries.
Even if the indictment in the case did not identify the purchasers as
victims of the scheme to defraud (and one cannot tell from the opin-
ion), the fraud practiced upon them was unquestionably relevant con-
duct under section 1B1.3. Thus, the owners were victims just as
much as the title company. The fact that the title insurer decided to
reimburse the individual owner-victims for their losses no more
erases those losses from the sentencing calculus than would the busi-
ness decision of a property insurer to recompense a burglary victim
for stolen items not covered by a homeowner's policy.
Judge Posner implicitly addressed the weakness in the ap-
proach of identifying the insurer as sole victim by going on to hold
that the collapse in value of property at the resort was not caused
(except, as he says, "in the sense.., of 'but for' causality"262) by the
defendant's fraud. "The fact that the purchasers would not have pur-
chased the time shares had it not been for the title insurance policies
issued by Ticor would not make Ticor an insurer against a drop in the
insurer to clear titles includable as loss); see also United States v. Barker, No. 95-3262, 1996 WL
294141, at *2 (10th Cir. June 4, 1996) (unpublished disposition) (consequential damages are not
to be included in the calculation of loss for purposes of section 2F1.1); United States v. Neadle,
72 F.3d 1104, 1118 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting a "need for
finding causation in making a loss determination"); United States v. Gottfried, 58 F.3d 648, 651
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that decisions holding incidental or consequential damages may not be
counted toward loss are not persuasive); United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163, 171-72 (3d Cir.
1994) (consequential and incidental damages are generally not to be included as loss under
section 2F1.1).
262. Marlatt, 24 F.3d at 1007.
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real estate market."2 63 Judge Posner noted that more than mere "but
for" causation has historically been required for the imposition of
criminal liability. However, in what at first glance appears a peculiar
omission, he neglected to identify what that something more might
be, saying only that "[t]he distinction runs throughout the law.
Criminal law is no exception."264 It is nonetheless plain that the
"distinction" to which he alluded is the foreseeability element of
traditional proximate cause analysis.265
Finally, Judge Posner said that "even if' the plunge in value
was caused by the fraud, the money paid by the insurer to compensate
the owners was a consequential damage excluded from loss by section
2F1.1, Application Note 7(c).266 Aided by the fact that Marlatt did
contain a contract, the court nicely melded the guideline definition of
loss with traditional contract law on consequential damages:
The defendant extracted from Ticor [the title insurer] by fraud a bunch of in-
surance policies on which Ticor was required to make good to the tune of
$476,000. This was the loss. In the wake of the loss Ticor incurred other ex-
penses, which were consequences, perhaps even foreseeable consequences, of
the fraud, but were not the thing actually taken from Ticor, the loss; the thing
taken was the promise to insure and the cost of honoring that promise was
$476,000.267
The reason for Judge Posner's odd reticence about defining the
"distinction [that] runs throughout the law" now becomes clear.
Evidently, he was reluctant to point out that foreseeability is the
nearly universal "distinction" between those harms chargeable to civil
and criminal malefactors and those that are not, because, in contrast
to the Ninth Circuit in Mende, Judge Posner held in Marlatt that even
economic harms directly and foreseeably caused by a defendant's
conduct are excluded from "loss" if they are "consequential damages."
This is, in my view, a regrettable outcome as a matter of policy (a
point to which we will turn momentarily). Nonetheless, at least as to
263. Id.
264. Id. (citing Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 79-80(7th Cir. 1993)).
265. Despite Judge Posner's studied avoidance of the term "proximate cause," Judge Becker
of the Third Circuit read Marlatt as "applying proximate cause analysis." Neadle, 72 F.3d at
1118 (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting).
266. See Marlatt, 24 F.3d at 1007-08. The opinion refers to Application Note 7(b), which is




the victim title company, Judge Posner's opinion provides a reason-
ably convincing interpretation of the Guidelines as now written.268
Less than a year later, the Seventh Circuit decided United
States v. Barrett, a case presenting facts nearly identical to those in
Marlatt.269 Defendant Barrett induced a title company to issue clear
title commitments based on false representations that existing mort-
gages had been satisfied. He also made false statements directly to a
federally insured savings and loan ("S & L") asserting that lots
pledged as collateral for construction loans were free of encum-
brances. He was convicted of making false statements to a federally
insured lending institution.
After discovery of the fraud, the title company made good on
its insurance policy by paying off the existing lienholders. The S & L
then foreclosed on the lots, but suffered a loss because the loan
amounts exceeded the foreclosure proceeds. The government argued
that both the title insurance payout and the S & L's loss due to de-
creased value of its collateral were components of the loss. The
Seventh Circuit agreed.
The court did not dispute Barrett's contention that the loss to
the S & L in this case was a "consequential damage" of precisely the
same sort suffered by the time-share buyers in Marlatt and excluded
from loss by Judge Posner. Indeed, the Barrett court cited Marlatt for
the proposition that "[a] loss due to reduced market value, whether it
is borne by the property owner or the title insurer, is consequential
and is not a loss attributable to the title fraud."270 The court nonethe-
less distinguished Marlatt on the ground that the victim in Barrett
was a financial institution, and section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(b)
regarding fraudulent loan cases includes as "loss" the decline in value
of collateral between the fraud and liquidation of the collateral.
Obviously uncomfortable with the disparate results dictated by the
Guidelines, the Barrett court supported the differential treatment of
the title insurer in Marlatt and the federally insured lender before it
on the ground that the defendant's misrepresentation to the S & L
268. I say "reasonably convincing" because, even on its own terms, the opinion is open to
question. Whether the money paid by the title insurer to purchase its insureds' units would be
a direct or consequential damage in civil law depends on what civil lawsuit one considers.
Presumably, the hypothetical suit would be by the title company against the criminal defendant
for breach of the agency contract and fraud. It is not at all clear that the insurer's payouts to its
insureds, whether made under threat of suit or not, would necessarily be considered a conse-
quential rather than a direct damage flowing from either the breach of the agency agreement or
the fraud or both.
269. 51 F.3d 86 (7th Cir. 1995).
270. Id. at 91.
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induced the S & L to make a loan it would not otherwise have made
by distorting the bank's initial assessment of "the actual likelihood of
his defaulting on the loans."271 The distinction is unconvincing. After
all, did not the defendants' misrepresentations to the title companies
in both Barrett and Marlatt cause them to miscalculate the risks they
incurred by issuing title insurance policies? The issue in both cases
was not whether the defendant's misrepresentations caused victims to
part with their money. They did. The issue in each case was whether
the defendant's conduct had a sufficient causal connection to the fact
that victims lost money when the property he induced them to buy (or
accept as a security) declined in value to justify holding him responsi-
ble for such losses at sentencing. The law of the Seventh Circuit on
consequential damages and loss remains murky.272
For its part, the D.C. Circuit seems to find persuasive the
Ninth Circuit's approach in Mende. In United States v. Gottfried, the
defendant was an Attorney Advisor to the Board of Veterans' Appeals
in the Department of Veterans Affairs.273 To save himself work, he
removed documents from the files of appeals of regional office deci-
sions denying eligibility for disability benefits, and recommended
remand of the cases to the regional office because of incomplete
files.274 The defendant was convicted of concealment, removal, and
mutilation of government records. 275 The district court counted as
part of the loss the costs incurred by the Board in reprocessing the
271. Id.
272. The recent case of United States v. O'Brien, 119 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 1997) muddied the
waters further still. Defendant O'Brien was convicted of bank fraud and wire fraud for taking
out loans secured by the assets of her oil delivery company and then selling those assets to
another company by claiming that they were unencumbered. The successor company was forced
to pay the bank to satisfy the liens, and both it and the bank suffered losses. At sentencing, the
district court included in the loss calculation as relevant conduct more than $40,000 the defen-
dant had obtained from her principal oil supplier, North Shore Oil, by ordering oil, selling it,
and sticking to the proceeds. See id. at 534. The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's claim
that the North Shore losses were excludable consequential damages, employing reasoning closer
to the Ninth Circuit's direct causation analysis in Mende than to Judge Posner's merger of
contract law with the "thing taken" language of section 2F1.1. The court wrote:
Consequential damages are defined as "damage, loss or injury as does not flow directly
and immediately from the act of the party, but only from some of the consequences or
results of such act.... Damages which arise from intervention of special circumstances
not ordinarily predictable." In this case, there was ample evidence from which the court
could, and did, conclude that the loss caused to North Shore Oil arose as a direct result
of O'Brien's fraudulent scheme.
Id. at 535 n.9 (citation omitted).
273. 58 F.3d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
274. See id. at 649-50.
275. See id. at 649.
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thirty-two appeals known to have been tampered with by the defen-
dant.
The D.C. Circuit approved, despite the inclusion of costs to the
government such as the pro rata overhead expenses of running the
Board.276 The court analogized the inclusion of overhead expenses to
awarding attorney's fees in a civil case.277 Said the court: "Including
pro rata overhead expenses in the amount of the Board's loss.., for
reprocessing the thirty-two appeals merely attributed to Gottfried the
cost of undoing the damage he had done."278
The court distinguished Marlatt and other cases that exclude
consequential damages,279 remarking: "Perhaps more may be dis-
cerned, but at the least the cases stand for the general proposition
that only 'direct' losses count."280 In the hands of the Gottfried court,
the "no-consequential-damages" rule is transmuted into little more
than a requirement of "but for" causation.281
4. Consequential Damages in Procurement Fraud and Product
Substitution Cases
As troublesome as the general exclusion of consequential dam-
ages from loss has proven in practice, the mandate of section 2F1.1,
Application Note 7(c), that such harms be included in loss in pro-
curement fraud and product substitution cases is perhaps even more
276. See id. at 651.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 651-52.
280. See id. at 652.
281. The court stated:
The cost of redoing the thirty-two appeals Gottfried had been assigned to handle was a
direct result of his crime. It followed immediately as a consequence of his unlawful ac-
tion. If Gottfried had not violated the law, the appeals would have been handled once,
by him. His illegal initial processing of the appeals forced the Board to reprocess them.
Id.
Judge Henderson's concurrence aptly noted that "the property loss valuation provisions of
the Guidelines are a bad fit for the kind of crime committed here (in that they focus on the value
of the property taken or damaged rather than the extent of the actual harm caused by the
criminal activity)." Id. at 653 (Henderson, J., concurring). The concurrence also suggested that
an upward departure would be a better approach than straining to assess an economic harm.
Id. (Henderson, J., concurring).
See also United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), in which the court
assessed a defendant convicted of destroying government documents for loss it equated with the
costs incurred in undoing the full extent of the damage, including the costs of "reorganizing the
documents," "reinterviewing the witnesses," and "obtaining" and "recopying" the documents. Id.
at 1390. Said the court, "[Time a person spends doing one thing is time that person cannot
spend doing something else; therefore, opportunity costs must also be factored into the cost of
replacing the documents." Id. Berkowitz was decided prior to the adoption of Application Note
7(d) excluding "consequential damages" in most cases, and is thus of dubious precedential value.
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puzzling as a matter of policy.282 It is not readily apparent why these
categories of cases should be treated differently. For example, why
should the "reasonably foreseeable costs of making substitute transac-
tions" and "the reasonably foreseeable administrative cost to the
government and other participants of repeating the procurement
action affected"m be chargeable to the defendant in procurement
cases when similar costs incurred by governmental and other victims
in non-procurement cases are not?
The explanation offered in note 7(c) for the special treatment of
procurement and product substitution cases-that consequential
damages "frequently are substantial in such cases"-is hardly ade-
quate. In the first place, the unstated implication that consequential
damages in other types of cases are generally insubstantial is, at best,
questionable. Second, if the concept of "loss" does not include conse-
quential damages, then the fact that such damages happen to be large
in one category of crimes is hardly an explanation for changing the
definition.28
Indeed, it is plain that some courts have been unable to fathom
the reasoning behind the distinction. Gottfried, for example, is a case
in which the loss measurement sanctioned by the D.C. Circuit can
fairly be described as either "the cost of making substitute transac-
tions" or "the reasonably foreseeable administrative cost to the gov-
ernment... of repeating the.., action affected."m Notwithstanding
their authors' protestations to the contrary, Gottfried and Mende are
282. See United States v. Hoffman, No. 95-3445, 1995 WL 465799 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 1995)
(unpublished), in which the court relied on USSG section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(c), for the
proposition that in procurement fraud or product substitution cases, consequential damages
may be part of the loss. In this case, consequential losses included payment for unusable goods
and storage costs, removal and inspection of the nonconforming goods, and the cost of holding
usable goods in evidence. See id.; see also United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996)
(including in loss the amount roofing company overcharged, the amount of false bond premiums,
the amount of additional materials the government had to purchase to complete the project, and
the amount of physical damage caused by defendant's company).
283. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(c).
284. It is undoubtedly true that consequential damages in product substitution cases are
sometimes very large indeed. See, for example, United States v. Roggy, 76 F.3d 189 (8th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1700 (1996), in which the defendant defrauded General Mills by
promising to spray oats with a pesticide safe for human consumption and instead spraying the
oats (16 million bushels of them) with Dursban, a cheaper pesticide not safe for human con-
sumption. See id. at 191. The damage to General Mills topped $80 million, and the Eighth
Circuit upheld the trial court's assessment of this amount as the loss under section 2F1.1
against the defendant's argument that the loss should be either the amount he saved by using
the cheaper pesticide, or, at worst, the total amount he was paid for his services. See id. at 193-
94.
285. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(c).
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both cases in which economic harms that would in any other context
be termed consequential damages were made part of the loss.
5. Causation and Multiple Factors
The issue of multiple causation commonly arises when a de-
fendant's conduct has apparently caused some actual loss to the
victim, but the defendant alleges that but for the intervention of
unforeseen factors, the loss would have been smaller or would not
have occurred at all. Consider, for example, a victim who purchases
stock based on a defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations about its
value, and then sees the stock decrease in value still further because
of an unforeseen downturn in the stock market after the purchase.
From one point of view, the only loss directly caused by the defendant
in this case is the difference between the price the victim paid for the
stock based on the representations by the defendant and the actual
(lower) market value of the stock at the time of purchase.286 On the
other hand, but for the defendant's blandishments, the victim would
not have been holding the stock to begin with and thus would not
have suffered the additional harm caused by the market decline. The
fundamental issue is the nature and strength of the required causal
nexus between a defendant's criminal conduct and the loss charged to
him under the Guidelines.
The Guidelines themselves provide somewhat conflicting ad-
vice on this problem. The only direct reference to multiple causation
in either the theft or fraud guideline is in Application Note 7(b) of
section 2F1.1, which suggests that the amount of loss caused287 by the
defendant's conduct may overstate the seriousness of the offense if
there existed some cause or causes extraneous to the defendant's
misbehavior.288 The example given is an unanticipated economic
286. This result is suggested by USSG § 2F1.1, Application Note 7(a), which says, "Where,
for example, a defendant fraudulently represents that stock is worth $40,000 and the stock is
worth only $10,000, the loss is the amount by which the stock was overvalued (i.e., $30,000)."
287. The commentary does not elaborate on what is meant by causation.
288. Section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(b) reads:
In some cases, the loss determined above may significantly understate or overstate the
seriousness of the defendant's conduct. For example.., a defendant may understate his
debts to a limited degree to obtain a loan (e.g., to expand a grain export business), which
he genuinely expected to repay and for which he would have qualified at a higher inter-
est rate had he made truthful disclosure, but he is unable to repay the loan because of
some unforeseen event (e.g., an embargo imposed on grain exports) which would have
caused a default in any event. In such a case, the loss determined above may overstate
the seriousness of the defendant's conduct... [and a] downward departure may be war-
ranted.
USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(b).
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event like a grain embargo.28 9 In such a case, the suggested remedy is
a downward departure.290
By contrast, as noted above in the discussion of United States
v. Barrett,291 the very same application note says that loss in fraudu-
lent loan cases will be determined by taking the unpaid balance of the
loan at the time of discovery of the fraud and subtracting the amount
the "lending institution has recovered (or can expect to recover)" from
liquidation of the collateral.292 The commentary does not exclude from
the loss calculation the increase in "loss" which necessarily occurs
whenever the value of pledged collateral decreases due to changed
market conditions, natural disaster, or other factors arising between
the making of the loan and the liquidation of the collateral after dis-
covery of the fraud. Where the victim is a bank, the defendant is
responsible for the bank's entire loss, whether or not multiple factors
are present.
The Guidelines provide no guidance on the question of when
losses arising from external factors should be attributed to the defen-
dant and when the connection between the external factor, the defen-
dant's conduct, and the victim's loss is so attenuated that some ad-
justment should be made by actual modification of the loss amount or
by departure. Courts have wrestled with this problem with indiffer-
ent success. Some appear to recognize that adjustments to "loss" for
multiple causation may be appropriate in certain cases.29 3 On the
other hand, the Third Circuit is of the view that multiple causation
can only be a ground for a downward departure.29
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
292. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(b).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 60 F.3d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting defen-
dant's request for a downward departure based on the claim that the loss was inflated due to an
"economic downturn in the regional economy," but recognizing the potential validity of such a
claim); United States v. Rostoff, 53 F.3d 398, 405 (1st Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that a down-
ward departure may be warranted in the few instances where "'a misrepresentation... is not
the sole cause of the loss.'") (quoting USSG § 2F1.1 application note 11 (1987)). See also United
States v. Irons, 53 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1995), an insurance fraud case in which the defendant
submitted false claims arising from a staged automobile accident. Insurance companies paid
out over $221,000. The defendant claimed that real loss was only around $50,000 because
insurer had paid only $50,000 in benefits before a second, genuine collision occurred. The court
of appeals rejected the defendant's argument on the ground that the insurer's payments were
based on the first accident, not the second. See id. The opinion implicitly conceded that an
adjustment might be appropriate in a case of multiple claims where one or more of the non-
fraudulent claims were genuine.
294. The Third Circuit reads note 7(b) as creating a rule that:
it is not appropriate to reduce the amount of the loss.., in order to reflect other causes
of the loss which were beyond the defendant's control. An intervening force that in-
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6. Causation: A Summary of the Status Quo
What then can we divine about the required causal relation-
ship between a defendant's criminal behavior and those economic
harms the Guidelines now count as "loss"? In truth, the Guidelines
and the cases construing them have created an ugly and nearly in-
comprehensible patchwork:
a. The Guidelines contain no rules for determining the
identity of victims whose losses will be taken into account for
sentencing purposes.
b. The relevant conduct guideline says that offense
levels are to be determined based on "all harm that resulted
from" 295 a defendant's own conduct, apparently setting up a rule
of pure "but for" causation.
c. By contrast, both the fraud and theft guidelines
define "loss" narrowly as the "thing taken," the corpus delicti of
the crime.
d. Moreover, section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(c), says
that only "direct damages" count for the purpose of determining
loss, and excludes from consideration "consequential damages."
If the latter term is given its customary meaning, Note 7(c) ex-
cludes from loss many economic harms which are both foresee-
able and directly caused by defendant's conduct.
e. On the other hand, in cases of procurement fraud
and product substitution the Guidelines specifically include
"consequential damages" in loss, if such "damages" were fore-
seeable.
f. Likewise, if a defendant has co-conspirators or other
criminal cohorts, he is responsible for all harms that resulted
from all of their "reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions" in
furtherance of the crime.
g. In loan fraud cases, a drop in value of pledged
collateral is a part of the loss to banks, despite the fact that such
loss is a classic "consequential damage." Moreover, the rule is
so broad that such losses are counted regardless of whether the
decline in value was caused by factors wholly extraneous to the
creases a fraud-related loss will not decrease the loss valuation but will only provide
possible grounds for a downward departure.
United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 1110 (3d Cir. 1995) (relying on United States v. Kopp,
951 F.2d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 1991)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 238 (1996).
295. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(3).
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crime and regardless of whether it was foreseeable to the
defendant.
h. Except in loan fraud cases, if a victim's loss is
genuinely attributable to several causes, there is no rule for
determining what the causal nexus to a defendant's conduct
must be before the loss should be counted.
i. In any case, courts routinely evade the no-
consequential-damages rule by ignoring it or by interpreting it
to impose something like a rule of proximate causation.
B. Causation: A Path Out of the Swamp
Judge Posner is exactly right when he says in Marlatt that the
idea of causation "runs throughout the law" as a distinction between
liability and non-liability.296 As we noted at the outset, causation is
one of the principal requirements, along with an act or omission and a
culpable mental state, for a determination of fault for crime.2 97 The
distinction between harms said to have been "caused" or "not caused"
by a party's misconduct is also central to torts and contracts. More to
the point for present purposes, and as I hope the foregoing discussion
has demonstrated, many, perhaps most, of the difficulties in deciding
which economic harms to include in loss under the Guidelines are at
bottom problems of causation. In any theory of liability for harm,
whether civil or criminal, and in criminal cases whether at the guilt
or sentencing phase, the indispensable link between the defendant's
conduct and a harm for which the law seeks to impose responsibility
is a definition of causation. When the drafters of the Guidelines cre-
ated a sentencing scheme for economic crime which made measure-
ment of harm the predominant sentencing factor, but failed to define
the required causal relation between the criminal conduct and the
harm to be measured, the current thicket of uncertainty became not
only predictable, but inevitable.
I hasten to add that by "causation" I do not refer only to the
purely mechanical relation of cause and effect between defendant's
conduct and a particular harm, though this is certainly one compo-
nent of the problem. While causation analysis takes slightly different
forms in different disciplines, two elements are common to causation
analysis throughout the law: (1) a requirement of cause-in-fact, that
is, a logical cause and effect relationship between the conduct com-
296. United States v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1994).
297. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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plained-of and the harm for which liability is sought; and (2) what
might be termed "cause in law," that is, some formula for cutting off
infinite liability for remote and unpredictable consequences, and thus
for keeping legal responsibility within reasonable limits.
To be doctrinally coherent and practically useful, a consoli-
dated economic crimes guideline must have rules concerning each of
these elements of causation. Indeed, the Commission should abandon
its current dysfunctional larceny-based definition of loss and redefine
the term expressly in terms of cause. In the following Section, I pro-
pose such a definition in the form of a draft application note, and then
analyze the language of the draft.
1. Loss Redefined
The Sentencing Commission should redefine "loss" in
application notes to a consolidated economic crimes guideline as
follows:
Application Notes:
1. 'Loss" means all pecuniary harm caused by the acts and omissions
specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) that
was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of such acts or
omissions. "Victims" are all persons or entities (public or private) which
suffered such harms.
(a) Pecuniay harm
The phrase "pecuniary harm" is to be given its common meaning.
Many physical and emotional harms, injuries to reputation, etc.,
can be assigned a monetary value. However, "loss" does not
measure harms of this kind. Its purpose is to measure economic
harms.
(b) Cause-in-fact
A harm has been "caused" for the purposes of this guideline if one
or more of the acts or omissions specified in subsection (a)(1) or
(a)(2) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) was a substantial factor in
producing the harm. "Loss" should not include harms that are
causally remote from the specified acts or omissions.
(c) Foreseeability
A foreseeable harm is one that ordinarily follows from one or more
of the acts or omissions specified in subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of §
1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in the usual course of events, or that a
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have
foreseen as a probable result of such acts or omissions....
Loss does not, however, include costs incurred by government
agencies in criminal investigation or prosecution of the defendant.
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(d) Cases of theft. receipt Qf stolen pronzerty, and destruction of
In cases involving larceny, false pretenses, embezzlement, and
other forms of theft, as well as cases involving receipt of stolen
property or the destruction or damage of property, loss includes,
but may not be limited to, the value of the property stolen,
embezzled, damaged, or destroyed.
(e) Congressional intent
In determining the loss (including the identification of the persons
or classes of persons to be treated as victims), the sentencing court
shall give particular weight to congressional intent. It shall be
rebuttably presumed that pecuniary harm which was: (i) caused
by one or more of the acts or omissions specified in subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct); and (i) suffered by
any person or class of persons whose interests Congress intended
to protect by passage of the offense(s) of conviction or offense(s)
considered by the sentencing court as relevant conduct, was
foreseeable to the defendant. For example, in a case involving
diversion of government program benefits, loss is the value of the
benefits diverted from intended beneficiaries or uses. Similarly,
in a case involving a Davis-Bacon Act violation (a violation of 40
U.S.C. § 276a, criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001), the
loss is the difference between the legally required and actual
wages paid.
(i) Interest
Loss shall include interest if interest or some other similar form of
return on investment was bargained for by a victim as part of a
transaction which is the subject of the count(s) of conviction, or
which is included as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. In such a
case, loss shall include a component of interest at the statutory
rate specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 calculated from the time at
which the money, property, or other thing of value was stolen,
embezzled, damaged, or destroyed, or the victim was otherwise
deprived of its use or benefit, until the time the crime was
detected. In all other cases, loss shall not include interest.
2. Analysis of the Proposed Redefinition of Loss
In drafting this new definition of loss, I have tried to balance
several sometimes cross-cutting principles. First, harm matters in
ranking offense seriousness; the Guidelines' general modified real
offense structure, together with the specific mandate of the relevant
conduct guideline to include in the offense level "all harms resulting
from" a defendant's crimes, strongly suggest that loss should be a
broad-based measure of the economic harm caused by the defendant's
criminal behavior. On the other hand, criminal law is preeminently
about fault. If a man is to be confined in a locked room for months or
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years because someone has suffered a pecuniary loss, then we must be
able to say that the loss was his fault in more than an arid logical
sense. Therefore, in defining for sentencing purposes the required
nexus between harm and criminal behavior, I have sought to put into
words what I think the Commission has always intended, and what
sentencing courts construing the convoluted loss rules have struggled
to achieve-that a defendant should be sentenced on the basis of all
harms, but only those harms fairly attributable to the wrongs he
committed.
a. Cause in Fact
The minimum requirement imposed by any definition of legal
cause is that the defendant's conduct be a "necessary antecedent to
the harm at issue."298 This requirement is often referred to as "but
for" causation. The Guidelines' definition of "loss" must at the very
least require "but for" causation. If a harm would have happened
regardless of defendant's behavior, there can be no justice in punish-
ing him for its occurrence. Presumably the relevant conduct guideline
refers to "but for" causation when it lays down the general mandate
that offense levels are to be determined by considering "all harms
resulting from" certain conduct.299
The more difficult definitional issue arises in deciding whether
to impose on the loss calculation a standard of logical causality
stricter than pure "but for" causation. Chains of cause and effect,
once initiated, run on infinitely through time. 0° It has been argued
that attempts to limit legal liability by defining the logical proximity
of conduct to harm are doomed to failure.301 In this view, language is
so imprecise and circumstances are so various that no verbal formula
can achieve a useful degree of precision. Moreover, most arguments
about causation in both criminal and civil law are less about cause-in-
298. Neadle, 72 F.3d at 1119 (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 4 FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 89-91 (2d ed. 1986)).
299. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(3).
300. As Benjamin Franklin observed, "A little neglect may breed great mischief.... [Flor
want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, and for want of a horse
the rider was lost." BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RIcHARD's ALMANAC, Preface: Courteous Reader
(1758) (quoting GEORGE HERBERT, JACULA PRUDENTUM, no. 499 (1651)); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) ("In a
philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an
event go backward to the dawn of human events, and beyond.").
301. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 300, § 42, at 279 (discussing the "fruitless quest
for a universal formula" for proximate cause).
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fact than about foreseeability, that is, whether the defendant antici-
pated, or should have anticipated, the harm at issue.
Nonetheless, it may be useful to adopt as part of the loss defi-
nition a standard of cause-in-fact more stringent than "but for" causa-
tion. It seems plain both from existing Guidelines' language and the
case law that neither the Sentencing Commission nor the courts are
disposed to count as "loss" harms logically remote from a defendant's
conduct or to which his conduct made only an insubstantial contribu-
tion. The definition proposed here maintains continuity with that
established approach, and is consistent with the general principle of
criminal fault that people should be sent to jail only for harms to
which they have a significant connection.
Among the various phrases that have been used over the years
to describe a more-than-but-for standard of cause-in-fact, the
"substantial factor" language first proposed by Jeremiah Smith 02 and
later adopted by the Restatement of Torts, 03 has three notable ad-
vantages. First, it does not employ the term "proximate cause," a
phrase redolent of the liberal causation rules of tort law, 4 and which
is, in any case, mostly concerned with foreseeability. Second, it allows
sentencing courts to make sensible limiting choices about cause-in-
fact without having to make the tortured analogies between the
situations before them and the law of larceny or contracts now re-
quired by the use of ill-fitting terms of art like "taken" and
"consequential damages." Third, it suggests an approach to cases
involving multiple causes more useful than the Guidelines' current
glib dismissal of the problem as one to be dealt with by departure.
302. See id. § 42, at 278 (citing Jeremiah Smith, Legal Causes in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 103, 223, 229 (1911)).
303. The substantial factor test was adopted as a test for proximate cause by the original
Restatement of Torts. In subsequent revisions, the Restatement limited its application to cause-
in-fact. See KEETONETAL., supra note 300, § 42, at 278.
304. The phrase "proximate cause" immediately calls to the mind of any Anglo-American
lawyer the unlikely series of catastrophes described in law school chestnuts like Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), in which a railroad employee trying to help a
passenger board a train knocked a package containing fireworks from the passenger's arms,
whereupon they exploded, causing a concussion which knocked over scales some distance away
on the platform, which in turn injured the plaintiff, and In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co.,.
3 K.B. 560 (Eng. C.A. 1921), in which a plank dropped by a defendants workman into the hold
of a ship struck a spark, which ignited gasoline vapors causing an explosion and fire that de-
stroyed the ship. Even though Judge Cardozo found no liability in Palsgraf, and the Privy
Council in The Wagon Mound, [1961] App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961), overruled the finding of liability
in Polemis, the general perception is that, as a limitation on liability, proximate cause is next to




Throughout the law, foreseeability of harm is a primary com-
ponent of rules designed to place limits on liability for harm a defen-
dant caused in fact. In torts, liability is commonly imposed for negli-
gence, 05 and the linchpin of negligence law is "proximate cause." A
defendant is civilly liable for negligence if he breaches a legal duty
and the breach is the proximate cause of actual loss or damage to the
interests of another.3086 However, logical causation is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for a finding of proximate cause. Instead,
proximate cause is customarily defined primarily by reference to
consequences that might ordinarily be anticipated, either by this
defendant or by the ubiquitous "reasonable man," a requirement usu-
ally denominated "foreseeability."307 Likewise in contracts, as ob-
served above, the determinant of whether consequential damages
arising from a breach of contract are recoverable is whether such
damages are foreseeable.308
The definition of foreseeability in torts and contracts differs
markedly,309 primarily because the two bodies of law exist to serve
different social ends. Torts, although concerned with fault, is equally
concerned with the more pragmatic goals of compensating injured
persons, restoring their productive abilities, and encouraging social
mechanisms for sharing the cost of injuries incident to communal
life.3' 0 Consequently, tort law has tended to define foreseeability quite
broadly, never quite saying that if a harm happened then it must
have been foreseeable, but at times reaching toward that extreme.
Contract law is more narrowly concerned with the fulfillment of pri-
vate agreements, and has been written against the background of
concern that the law not burden beneficial business activity with
crippling liability for the occasional breaches of promise which are an
305. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 300, § 7, at 31-32 (identifying three categories
of tort).
306. See id. § 30, at 164-65.
307. See id. § 43, at 280.
308. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
309. Of course, there is also dispute over the definition of what is foreseeable within torts
and contracts, but the subtleties of those definitional conflicts are beyond the scope of this
Article.
310. See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866, 869,
871-72 (1986) (holding admiralty law incorporates principles of product liability, and noting that
the assessment of liability for defective products in torts is justified by policy considerations of
cost-shifting, promotion of product safety, and encouragement of insurance). See generally
KEETON ET AL., supra note 300, § 4, at 20-21 (discussing factors affecting tort liability).
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inescapable feature of commercial life.311 As a result, contract law has
taken a narrower, more subjective and therefore more restrictive,
view of foreseeability, 12 insisting as did the court in Hadley v.
Baxendale3l that a defendant have been warned of the harm at issue
or that a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances, knowing
what he knew, would have anticipated the harm.
Although the question is less often discussed in criminal law,3 14
foreseeability is also a hallmark of criminal causation,35 and has long
been a staple of analysis both in determining guilt and in imposing
sentences. In guilt determinations, foreseeability is, of course, ex-
pressly an element of crimes where the prohibited mental state is
criminal negligence3 6 or recklessness.3'7 It is also integral to determi-
nations of guilt for crimes in which the ostensible mens rea involves
intentionality or knowledge. 318 For example, a party to a conspiracy is
responsible for any crime committed by a co-conspirator if it is within
the scope of the conspiracy or is a foreseeable consequence of the
unlawful agreement.31 9 Similarly, a criminal accomplice "is guilty not
only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of
311. See MURRAY, JR., supra note 234, at §§ 219-24.
312. See Exxon Co., U.S-.A v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 116 S. Ct. 1813, 1819 (1996) ("[Tlhe
requirement of foreseeability may be more stringent in the context of contract liability than it is
in the context of tort liability.").
313. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
314. See generally Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 773, 773
(1958) ([The problem of causation has received scant attention in Anglo-American criminal law
literature.").
315. "The notion of causation runs throughout the law-including the criminal law-and it
is generally understood to encompass two concepts. A defendant's conduct must generally be
both the 'cause in fact' and the 'proximate cause' of some harm before liability is imposed."
United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d 1104, 1119 (3d Cir. 1996) (Becker, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
316. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2Xd) (1962) (defining criminal negligence to
require that defendant should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm).
317. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1977) (finding foreseeability of
death a necessary component of depraved indifference murder under New York law); Regina v.
Cunningham, 2 Q.B. 396 (1957) (holding that "malice" under the Offenses against the Person
Act, 1861, embraces both intentional and reckless conduct, and recklessness requires evidence
that defendant foresaw the threatened injury).
318. See, e.g., People v. Rakusz, 484 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1985) (finding de-
fendant guilty of assault, defined as causing injury to a police officer "[w]ith intent to pre-
vent... [him] from performing a lawful duty," when an officer frisking a struggling defendant
cut his hand on a knife, because the injury was foreseeable to defendant) (quoting N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.05(3)); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986) (holding that a defen-
dant "subjects a child" to abuse if, by act or omission, "she causes the child to come within the
influence of a foreseeable risk of cruel maltreatment").
319. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946); see also United States v.
Laurenzana, 113 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit
mail fraud where he entered scheme in which it was reasonably foreseeable that U.S. Mail
would be used).
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any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids
and abets."3 20 The felony murder rule, which imposes liability for the
highest available degree of criminal homicide for killings occurring
during certain dangerous felonies, in effect substitutes foreseeability
of death for the intent to cause it.321
Foreseeability of harm is also widely employed as a determi-
nant of which harms to consider in sentencing. As observed above,
the Guidelines themselves repeatedly use foreseeability to distinguish
between those harms that count for measuring offense seriousness
and those that do not.322 This approach has received the imprimatur
of the United States Supreme Court, even in the capital sentencing
context. In Payne v. Tennessee,32 the Court approved the use of vic-
tim impact evidence over the objection that such evidence concerns
"factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were ir-
relevant to the decision to kill," and thus has nothing to do with the
"blameworthiness of a particular defendant."32 Justice Souter, in his
concurrence, responded to this argument by observing that the harms
to the surviving victims of homicide (the families, friends, communi-
ties, and loved ones of the deceased) portrayed in victim impact evi-
dence are morally, and therefore legally, relevant precisely because
they are so plainly foreseeable.32
320. People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392, 398 n.5 (Cal. 1985). See generally DRESSLER, supra note
62, § 30.05[B][5], at 443 (discussing natural-and-probable-cause-consequences doctrine).
321. Some jurisdictions apply the felony murder rule to all deaths caused in fact by the
commission of designated dangerous felonies, on the theory that such felonies always present a
particular risk of death. See LAFAVE & SCoT, JR., supra note 27, § 7.5(b), at 624-25. Other
jurisdictions impose a specific requirement that the death in the particular case have been a
foreseeable outcome of the defendant's felony. See id. § 7.5(d), at 626-27.
322. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing section 1B1.3(a) which dictates
that sentencing be based on harms resulting from the foreseeable conduct of defendant's
criminal partners); supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing section 2FL.1, application note 7(c), including
in "loss" foreseeable consequential damages in procurement fraud and product substitution
cases); see also USSG § 2FL.1 n.10(a) (authorizing a departure for "reasonably foreseeable non-
monetary harm"), id. § 2F1.1 n.10(c) (authorizing departure for "reasonably foreseeable"
physical, psychological, or emotional harm). Cf United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir.
1995) (finding all losses on fraudulently procured loan attributable to the defendant even where
the default was not his fault because it was reasonably foreseeable from the defendant's conduct
that the loan would be approved, putting the bank's money at risk).
323. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
324. Id. at 818 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504, 505 (1987)).
325. See id. at 838-39 (Souter, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Stevens tacitly conceded
that impact on surviving victims would be relevant if foreseeable. He simply argued that the
majority's holding
permits a jury to sentence a defendant to death because of harm to the victim and his
family that the defendant could not foresee, which was not even identified until after the
crime had been committed, and which may be deemed by the jury, without any rational
explanation, to justify a death sentence in one case and not in another.
Id. at 863 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
534
COPING WITH "LOSS"
The inclusion of foreseeable harms in the sentencing calculus
is not only sanctioned by long precedent, it is entirely consistent with
the fundamental principles and purposes of criminal sentencing.
Again, criminal law is preeminently about fault. It is unjust to put
someone in prison for harms he did not intend or that he could not
reasonably have anticipated would follow from his choice to do wrong.
It is entirely appropriate, however, to punish based on harms that
would not have occurred but for the defendant's evil choices, and that
the defendant either anticipated or could and should have anticipated.
Because the emphasis in criminal law is on fault, the definition
of what is foreseeable for sentencing purposes should be relatively
narrow. Accordingly, I have borrowed language from contract law326
that emphasizes two points: (1) Although the idea of foreseeability is,
by definition, an objective standard (we ask not what the defendant
did foresee, but what he could have foreseen), the definition I have
chosen requires that the harm have been foreseeable to this defendant
given the facts available to him at the time he acted; and (2) the pro-
posed standard requires that a reasonable person in defendant's shoes
"would have foreseen" the harm in question "as a probable result."
The combination of a more-than-but-for cause in fact standard
and a tougher-than-tort-law foreseeability standard should produce
several practical results. First, the universe of pecuniary harms that
count as loss will be somewhat larger than is now the case. In my
view, such a result is desirable as it will provide a closer congruence
between the true harm caused by economic offenders and the sen-
tences they serve.3 27 Nonetheless, by specifying a relatively restrictive
definition of foreseeability, the Commission would signal that the
scope of loss is not limitless, and is instead confined to harms for
which a defendant can justly be held accountable.
Second, the new rule should simplify the task of sentencing
economic criminals. Some will contend that the rules proposed here
326. The definition of "foreseeability" suggested here draws on Professor Corbin's state-
ment of the modem rule governing the recoverability of consequential damages arising from
special circumstances. He wrote:
All that is necessary, in order to charge the defendant with a particular loss, is that it is
one that ordinarily follows the breach of such a contract in the usual course of events, or
that reasonable men in the position of the parties would have foreseen as a probable re-
sult of the breach.
CORBIN, supra note 246, § 1010, at 79.
327. I have argued elsewhere that, in contrast to narcotics sentences, economic crime
sentences under the Guidelines are "often too short in relation to their moral seriousness, in
relation to the harm they cause, and in relation to the investment of resources required to
prosecute them." Bowman, supra note 10, at 740.
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will impose a far greater fact-finding burden on courts.3 28 I disagree.
Zealous government advocates in search of more severe sentences will
present roughly the same evidence and arguments whether or not the
changes advocated here are adopted. Zealous defense counsel will
argue just as strenuously that the harms urged by the government
have not been proven, or if proven, should not count. The only differ-
ence will be that courts will draw the lines of inclusion and exclusion
from "loss" in different (and I hope easier to find) places. District
courts are very well equipped to make findings of fact. That is, after
all, their job. The problem with the loss calculation has never been
the factual issues; it has been with trying to apply an incomprehensi-
ble set of conflicting rules to well understood facts.
As some workingman's sage once observed, the key to success
in any undertaking is having the right tools. The current Guidelines
use the wrong verbal tools to define loss, tools designed for other
tasks. The core issues in defining loss are questions about causa-
tion-cause-in-fact and foreseeability. The Guidelines should deal
with these questions squarely and give sentencing judges the defini-
tional tools they need to make case-by-case decisions. Judges do not
know how to merge larceny language ("taken") with contracts termi-
nology ("consequential damages"). They do know how to determine
cause-in-fact and foreseeability. The Commission should let them.
c. Victims and Gain
I am of two minds on the subject of using a defendant's "gain"
as an alternate measure of "loss." On the one hand, the issue of gain
arises primarily because the present Guidelines tend to obscure the
identity of the true victims in criminal transactions. As explained
above,3 29 the problem of identifying victims is in reality a problem of
defining the requisite causal relation between the defendant's conduct
and the harms for which we vish to hold him answerable at sentenc-
ing. Once the cause riddle is solved, the question of who is the victim
answers itself and the need to use "gain" as an alternative measure of
loss largely evaporates. A consideration of gain is currently necessary
primarily because the present Guidelines tend to obscure the identity
of the true victims in criminal transactions. In a regime in which the
sentencing court is at liberty to identify all reasonably foreseeable
328. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1993) (expressing con-
cern that calculation of "consequential damages" for arson or theft in insurance fraud case
would be "too complex").
329. See supra notes 199-229.
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victims of a defendant's conduct and aggregate their economic injuries
in the loss calculation, gain as an alternative measure of loss should
be superfluous. Therefore, the proposed consolidated guideline
contains no reference to gain.
On the other hand, colleagues at the Commission and the
Department of Justice have argued persuasively that there are some
cases, particularly frauds involving numerous victims with small
individual losses, in which proving loss directly victim-by-victim is
prohibitively difficult,330 while proving the defendant's aggregate gain
is perfectly practical. It may be that some provision permitting the
use of gain should be retained in the Guidelines to account for those
unusual cases. If so, gain should be used only as an alternative meas-
ure of loss when more direct measures prove impracticable.
d. The Object of the Crime
I have included in the proposed guideline application notes331 a
paragraph designed to emphasize continuity with the current primary
definition of loss, the "value of the thing taken, damaged, or de-
stroyed."332 "Loss" under the new regime would begin with the value
of the object of the crime, the money or property stolen or embezzled
or destroyed by the defendant. However, the revised language es-
chews the confusing word "taken," and makes clear that the loss cal-
culation always begins, but may not end, with the value of the imme-
diate criminal object.
e. Legislative Intent
As discussed above, 333 the punishment for any crime should be
related to the damage inflicted on interests the legislature sought to
protect by proscribing the behavior at issue. Given the cornucopia of
federal economic crime statutes, any attempt by the Commission to
identify and account for all the interests Congress has sought to pro-
tect would introduce not clarity, but clutter. The solution is, once
again, to let courts do what they already know how to do-in this case
330. See, e.g., Carol C. Lam, Assessing Loss in Heath Care Fraud Cases, 10 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 145, 147 (Nov.-Dec. 1997) ("It is, of course, logistically impossible to prove
widespread fraud on a patient-by-patient, claim-by-claim basis in a medical practice that had
thousands of patients, each of whom received multiple services.").
331. See Appendix A, Proposed § 221.1 application note 1(d).
332. USSG § 2Bl.1 application note 2.
333. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
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determine legislative intent. If there is any question about whether a
particular type of economic harm was contemplated by Congress,
sentencing courts will apply well understood tools of statutory con-
struction to divine legislative intent.
Because the primary consideration in assessing loss is fault, I
have made legislative intent not conclusive, but presumptive evidence
of foreseeability. Doing so not only assigns to the legislature its ap-
propriate role, it comports with common sense. If the connection
between a particular crime and a particular type of harm was suffi-
ciently clear that Congress bestirred itself to pass a law criminalizing
the conduct to prevent the harm, the occurrence of the harm as a
consequence of the crime should be reasonably foreseeable to the
average perpetrator. Still, exceptional cases will arise and a defen-
dant should be permitted to prove that a connection clear to Congress
was neither clear nor foreseeable to him.
f Causation and the Problem of Interest
The question of whether a defendant should be assessed inter-
est as a part of "loss" is merely a special case of the general causation
problem. A proponent of including interest would argue that the
defendant's fraud or theft causes not only a loss of the thing stolen,
but also the loss of an income stream which would have been gener-
ated had the defendant not stolen the asset. Opponents of including
interest in "loss" would respond that the causal relationship between
the defendant's conduct and a hypothetical income stream is too
speculative: In general, we cannot say with confidence how a victim
might have used the stolen asset had it not been stolen, or how pro-
ductive that use might have been.
The Sentencing Commission has sided with the opponents of
including interest, stating in Application Note 7 to the fraud guideline
that loss "does not.., include interest the victim could have earned
on the funds had the offense not occurred."34 Despite the apparent
clarity of the commentary, at least five circuits have held that interest
should be counted if it was specifically bargained for by the victim in
the transaction which is the subject of the criminal case.335
334. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7, construed in United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419,
1423 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating in dictum that loss does not include interest).
335. See United States v. Gilberg, 75 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (including accrued mort-
gage interest in loss of $726,637, and distinguishing section 2F1.1, application note 7, on the
ground that accrued mortgage interest is not "opportunity cost" interest), relying on United
States v. Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding accrued finance charges on credit
cards are not opportunity cost interest and therefore may be included in loss); United States v.
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The flaw in the reasoning of courts including agreed-upon
interest in loss becomes apparent when we recognize that banks are
not the only victims to whom fraud defendants promise to pay inter-
est. The promise of a return on investment is a staple of virtually
every con game ever devised. The implication of the cases that count
interest promised by contract as "loss" is that the loss caused by any
fraud defendant should be measured by the promises he makes but
does not keep. By this logic, if the friendly man on the phone guaran-
tees a 10% monthly return on my investment, my "loss" must then be
the amount I send him plus the promised 120% per annum.
The only way to escape this parallel is to argue that the inter-
est a defendant promises to pay a bank on a fraudulently obtained
loan, or a credit card company in a credit card fraud scheme, is
"commercially reasonable," while the expectations of the ordinary
noncommercial fraud victim are not.3 6 After all, a telemarketer's
promise to pay 120% annual interest on the money I send him is dis-
tinguishable from my promise to pay the bank 8% interest on the
money it lends me only by the differing probabilities that the two
promises will be kept. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits seem to have an
inkling of this difficulty because both qualify their opinions by saying
contractually promised interest should be included in loss where the
victim had a "reasonable expectation" of receiving it.337 Trying to
Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 928 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[The] commentary sweeps too broadly and, if ap-
plied in this case [a bank fraud case] would be inconsistent with the purpose of [section]
2F1.1.... Interest should be included if, as here, the victim had a reasonable expectation of
receiving interest from the transaction."); United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir.
1995) (distinguishing between interest a defendant specifically agrees to pay by contract and
"speculative 'opportunity cost' interest"), overruling United States v. Clemmons, 48 F.3d 1020
(7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Jones, 933 F.2d 353, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding
interest should be included where defendant defrauded credit card companies that had a rea-
sonable expectation of a specific return on the credit extended); United States v. Lowder, 5 F.3d
467, 471 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding interest should be included where the defendant promised
victims a specific interest rate); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1532 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that lower court properly determined loss based upon repaid principle without consid-
eration of repaid interest and that lower court properly excluded from loss the interest due
investors).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Clemmons, 48 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The degree
of certainty with which defrauded investors expected a return on their investments is not, in our
opinion, a significant distinction.... [Flailure to receive the promised interest is not a loss at
all, but a frustrated expectation."), overruled by United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 917 n.2
(7th Cir. 1995).
337. See United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 928 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Interest should be
included if, as here, the victim had a reasonable expectation of receiving interest from the
transaction."); Jones, 933 F.2d at 354 ("When [defendant] failed to pay [credit card bills], the
issuer lost the use of money that ought to have come back to it."). But cf. United States v.
Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (4th Cir. 1992) (excluding from loss the profits promised by a
fraud defendant to his investors).
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make this distinction takes courts down a very difficult path. For
example, if a bank makes a self-evidently risky loan without following
customary industry procedures, is that behavior commercially rea-
sonable? Or if a credit card company fails to have a theft detection
system or issues cards to people with bad credit histories, is that
commercially reasonable?
Several courts, particularly the First Circuit in United States
v. Goodchild338 and the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Allender,339
emphasize that including interest in loss is justified where the defen-
dant agreed to pay it and the lending institution relied on that prom-
ise in extending credit. But such reliance is present in every fraud
case-the defendant promises the victim his money back plus a profit,
the victim relies on those promises and writes a check. Holding the
defendant to his promises has a superficial appeal, but it strays a very
great distance from the concept of loss as something the defendant
actually took or intended to take from a victim. Indeed, the
"opportunity cost" interest the courts are at pains to distinguish from
promised interest comes closer to being a "loss" that can be causally
related to the defendant's conduct than does a loss calculation based
on pie-in-the-sky promises the defendant never intended to fulfill.
Whether to include interest in the calculation of loss is one of
the more vexing problems in redrafting the economic crime guidelines.
If causation is to be the sine qua non of a new definition of loss, then
it would seem that there could hardly be a clearer case both of cause-
in-fact and foreseeability than a fraud victim's deprivation of the time
value of the money purloined by the defendant. If an elderly couple
gives their retirement savings to a confidence man instead of leaving
those savings invested in government bonds, the defendant has
plainly caused the couple to lose not only their principal but the re-
turn they would have earned had they never met the defendant. In
such a case, the defendant's conduct was inescapably the cause-in-fact
of the loss of accrued interest, and the loss of that accrual was easily
foreseeable. And yet, it is hard to say what the victims would have
done had they not been victims. Perhaps they would have lost all the
money, principal and potential interest, at the nearest gaming empo-
rium. Perhaps they would have stuck it under the mattress, keeping
the principal but foregoing the interest.
The rule proposed here takes a middle position. It adopts,
with some modifications, the "bargained-for interest" exception cre-
338. 25 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 1994).
339. 62 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1995).
540 [Vol. 51:461
COPING WITH "LOSS"
ated by the courts of appeals to the Guidelines' current "no interest
ever" rule. Under the new rule, interest will be included in loss if a
victim relied on a promise to pay a return on investment in deciding
to part with his money or property. This result is justifiable, not
because we are giving the victims the benefit of a criminal bargain,
but because the fact that the victims' bargained for return on in-
vestment is proof that they would have sought some other legal
avenue of investment, and thus that there is a genuine causal link
between the defendant's conduct and the victim's deprivation of
opportunity cost interest.
However, under the proposed rule, the amount of interest
included in the loss figure would be calculated, not by reference to the
defendant's promises, but by reference to the same statutory rates
applied to damages awards in civil cases. 0 There are several reasons
for taking this approach. First, the opportunity cost component of
loss would, and should, remain constant from case to case and de-
fendant to defendant. There is no sound reason for punishing a de-
fendant who commits a $10,000 credit card fraud against an issuer
that charges twenty-one percent interest more severely than a defen-
dant who defrauds a different issuer of the same amount simply be-
cause the second issuer happens to charge the more reasonable inter-
est rate of fourteen percent. Similarly, it makes no sense to sentence
two con men differently because one makes more outlandish promises
of improbable profits than the other. Second, use of a standard inter-
est rate simplifies the fact-finding process in two ways: (1) by elimi-
nating the need to determine precisely what the promised rate of
return was; and (2) by eliminating the even more troublesome issue of
whether any particular promised rate of return was commercially
reasonable.
C. Loss and the Problem of Measurement
As noted above, the two basic definitional problems inherent in
a scheme to rank economic crimes by measuring economic harm are
the problem of inclusion and the problem of measurement. 41 I have
argued in the preceding section that the problem of inclusion is best
addressed by defining loss in terms of cause-in-fact and foreseeability.
340. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) (setting interest on money judgments in civil cases at "a
rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent (as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury)
of the average accepted auction price for the last auction of United States Treasury bills settled
immediately prior to the date of the judgment").
341. See supra Part IV.A.
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Even under this approach, a number of critical problems of measure-
ment remain, in particular the question of when loss should be meas-
ured, and the question of net versus gross loss.
1. When Should Loss Be Measured?
The current Guidelines do not specify when actual loss should
be measured. 42 The word "actual"M3 implies that courts are to meas-
ure the real economic harm to victims that resulted in fact from a
defendant's conduct. But, the result of that measurement may be
different depending upon when the measurement is taken. There are
at least four different points at which the measurement could be
made: (1) the point at which the crime is legally complete, i.e., when
there has been a confluence of culpable mental state and actus reus on
the part of the defendant sufficient to render him criminally liable;
(2) the point at which the crime is discovered; (3) the sentencing date;
or (4) the point at which all the economic consequences of the defen-
dant's conduct have become final (for example, when civil lawsuits for
damages or recovery of property have been concluded).m
A simple illustration may be helpful. If A breaks the window
of my car and steals it, but is apprehended pulling out of my drive-
way, the "actual loss" to me in real economic terms may differ depend-
ing on when I measure it. At the moment A assumes control over the
vehicle and begins pulling away, my loss is the fair market value of
the car because I have lost control over the whole asset. At the mo-
ment of A's apprehension, my only loss is the damage to the window,
because I have the car but must spend money to repair it. By the
time of A's sentencing, I may have suffered no measurable economic
loss at all if my insurance company has reimbursed me for the win-
dow.345 After sentencing, again I may have sustained no real loss if A
342. See United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218, 220-21 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Neither [section]
2Bl.1 nor [section] 2FL.1 of the Guidelines addresses the point in time at which actual loss is to
be measured.").
343. USSG § 2Fl.1 application note 7.
344. This point could be reached at the moment the crime is legally complete, at the mo-
ment of discovery, at the moment of apprehension of the defendant, at the time of sentencing, or
at some time long after sentencing. Picking a time after sentencing as the point at which loss
becomes final does not foreclose making the determination of loss at sentencing;, it simply
requires an explicit recognition that the loss calculation will involve prediction of future events.
345. If we apply the cause-based analysis suggested above to the question of determining
the identity of the victim, the fact that an insurance company would have to compensate me for
the damages would surely be foreseeable, and thus the company would be a victim and its loss
chargeable to the defendant.
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makes restitution or my insurance company reimburses me for the
window.
Language in the Guidelines or in the cases provides some sup-
port for all four options.346
a. Time of the Crime
Application Note 2 to the theft guideline provides two exam-
ples that lend support to the use of the time of the crime as the point
at which loss should be measured.347 Example 1 says that in the case
of theft of a check or money order, the loss is the value of the stolen
instrument regardless of whether the check was cashed. Example 2 is
the case discussed above of the stolen car "recovered immediately."
The commentary says that the loss is the value of the vehicle despite
its prompt recovery, a result explainable only if the loss measurement
is taken immediately after the legal completion of the theft.
Two, or perhaps three, courts of appeal have implicitly adopted
a "time of the crime" rule.348
346. The Seventh Circuit, for example, is of many minds on the question, having issued
opinions endorsing three of the four possible views. Compare United States v. Mount, 966 F.2d
262, 265 (7th Cir. 1992) (time of the crime), with United States v. Downs, 123 F.3d 637, 644 n.2
(7th Cir. 1997) (loss measured at time of discovery in fraudulent loan case), and United States v.
Asher, 59 F.3d 622, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (loss in check-kiting scheme measured at time of
detection), and United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1993) (time of sentenc-
ing).
347. See USSG § 2B1.1 application note 2.
348. See United States v. Copus, 110 F.3d 1529, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1997) (where defendant
obtained loan legitimately, but later lied to bank inspector about collateral, offense committed
at time of lie and loss should be measured as if bank had foreclosed at that time); United States
v. Mount, 966 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that embezzler causes loss once property
taken, despite intent to repay and lack of discovery). The views of the Eighth Circuit are
somewhat hard to divine. See United States v. Smith, in which the court considered a credit
card fraud case in which, between discovery and sentencing, some items were recovered from co-
defendants. 62 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 1995). The court held that the defendant was not
entitled to credit for these items. This result could flow from either a rule that the time at
which loss should be measured is when the crime is complete or a rule designating the time of
discovery. In United States v. Morris, the defendant was convicted of various forms of bank
fraud, check-kiting, false statements to obtain loan, etc. 18 F.3d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1994).
During the course of the scheme, but before detection, the defendant arranged for the sum of
$156,000 to be repaid to the bank to avoid detection of the scheme by bank regulators. See id. at
570. At sentencing, the defendant asked for credit for this amount against the loss. The district
court granted the credit; the court of appeals reversed and refused the credit. See id. The
Eighth Circuit offered no rationale for this holding, but the holding is consistent with a "time of
the crime" rule and inconsistent with a "time of detection" rule.
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b. Time of Detection
Application Note 7(b) to the fraud guideline says that the loss
in a fraudulent loan case is "the amount of the loan not repaid at the
time the offense is discovered." 49 The guideline does not address the
question of discovery by whom: Is it sufficient that the victim or the
authorities discover the crime, or must the defendant be aware that it
has been discovered?350 That question is largely unresolved, but at
least seven circuits have written opinions stating that loss should be
measured at the time of detection of the crime. 5'
c. Time of Sentencing
The Third and the Seventh Circuits have said that loss should
be measured at the time of sentencing. 352
349. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(b).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 99 F.3d 1290, 1296-97 (6th Cir. 1996) (endorsing time
of discovery rule and finding that discovery refers to state of mind of victim or authorities
depending upon which party discovers the offense first).
351. See United States v. Fraza, 106 F.3d 1050, 1055 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding loss is amount
of fraudulent loan not repaid at time offense was discovered, reduced by the amount the lending
institution may recover from assets pledged to secure the loan); United States v. Akin, 62 F.3d
700, 702 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting check-kiting defendant's argument that loss should be re-
duced by restitution payments made after discovery of the offense but prior to sentencing and
holding that loss should be measured at time of discovery of scheme); United States v. Asher, 59
F.3d 622, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding time for determining loss is time crime is detected);
United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218, 220-22 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding in check-kiting case that
loss was amount of outstanding bad checks, less any amount in accounts at time of discovery);
United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding loss in bond fraud case was
amount of devaluation occurring during period between bank officer defendant's misstatements
to bank and customers and the time at which fraud was discovered); United States v. Shaffer, 35
F.3d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that loss should be determined when crime is detected);
United States v. Frydenlund, 990 F.2d 822, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that
check-kiting should be treated like fraudulently obtained loan and instead measuring loss at
time of discovery of scheme); United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1989)
(stating that restitution does not justify reducing minimum sentence under the Guidelines
although it may be relevant in deciding what sentence within the Guidelines the court should
impose).
352. See United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 585-86 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that loss is
"'the amount of money the victim has actually lost.., estimated at the time of sentencing' ");
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that although actual loss in a
fraudulent loan application case should be estimated at the time of sentencing, "the 'loss' should
be revised upward to the loss that the defendant intended to inflict, if that amount is higher
than actual loss"); see also Stephen V. Manning & Barbara Bailey Jongbloed, Timing of Loss in
Secured Loan Cases, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 149 (Nov.-Dec. 1997) (arguing that in loan fraud
cases loss should be measured at time of sentencing' ") (quoting Kopp, 951 F.2d at 536).
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d. Time of Final Resolution of All Claims
While it might seem impractical to suggest that courts should
or would attempt to measure loss by taking into account events that
have not occurred by the time of sentencing, in fact, the Guidelines
attempt in certain respects to do just that. For example, Application
Note 7(b) to the fraud guideline states:
In fraudulent loan application cases and contract procurement cases, the loss
is the actual loss to the victim (or if the loss has not yet come about, the ex-
pected loss). For example, if a defendant fraudulently obtains a loan by mis-
representing the value of his assets, the loss is the amount of the loan not re-
paid at the time the offense is discovered, reduced by the amount the lending
institution has recovered (or can expect to recover) from any assets pledged to
secure the loan.3
53
The reference to "expected loss" is incompatible with the view
that the amount of loss is fixed for sentencing purposes the moment a
crime is complete. It suggests a bottom-line economic approach to
loss. It clearly implies that the victim's loss cannot be tallied up until
all claims have been resolved (or, at the least, until there has been a
prediction about how they will be resolved) and there is a
determination of how much economic harm the defendant ultimately
will cause.35
2. What Amounts Should Be Credited to a Defendant in
Determining "Actual Loss"?
The question of the point in time at which loss should be mea-
sured is often another way of asking whether a defendant should
receive credit for money or things of value the victim received either
during the course of the criminal transactions or thereafter. Among
the common problems are:
353. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7(b).
354. A careful examination of Note 7(b) reveals that it has both "time of detection" and
"time of sentencing" components. In making a loss calculation under Note 7(b), the court is
asked to begin with "the amount of the loan not repaid at the time the offense is discovered,"
and then to subtract any amount the bank "has recovered (or can expect to recover) from any
assets pledged to secure the loan." Id. The use of the phrase "has recovered" plainly refers to
the state of affairs existing at sentencing. The phrase "or can expect to recover" requires the
sentencing court to make loss calculations based in part on predictions regarding resolution of
future foreclosures and subsequent sales of collateral.
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(1) Whether a defendant should be given credit in the
calculation of actual loss for anything of value he gives to vic-
tims in return for the money or property obtained by fraud.
(2) Whether a defendant should be given credit for amounts
or assets pledged as collateral as part of a fraudulently induced
transaction.
(3) Whether a defendant should be given credit for repay-
ments made after the completion of the theft or fraud, but before
detection of the crime.
(4) Whether a defendant should be given credit for repay-
ments or recoveries made after discovery of the crime, but before
sentencing.
The answers to the first and fourth questions have been both
clear and uniform: Except for assets pledged by the defendant in a
fraudulent loan setting, payments made by the defendant or recover-
ies of property occurring after discovery of the crime but before sen-
tencing, are not credited to the defendant. 355 Similarly, there is gen-
eral agreement that a defendant is to be given credit for anything of
value he transfers to a victim in return for the money or property
obtained by fraud. For example, section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(a),
provides that where a defendant misrepresents the value of an item,
the loss is the difference between the item's actual value and the
falsely represented value. The defendant is credited for any real
value conveyed to the victim.35
355. See United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding credit card
fraud defendant responsible for total amount of unauthorized charges and giving no credit for
items obtained by fraud but later recovered); United States v. Asher, 59 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that check-kiting defendant's immediate repayment of $160,000 overdraft outstanding
at time of discovery does not affect loss figure); United States v. Mau, 45 F.3d 212 (7th Cir.
1995) (arranging a fully collateralized repayment plan after discovery will not reduce loss);
United States v. Bean, 18 F.3d 1367, 1369 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no basis for extraordinary
departure when defendant repaid principal of involuntary loan before trial); United States v.
Carey, 895 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing a district court's downward departure for pre-
sentencing restitution, noting that restitution may be relevant to acceptance of responsibility
under section 3E1.1, or to a departure under section 5K2.0, if extraordinary, but that district
court already considered restitution in awarding two point deduction for acceptance of respon-
sibility and did not present findings or extraordinary circumstances to warrant a further reduc-
tion).
But see United States v. Baum, in which the Fourth Circuit seems to have held that pay-
ments made on a fraudulently obtained loan after discovery of the fraud but before sentencing
should have been credited to the defendants to reduce the loss. 974 F.2d 496, 498-99 (4th Cir.
1992). However, this opinion was written before the November 1992 amendment to USSG
section 2F.1, note 7(b), and therefore may no longer be good law, even in the Fourth Circuit.
356. See United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding loss in tele-
marketing scam equal to amount paid by victims less cost to defendant of goods transferred to
victims as part of scheme); United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 (3d Cir. 1996)
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The issue of deducting value received by the victim is also
presented in government contracting cases where a bidder secures the
contract by lying about his qualifications, financial stability, or some
other material fact. In the leading case of United States v. Schneider,
Judge Posner distinguished between the contractor who secures a
valuable contract by misrepresenting some fact, but who nonetheless
intends to perform the contract to the best of his ability, and the con-
tractor who obtains the valuable concession or contract with no inten-
tion of performing ("he means to pocket the entire contract price
without rendering any service in return").357 Although the focus of the
opinion is on intended loss where the misrepresentation has been
discovered before the contract has been performed, its logic is argu-
ably as applicable to cases in which the contract has been performed
in whole or in part before discovery of the fraud, and where the go-
vernment has thus received some benefit of its bargain. 358
The Eleventh Circuit adopted an interesting modification of
the Schneider approach in United States v. Orton.359 There the court
calculated loss in a Ponzi scheme using what it characterized as a
(holding that defendant convicted of mail fraud for deceiving clients by practicing law without a
license should be credited in loss calculation for value of satisfactory legal services rendered);
United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding defendant should have
been credited with value of wine grapes that were delivered, even though they were misrepre-
sented); United States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (remanding case to
district court for factual findings on value of degrees received by students at defendant's failed
and fraudulently operated proprietary school, holding that gross amount of tuition paid for
unaccredited degree was not necessarily correct assessment of net loss to student victims
without evidence regarding the value of the degrees received); United States v. Gennuso, 967
F.2d 1460, 1461-63 (10th Cir. 1992) (reducing victims' losses because they received from the
defendant the value of the wholesale cost of a water purification system and a vacation pack-
age); United States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991) (decreasing victims' losses
because they received from the defendant value in the form of security interests and promises of
individual borrowers to repay fraudulently secured loans). But see United States v. Pappert,
104 F.3d 1559, 1567 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to credit defendant in fraudulent equipment lease
scheme for value of machines retained by victims where there was evidence that sometimes
used machines were represented to be new, some machines were pledged as collateral on
multiple leases, and in at least one case, machinery had depreciated to point where cost of
repossession exceeded value).
357. 930 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991).
358. After Schneider, Application Note 7(b) was added to the section 2F1.1 commentary. It
begins: "In fraudulent loan application cases and contract procurement cases, the loss is the
actual loss to the victim (or if the loss has not yet come about, the expected loss)." USSG
§ 2F1.1 application note 7(b). The note makes no further reference to contract procurement
cases and gives no explanation of how "actual loss" is to be measured in such cases. Likewise,
the note does not define "expected loss." See also United States v. Stern, 13 F.3d 489, 496-98
(1st Cir. 1994) (suggesting that when contractor uses phony bond to obtain a contract, the court
may estimate loss as the cost of a valid performance bond).
359. 73 F.3d 331 (11th Cir. 1996).
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"loss to the losing victims" method. 360 That is, the court added up all
the losses to victims who actually suffered losses, but gave credit to
the defendant for repayments made to early victims only to the extent
of their original investment. The court did not credit the defendant for
"interest" payments made to early victims above their original in-
vestment. The court stated: "[This method] does not reward a defen-
dant who returns money in excess of an individual's initial
'investment' solely to entice additional investments and conceal the
fraudulent conduct."361
The more difficult issues have concerned collateral and repay-
ments made after completion of the crime, but before detection.
a. Credit for Assets Pledged as Collateral
The question of whether to credit the value of collateral
against "loss" is closely related to the problem just discussed of
whether things of value given to victims by defendants as an induce-
ment or as part of the criminal scheme should be credited. The rule
noted there (that credit should be given) is consistent with the specific
rule expressed in Application Note 7(b) for cases of fraudulent loan
applications, namely that the value of "assets pledged to secure the
loan" should be deducted from the loss.a62 The distinction between the
360. See id. at 334.
361. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument for using "net loss" to the victims as a
group, because such an approach "focuses on the gain to the defendant, which ordinarily
underestimates the loss." Id. (citing USSG § 2F1.1 application note 8).
Several courts have held that Ponzi scheme defendants are entitled to no credit against loss
for any repayment made to victims. See United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir.
1997) (refusing to reduce loss by amounts paid to early investors in fraud scheme); United
States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Dobish, 102 F.3d
760, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding amount returned to victims as "profits" to maintain investor
confidence not deductible from loss); United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228, 1237-38 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding amounts paid to maintain confidence of Ponzi scheme investors could not be used
to reduce loss).
362. USSG § 2Fl.1 application note 7(b). In United States v. Channapragada, the Seventh
Circuit raised the question of what section 2Fl.1, Application Note 7, means by "assets pledged
to secure the loan." 59 F.3d 62, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1995). In that case, the defendant gave a per-
sonal guarantee of all his personal assets as a condition of the four loans at issue. After the
crime was complete, and after discovery but before sentencing, the defendant acquired some
stock. See id. at 66. He claimed the value of the stock should be offset against the loss. See id.
The defendant relied on language in United States v. Mount, in which the court suggested in
dictum that loss should be reduced where the victim has "access to a ready source of compensa-
tion." Channapragada, 59 F.3d at 66 (quoting United States v. Mount, 966 F.2d 262, 266 (7th
Cir. 1992)). The Seventh Circuit denied the offset, stating, "'unrealized plans to repay do not
reduce the loss amount.'" Id. at 67 (citing United States v. Holiusa, 13 F.3d 1043, 1046 (7th
Cir. 1994)). Channapragada reached the right result via the wrong route. The important point
was that the stock was not among the defendant's assets when he fraudulently induced the
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two situations is that the first concerns a transfer by the defendant of
ownership or control of the thing of value, and the second concerns
transfer by the defendant of a security interest that may be exercised
only in the event of the defendant's default on his undertakings.
Despite the apparent clarity of Application Note 7(b), the cir-
cuits vary widely in interpreting it. Several circuits have held that a
reduction of the loss figure by the value of the "assets pledged to
secure the loan" is discretionary with the district court.33  And al-
though the majority of courts heed the plain implication of Note 7(b)
that assets of a defendant not pledged to secure the loan should not be
credited against the loss figure,3 64 one court has taken the position
that unpledged assets should be, or at least may be, deducted from
the "loss" calculation. In United States v. Wright, the defendant
fraudulently obtained three loans.3 65 Two of the loans were secured by
security interests in real property purchased with the loan proceeds;
one of these was also secured by a right of set off against a deposit
account held by the defendant at the lending bank. The third loan
was secured by a fictitious deed of trust.366 After discovery of the
fraud, the bank made good its losses on the first loan by foreclosing on
the property and exercising the set-off against the deposit account.
On the second loan, the bank recovered most, but not all, of its money
by foreclosure. As to the third loan, the defendant made additional
lenders to make the loans. See id. at 66. The focus should be on the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the crime, and the economic facts at the time of the crime.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding district
court had discretion to refuse to subtract the proceeds of an auction by the bank of property
acquired with the fraudulent loan, and that it is "proper to calculate loss based on the risk
engendered by the defendant's criminal conduct, even where the actual loss was lower") (citing
United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Norris,
50 F.3d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1995) (where repayments were made after detection, holding that a
district court that uses Application Note 7(b) should consider repayments, but declining "to hold,
that repayments can never be included in loss"); United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 602-03
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morris, 18 F.3d 562, 570 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the loss
calculation "did not turn on whether [the bank] recovered or could have recovered its potential
loan losses by foreclosing on the pledged security").
364. See, e.g., United States v. Chorney, 63 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 1995) ("To give the defen-
dant credit for other, unpledged assets is simply a free ride for the wealthy defendant and
wholly at odds with the underlying purpose of the guideline."); see also United States v.
Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding in case concerning damages that could be
recovered by the victim in a civil proceeding that assets other than collateral which a bank may
recover are "akin to restitution and fare] not a proper consideration in determining the loss
suffered as a result of the fraud"). Accord United States v. Eliassi, No. CR-93-110, 1995 WL
44656, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 1995) (holding that "assets other than collateral that a bank may
recover 'is akin to restitution and is not a proper consideration in determining the loss suffered
as a result of the fraud'") (quoting United States v. Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1992)).
365. 60 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 1995).
366. See id. at 242-43 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
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arrangements to collateralize it after discovery of the fraud. 67 The
district court credited the defendant only with the amounts recovered
from the sale of the real property pledged as loan collateral.
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the set off against the
deposit account on the first loan, the post-discovery repayment of the
deficiency on the second loan, and the subsequent recollateralization
of the third loan could all be credited against the loss. 368 The court
ignored section 2F1.1, Application Note 7(b),369 and concluded: "'Loss'
should not include amounts that a bank can and does easily recover
by foreclosure, set off, attachment, simple demand for payment,
immediate recovery from the actual debtor and other similar legal
remedies, including the sale of a 'pledged' asset covered by the exam-
ple."370 In short, Wright held that a defendant can buy his way out of
a portion of his prison sentence by making post-discovery restitu-
tion.37'
The Sixth Circuit has since limited the holding in Wright, but
in the course of doing so it created still more confusion. In United
States v. Lucas, the court held that "application of Wright to simple
demands for payment is too much at odds with the text of Application
Note 7(b) to be accepted."372 Thus, if a bank discovers a fraud and
demands repayment from the defendant and gets it, that repayment
apparently will not be credited against loss. However, the Lucas
court insisted that Wright survives in cases where the defendant's
fraud assisted a third party to get a loan; in such a case, repayments
by the third party after discovery (and even expected repayments)
367. See id. (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
368. See id. at 241-42.
369. Its explanation for doing so was that the use of the word "pledge" in the commentary
distorts the meaning of the guideline. See id. at 241. Presumably, the court meant that the use
of the unadorned term "loss" in the guideline restricts the concept to the final economic harm
suffered by the victim after all civil or criminal recoveries, foreclosures, and offsets. The court
cited Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), for the proposition that because of the per-
ceived conflict it could ignore the plain language of the commentary. See Wright, 60 F.3d at
241-42.
370. Wright, 60 F.3d at 242.
371. The panel's opinion in Wright is followed by the persuasive dissent of Judge
Batchelder, who found no inconsistency between the text of section 2F1.1 and the example in
application note 7(b). See id. at 243 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). Judge Batchelder noted that
the set off against the deposit account had no fixed value (because the amount in the account
could be changed at the whim of the defendant), distinguished the Sixth Circuit cases cited by
the majority, and chided the majority for focusing purely on the harm to the victim as opposed
to the severity of the criminal act. See id. at 243-44 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). Finally, she
noted that the majority's approach to fraudulent loan application cases "has loaded the scales in
favor of the wealthy." Id. at 244 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
372. 99 F.3d 1290, 1299 (6th Cir. 1996).
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may be credited against loss. 373 This result seems contrary to the
plain wording of Application Note 7(b), to the relevant conduct policy
of section 1B1.3 mandating inclusion of harms resulting from the
foreseeable acts of one's criminal partners, 374 and to common sense.
Why should a defendant be credited for the post-discovery repayments
made by his partners when he receives no credit for his own?
b. Credit for Pre-Detection Payments
Should a defendant be given credit for repayments made after
the completion of the theft or fraud, but before detection of the crime?
This question arises most commonly in two situations: (1) where the
defendant's purpose was to misappropriate money or property for a
limited time in order to invest it, to cover short-term cash flow prob-
lems, or the like; and (2) where the defendant repays money he origi-
nally intended to keep either out of guilt or a desire to avoid detection.
The courts are divided in cases involving these situations.
In check-kiting cases, the general consensus is that loss is to
be measured by determining the size of the overdraft at the time of
discovery of the crime. 375 Not all courts agree, however. The Eighth
Circuit, for example, adopted a minority position in United States v.
Morris.376 Morris was convicted of bank fraud, check-kiting, and mak-
ing false statements to obtain a loan.377 During the course of the
scheme, but before detection, the defendant arranged for the sum of
$156,000 to be repaid to the bank to avoid detection by bank regula-
373. See id. at 1298-99.
374. See USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1XB).
375. See United States v. Akin, 62 F.3d 700, 701 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding loss in check-
kiting case to be measured at time of detection, and rejecting defendant's argument that the loss
figure should be reduced by restitution payments made between time of discovery of check-kite
and sentencing); United States v. Asher, 59 F.3d 622, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding amount of
loss in check-kiting scheme is amount of overdraft measured at the time of discovery of the
scheme); United States v. Flowers, 55 F.3d 218, 220-22 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding loss in check-
kiting case is amount of outstanding bad checks less any amount in accounts at time of discov-
ery); United States v. Mau, 45 F.3d 212, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding amount of loss in check-
kiting scheme is amount of overdraft measured at the time of discovery of the scheme); United
States v. Frydenlund, 990 F.2d 822, 825-26 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that check-kiting
should be treated like fraudulently obtained loan and instead measuring loss at time of discov-
ery of scheme).
Implicit in this result is the holding that the defendant will not be held responsible for
larger overdrafts that existed earlier in the scheme, but which were paid back before discovery.
This rule might be thought to stem from the idea that the loss in a kiting scheme would only be
measurable at its conclusion, but in truth the net overdraft could be measured at any point in
the course of the scheme by a retrospective review of the records.
376. 18 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 1994).
377. See id. at 564.
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tors. At sentencing, the defendant asked for credit for this amount
against the loss. The district court allowed the credit, but the court of
appeals disagreed and refused the credit.378
Embezzlement cases also present the problem of whether to
credit defendants for repayments made before detection. In United
States v. Johnson, a credit union clerk "embezzled" $88,483 (by with-
drawing funds from credit union accounts) and misapplied another
$318,915 by transferring it to another account in the credit union, but
not withdrawing it. 79 She turned herself in before withdrawing the
$318,915. The Eighth Circuit held that the loss included the embez-
zled $88,000, but not the misapplied $318,915.380 Likewise, in United
States v. Shattuck, the First Circuit indicated in dicta that the
amount of "victim loss" in an embezzlement does not include the
amount of misapplied funds that remained in a bank account. 381
The Third and Seventh Circuits have taken a contrary posi-
tion. In United States v. Strozier, the Seventh Circuit held that where
the defendant fraudulently deposited $405,000 into a bank account,
but withdrew only $36,000, the loss was $405,000.382 In United States
v. Kopp, the Third Circuit discussed in dicta the situation of a hypo-
thetical bank clerk who intends to withdraw the money, invest it, and
then return it.383 The court noted that, while the "amount taken"
would be the amount invested, if the clerk were successful and re-
turned the money without detection, both the intended and actual loss
would appear to be zero. The court appeared to view this result as
unacceptable, and implied that the proper measure of loss would be
the whole amount.38
378. See id. at 570. The Eighth Circuit offered no explanation for this result other than to
say, "We believe that the district court's exclusion of the $156,000 from the loss calculation
resulted from an erroneous interpretation of [section] 2F1.1 and our prior cases." Id.
379. 993 F.2d 1358, 1358-59 (8th Cir. 1993).
380. See id. The holding was apparently based on the theory that there was no "taking" as
to the larger sum. The problems flowing from the use of the term "taken" in section 2B1.1,
Application Note 2, are discussed below in Part IIM.B.1. See also supra notes 195-98 and accom-
panying text.
381. 961 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1st Cir. 1992), cited with approval in United States v. Johnson,
993 F.2d 1358, 1359 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993).
382. 981 F.2d 281, 284-86(7th Cir. 1992).
383. 951 F.2d 522, 530 n.13 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "[iun that case intended loss would
be zero and actual loss might also be zero").
384. The court says that, "embezzlement, unlike ordinary theft or fraud, involves not only a
taking but also an action akin to a breach of fiduciary duty, which might justify always using
the amount taken as 'loss'." Id.
See also United States v. Mount, in which the defendant stole baseball playoff tickets with a
face value of $12,000 and sold them in a block to a scalper for $30,000. 966 F.2d 262, 266 (7th
Cir. 1992). In order to cover up the theft, the defendant planned to deposit $12,000 into the
baseball team's account; presumably, the money would come from the sale to the scalper. The
[Vol. 51:461552
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3. Proposed Application Notes Regarding Time of Loss and Net Loss
The consolidated economic crimes guideline should adopt the
following application notes containing rules for determining the time
at which loss is to be measured, and defining net loss:
Application Notes /ont. 7
09 Time of measurement of loss
Loss should ordinarily be measured at the time the crime is
detected. However, if the loss was higher at the time the crime
was legally complete, the loss should be measured at that time.
Likewise, if a defendant continues to engage in criminal conduct
that increases the loss after the crime is detected, the increased
loss resulting from such post-detection conduct should also be in-
cluded as loss.
For purposes of this guideline, a crime is detected when either a
victim or a public law enforcement agency has (at least) a
reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or has been committed
and the defendant becomes aware that such suspicion exists. In
many cases, the crime will be "detected" at the moment of a de-
fendant's arrest. Examples: (i) In the case of a defendant
apprehended in the act of taking a vehicle, the loss is the value of
the vehicle even if the vehicle is recovered immediately. (ii) In the
case of an embezzlement in which the defendant converts to his
own use money from a bank to invest or to cover short-term cash
flow problems and then returns it before being caught, the loss is
the amount of money originally converted. (iii) In the case of a
bank fraud involving a bank officer, the crime would be detected
when defendant became aware that bank examiners were
reviewing irregularities in the bank's books relating to the fraud,
or that federal agents were interviewing witnesses or serving
grand jury subpoenas relating to the fraud.
(g) Net loss
The loss shall be the net loss to the victim or victims.
i) The amount of the loss shall be reduced by the value of
money or property transferred to the victim(s) by the defendant in
the course of the offense. For example, where a defendant sells
stock to the victim by fraudulently representing that the stock is
worth $40,000 when it is worth only $10,000, the loss is the
amount by which the stock was overvalued (i.e., $30,000).
However, where there is more than one victim, the loss will be the
court suggested that the defendant's intention to repay (and perhaps even whether he did repay)
was irrelevant: "An embezzler who abstracts $10,000 to invest in the stock market causes a
'loss' of $10,000 even if he plans to repay before the next audit (to avoid detection) and even if he
invests only in blue chip stocks." Id.
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total of the net losses of the losing victims. For example, in a
Ponzi scheme in which the defendant repays early victims their
entire investment plus a profit in order to keep the scheme going
and. attract new investments and investors, the defendant should
be credited for repayments to early victims only to the extent of
their original investment, plus statutory interest in an amount
determined by reference to Application Note 7(i).
(ii) The amount of the loss shall be reduced by the value of
property pledged as collateral as part of a fraudulently induced
transaction. Where a victim has foreclosed on or otherwise
liquidated the pledged collateral before detection of the crime, the
loss shall be reduced by the amount recovered in the foreclosure or
liquidation. Where a victim had not foreclosed on its security in-
terest in the pledged collateral at the time of detection of the crime,
the loss shall be reduced by the fair market value of the pledged
collateral at the time of detection.
(iii) With the exception of amounts recovered or readily
recoverable by a victim through liquidation or foreclosure of
collateral pledged by the defendant as a part of the illegal
transaction(s) at issue in the case, the loss shall not be reduced by
payments made by the defendant to a victim after detection of the
crime. With the same exception, loss shall not be reduced by
amounts recovered or readily recoverable by a victim from the
defendant through civil process or similar means after detection of
the crime.
4. Analysis of Proposed Application Notes on Time of
Measurement and Net Loss
a. When to Measure Loss
From the four possible points at which loss could be meas-
ured-time-of-the-crime, time-of-detection, time-of-sentencing, and
time-of-resolution of all victim claims-the proposed rule adopts a
combination of time-of-the-crime and time-of-detection.
A pure time-of-the-crime rule would seemingly mesh nicely
with general principles of criminal liability. Assuming the legislature
has made it so, conduct becomes criminal, and thus punishable, once
there has been a confluence of harm, causation, a prohibited act or
omission, and a prohibited culpable mental state.385 If a thief is
caught wheeling my car out of my driveway, the law deems him to
have successfully stolen the whole car, notwithstanding that a po-
liceman happens to foil his getaway. Moreover, regardless of the final
385. See generally HALL, supra note 21, at 185-90.
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outcome to the victim in economic terms, it makes intuitive sense to
say that, at the moment of the theft, the victim has suffered an actual
loss in the amount of the value of the car.
However, a pure time-of-the-crime rule would pose a number of
practical problems. Primary among these is the fact that a crime is
often legally complete before the full extent of the ultimate harm is
inflicted. To take the simplest example, a conspiracy to rob a bank is
legally complete once there has been an agreement to rob followed by
an overt act by one of the conspirators,38 but the amount of the actual
loss occasioned by the crime will not become clear until the conspira-
tors secure the loot and leave the bank. Similarly, a fraud case may
be federally prosecutable following the formation of a scheme to de-
fraud, a single misrepresentation to a potential victim, and a single
wiring or mailing,38 7 but the defendant's criminal conduct will con-
tinue and the victim's losses will continue to mount until the defen-
dant shuts down the scam or gets caught.
A time-of-detection rule is presently employed by at least seven
of the twelve circuits,388 and for most cases this rule makes the best
sense. Once a crime is discovered by its victims, the victims can take
steps to eliminate further losses. Because the rule defines "detection"
to include an awareness of discovery by the defendant, defendants
will ordinarily stop their criminal behavior at detection, either be-
cause they have been arrested or because they fear arrest and do not
wish to make their punishment worse. Thus, in the ordinary case, the
time of detection will be the point of maximum loss. There are three
exceptions to this generalization, all of which are accounted for in the
proposed rule.
First, some criminals will pay back stolen money before detec-
tion out of guilt, remorse, or a desire to avoid getting caught. The
charitable approach to such cases would be to give the defendant
credit for the money repaid. The objections to such charity are:
(1) By using the amount of money originally stolen as the measure of
offense seriousness despite the payback, we account for the risk of
loss the defendant originally imposed regardless of his good inten-
tions; and (2) a pure time-of-detection rule in such cases would pro-
duce disparate sentences for defendants with identical intentions to
386. See Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (The overt act.., need not be
itself a crime."). See generally LAFAVE & SCorr, JR., supra note 27, § 6.5(c), at 547-49.
387. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
388. See supra note 351 and accompanying text. Note that the Seventh Circuit is included
in this total, and it has used a variety of time-of-measurement rules. See supra note 346.
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repay based on the fortuity of when the authorities caught on to the
scam. I find the objections compelling, as well as in line with existing
precedent, and so have eschewed charity.38 9
Second, some obstinate offenders will continue to steal even
after the jig is up and they know it. They should not be relieved of
liability for defalcations occurring after detection.
Third, although in many cases loss will continue to accrue
after detection despite the cessation of a defendant's active criminal
efforts, measuring loss at the date of sentencing raises too great a
potential for arbitrariness. If defendants were credited with repay-
ments made after detection but before sentencing, the rich (or those
who simply had not yet spent the swag) could buy themselves out of
prison time.3 90 And from the defendants' point of view, they should
not have to spend more time in prison because losses mounted while
the government or court delayed prosecution or sentencing.
b. Net Loss
The net loss rules proposed here are generally in accordance
with existing Guidelines language and with the majority positions of
courts that have dealt with the subject. The proposed rules do adopt
one minority position, the "loss to the losing victims" approach to
multiple victim frauds sanctioned in United States v. Orton.391 The
opposing view, that scam artists should receive no credit whatever for
money paid to maintain investor confidence and prolong the fraud, is
understandable. 392 Nonetheless, if "loss" is indeed to be net loss, it is
difficult to draw a principled distinction between payments to Ponzi
scheme investors and other benefits conferred on fraud victims that
are incontestably deductible from loss, such as undervalued stock or
real estate pledged as collateral for a loan. The "loss to the losing
victims" approach provides an attractive compromise between credit-
ing a defendant for no Ponzi repayments, and thus overstating the
degree of economic harm inflicted, and crediting a defendant with all
repayments including overpayments to early investors, a result that
ignores the fact that economic losses are experienced individually and
that the undeserved bonanzas of early investors are no balm for the
uncompensated losses of those victimized after the well runs dry.
389. See Appendix A, Proposed § 221.1 application note 1(g).
390. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 60 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 1995), discussed supra note
365 and accompanying text.
391. 73 F.3d 331 (11th Cir. 1996), discussed supra notes 359-61, and accompanying text.
392. For cases adopting this approach, see supra note 361.
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The proposed rules also emphasize that assets pledged as
collateral as part of the inducement in fraudulent loan cases are to be
deducted from "loss." The principal change proposed is in the time at
which the collateral is to be valued. Consistent with the approach to
time of measurement explained in the previous section, the collateral
is to be valued at its sale price if sold before discovery of the crime, or
if not sold, at its fair market value at the time of detection. This ap-
proach continues to penalize the defendant for decreases in collateral
value regardless of the reason for the decrease; however, it shortens
the period within which such decreases might conceivably occur by
excluding devaluations between detection and sentencing.
This approach is a compromise. Where a defendant offers
collateral, he ought to receive credit for its value against loss. By the
same token, when a defendant fraudulently induces a victim to enter
into a transaction, even a collateralized one, it does not seem unrea-
sonable to penalize him when investment risks to which he exposed
the victim are realized in the form of a drop in collateral value.
However, once the crime is detected, the victim is at liberty to liqui-
date the collateral or take other steps in mitigation. A defendant
should not suffer for a victim's lassitude, or be exposed to the risk of
market declines for periods dependent on prosecutorial efficiency, the
condition of court calendars, or other factors unrelated to culpability.
V. "INTENDED Loss" SHOULD REMAIN A COMPONENT OF FEDERAL
ECONOMIC CRIMES SENTENCING
A. The Rationale for Sentencing Based on "Intended Loss"
The preceding Part was devoted to defining and measuring the
actual losses inflicted by defendants. We now turn to "intended loss."
The present fraud guideline provides that where the loss a defendant
intended to inflict was larger than the loss the victim actually sus-
tained, the larger intended loss figure should be used to calculate the
sentence.393 Moreover, a good many courts have held the same rule
393. See USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7 ("[If an intended loss that the defendant was at-
tempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual
loss."). In general, the courts have complied. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 1073,
1079 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding credit card fraud defendant responsible for total amount of un-
authorized charges, granting no credit for items obtained by fraud but later recovered); United
States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1547 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding in credit card fraud case that loss
19981
558 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 51:461
applicable to theft crimes, despite the absence of language in section
2B1.1 applying the intended loss rule generally to such cases. 394
Before addressing the interpretational problems posed by the current
intended loss provisions, however, it may be useful first to consider
the place of intended loss in the overall scheme of sentencing eco-
nomic crime.
A measurement of actual loss caused by a defendant's criminal
conduct is an appropriate component of the sentencing calculation
because, as noted above, it measures actual harm and serves as a
proxy measurement for other offense seriousness factors like state of
mind. By contrast, "intended loss," because it is only used when it
exceeds actual loss, measures harms that never happened. Therefore,
if intended loss is to be included in a revised and consolidated eco-
nomic crime guideline, it must serve a different purpose than "actual
loss."
equals greater of actual or intended losses); United States v. Mizrachi, 48 F.3d 651, 657 (2d Cir.
1995) (upholding district court's use of intended loss in amount of face value of policy taken out
by defendant on property he burned); United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 585-86 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating that loss is calculated at time of sentencing, but revised upward if the defendant
intended to inflict loss greater than that actually inflicted); United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d
1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1993) (formulating test for when a defendant is responsible for intended
loss); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 536 (3d Cir. 1991) ("'[L]oss' is... the amount of
money the victim has actually lost (estimated at the time of sentencing), not the potential loss
as measured at the time of the crime. However, the 'loss' should be revised upward to the loss
that the defendant intended to inflict, if that amount is higher than actual loss.").
394. One of the notable textual differences between the two guidelines is that section
2F1.1, Application Note 7, provides for use of "intended loss" if greater than "actual loss," USSG
§ 2F1.1 application note 7, while section 2B1.1 defines loss as the "value of the property taken,"
and does not refer to "intended loss." USSG § 2B1.1 application note 2. This difference has
been the source of some confusion, but the courts count intended loss, if greater, even in many
theft cases. See, e.g., Kopp, 951 F.2d at 530-31 (holding intended loss, if higher than actual loss,
is the proper measure in theft case because, "in a theft case, the thief intends to steal whatever
he or she takes; the amount taken is the loss the defendant intended to inflict.... In a theft
case, unlike a fraud case, the amount taken (the intended loss) is always as high or higher than
the amount the victim actually lost (which may be reduced due to fortuitous recovery of the
stolen property)."); United States v. Offiong, Nos. 95-50179, 95-50247, 1996 WL 195547 (9th Cir.
Apr. 23, 1996) (applying section 2B1.1, application note 4, presumption of $100 per credit card
intended loss in stolen credit card case); United States v. Sowels, 998 F.2d 249, 251 (5th Cir.
1993) (affirming determination that loss equalled combined credit limits of stolen cards); United
States v. Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying intended loss in an attempted
robbery case, and quoting section 2X1.1, application note 2, which states that, "[ijn an
attempted theft, the value of the items the defendant attempted to steal would be considered");
United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding intended loss an
appropriate component of sentencing calculation for tape counterfeiting defendant sentenced
under section 21.1); see also United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that defendant who acted as middleman in an attempt to bribe IRS employee to relieve
codefendant of $41,000 tax liability intended tax loss of $41,000). But see United States v.
Redlin, 983 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that intended loss may not be part of
calculation under section 2B1.1).
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In fact, it serves two. The Sentencing Commission provided an
increase in offense level for "intended loss" for the same reasons that
substantive criminal liability is imposed for inchoate crimes like at-
tempt and conspiracy. 395 The connection between "intended loss" and
inchoate criminality is manifest in the language of section 2F1.1,
which says, "Consistent with the provisions of section 2X1.1 (Attempt,
Solicitation or Conspiracy), if an intended loss that the defendant was
attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used .... 3 96
The Commission was certainly correct to include "intended loss" in
the sentencing mix. First, criminal law is preeminently concerned
with blameworthiness. 397 While the occurrence of harmful results is
ordinarily a prerequisite for criminal liability, to some degree pun-
ishment on that basis has more to do with luck than just deserts.
Would-be killers who shoot straight are punished for murder while
those who aim badly are not. Nonetheless, we punish
unconsummated efforts to cause harm as "attempts" or "conspiracies"
(albeit usually less severely than completed crimes) so long as the
would-be perpetrator has come close enough to success that we can be
confident his malignant designs were real and not mere fantasy, and
thus that his conduct was morally blameworthy. 98 Second, we punish
the unsuccessful criminal, not only because he deserves it, but
because his frustrated plans present a high enough risk of actual
harm that punishment for the purpose of deterrence is warranted.
The idea of basing punishment for economic crime on intended
loss is grounded in the same moral and utilitarian considerations that
395. For a general discussion of the rationale of the law of attempt, see Richard Buxton,
The Working Paper on Inchoate Offenses: (1) Incitement and Attempt, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 656,
660 (1973) ("We have a law of Attempt because persons who threaten to commit acts forbidden
by the substantive criminal law should be open to social prevention and deterrence, since such
person is, by reason of their intentions, socially dangerous.").
396. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7.
397. See United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1562-64 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting
defendant's argument that actual loss is the dominant focus of the Guidelines, and thus that
there should be an impossibility limitation on intended loss on the ground that "[o]ne of the
Guidelines' goals is to tailor punishment to a defendant's particular degree of culpability").
398. Criminal liability for conspiracy requires evidence of some fixity of purpose in the form
of an agreement with one or more co-conspirators, see United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999,
1011 (5th Cir. 1976), DRESSLER, supra note 62, § 29.04[A], at 397, and an overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy committed by one of the conspirators. See United States v. Offutt, 127
F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Attempt liability customarily requires the commission of a
"substantial step" toward accomplishment of the criminal goal. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 5.01(2) (1980); see also Buxton, supra note 395, at 660:
The law of Attempt ... limits its deterrent and preventive role in the interests of free-
dom by requiring action, of some sort, as well as intention, on the part of the accused; in
the same way as in substantive crime the deterrent and preventive role of the law is to
some degree limited by the requirement of mens rea.
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support imposing substantive liability for attempts and conspiracies.
Morally, we may consider that a swindler who intends to take a large
amount of money is more culpable, and thus deserves a greater pun-
ishment, than one who seeks or secures a smaller amount.399 From a
utilitarian perspective, use of intended loss in the sentencing calculus
imposes consequences (and thus, one hopes, achieves a deterrent
effect) proportionate to the degree of risk the defendant's behavior
posed to the economic well-being of his fellow citizens, as measured by
the magnitude of his criminal objectives.
B. What Is Meant by Intended Loss?
In "intended loss" cases, most courts say they look to the de-
fendant's subjective intent,400 rather than presuming the defendant to
intend all the natural and probable consequences of his acts.401 The
provision of section 2F1.1 concerning intended loss seems to have
been primarily directed at situations in which a defendant is seeking
to defraud victims of a large amount, but is forestalled from doing so
by arrest, discovery of the scheme, or other happenstance, and actu-
ally obtains less than he had planned. Despite the fact that the
"intended loss" component of section 2F1.1 may have been primarily
399. See Studevent, 116 F.3d at 1563 ("Limiting intended loss to that which was likely or
possible... would eliminate the distinction between a defendant whose only ambition was to
make some pocket change and one who plotted a million-dollar fraud.").
400. See, e.g., United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 429 (1st Cir. 1995) (considering but
not resolving question of whether subjective or objective standard of intent should be used
because sufficient evidence was in record to support finding subjective intent); United States v.
Quaye, 57 F.3d 447, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding for finding on whether defendant subjec-
tively intended to repay loan); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding actual knowledge of amount of "intended" loss was not necessary, implying the record
was sufficiently clear that no finding was needed); United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1425
(6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Shaw, 3 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1993), (holding that,
under the 1989 Guidelines, loss in fraudulent loan case was the unpaid balance of a loan minus
the amount the defendant subjectively intended to repay). It is questionable whether Shaw
remains good law in light of subsequent amendments to section 2F1.1.
401. See, for example, United States v. Hill, which stated:
When reviewing the calculation of an intended loss, we look to actual, not constructive,
intent, and distinguish between cases in which "the intended loss for stolen or fraudu-
lently obtained property is the face value of that property" and those in which the in-
tended loss is zero because "the defendant intends to repay the loan or replace the prop-
erty."
42 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Henderson, 19 F.3d 917, 928 (5th Cir.
1994)).
In a regime based on constructive intent, the government's obligation would be to show the
likely effects of the scheme and ask the court to infer from those likely effects the defendant's
subjective intent. See United States v. Stern, 13 F.3d 489, 497 (1st Cir. 1994) ("In this case, the
potential was not realized but it was still intended or reasonably likely and thus a proper meas-
ure of loss under the guideline.").
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directed at expanding the scope of sentencing liability for enterprising
but unsuccessful crooks, it has frequently been the basis of arguments
for reducing loss calculations. For example, in United States v.
Schneider, Judge Posner distinguished between the contractor who
lies to get a contract but intends to perform it and the "true con artist"
who "means to pocket the entire contract price without rendering any
service in return."42 In other cases, defendants have successfully
argued that loss should be reduced if they could establish a subjective
intention to repay the victim. 40 3
The Ninth Circuit has rejected an analogous argument.
United States v. Yellowe concerned a credit card fraud in which the
defendant tried unsuccessfully to use credit card numbers to make
unauthorized charges. 404 The defendant argued that, because section
2F1.1 mandated the use of the greater of either "actual loss" or
"intended loss," and because there was no actual loss, then the meas-
ure of intended loss should focus on the defendant's subjective expec-
tations about the loss amount. He claimed he only expected 12.6% of
the card numbers to be valid and thus he should be accountable only
for those. The district and appellate courts rejected his argument and
held him responsible for the minimum $100 per card specified in
section 2B1.1, Application Note 4.405
C. Must the Defendant's Intentions Be Realistic?
Should a defendant be held responsible for losses he intended
to inflict even if the achievement of his criminal goals was impossible
or highly improbable? This issue arises in two types of cases-those
involving government "sting" operations where no loss was possible
because the defendant was dealing with government agents, and
those in which the defendant's objectives were either impossible or
improbable for some other, usually economic, reason. There is a di-
vergence of views among the circuits on both types of case.
402. 930 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991).
403. See Hill, 42 F.3d at 918; Quaye, 57 F.3d at 448.
404. 24 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1994).
405. The precedential value of Yellowe is somewhat diluted by the fact that the district
court and the court of appeals were able to sidestep the full force of the defendant's argument
because of the existence of a specific guideline provision for credit card fraud, section 2B1.1,
Application Note 4, which provides that the loss in such cases "'includes any unauthorized
charges made with stolen credit cards, but in no event less than $100 per card.'" Id. (citing
USSG § 2B1.1 application note 4). Said the court, "Application Note 4 says nothing about




Defendants caught by government undercover operations be-
fore they can steal any money commonly argue that the intended loss
provision of section 2F1.1, Application Note 7, should not apply to
them because no actual loss was possible. The majority of the circuits
to have addressed the question reject this argument and treat fraud
cases no differently than drug cases or other stings in which success is
foreclosed by the defendant's choice of confederate.406
The Tenth Circuit, however, has taken a different view. In
United States v. Galbraith, the court held that where the defendant is
dealing with a government agent and no money changes hands, there
is no loss.407 The court reasoned that, because loss is supposed to
measure economic harm, the loss is zero in a situation where no harm
could have occurred. The court's rationale for ignoring the fraud
guideline's directive to use "intended loss" merits some scrutiny.
The Galbraith court relied heavily on United States v.
Santiago.408 In Santiago, the defendant falsely reported to his insur-
ance company that his car had been stolen and submitted a claim for
$11,000. Because the police intervened, the claim was not processed;
had it been, the insurance company would have paid at a maximum
the car's "blue book" value of $4,800.409 The court concluded that the
"intended loss" could not "exceed the loss a defendant in fact could
have occasioned if his or her fraud had been entirely successful," in
this case $4,800.410
Santiago does not compel the result in Galbraith. Indeed,
literal application of the Santiago standard to the facts of Galbraith
produces a result contrary to the one reached by the court. If
Galbraith's "fraud had been entirely successful," he would have se-
cured over $600,000.411 To say that Galbraith "could not have suc-
406. See, e.g., United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (loss calcu-
lation includes stolen checks passed to undercover FBI agent despite fact they would never be
cashed); id. at 1110 (applying intended loss provision of section 2F1.1 where defendant entered
into a scheme with a government informant to make unauthorized credit card charges); United
States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1996) ("There is no reason why defendants
caught as a result of a sting operation should be treated any differently than defendants caught
participating in an ongoing fraud."); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Simply because the government's crime prevention efforts prove successful... does not mean
that the 'intended loss' is zero.").
407. 20 F.3d 1054, 1058-60 (10th Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570
(10th Cir. 1994).
408. 977 F.2d 517, 519(10th Cir. 1992).
409. See id. at 524.
410. Id.
411. See Galbraith, 20 F.3d at 1058.
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ceeded" because he was dealing with government agents is the same
as saying that Santiago "could not have succeeded" because the police
discovered his scam before the claim could be processed.
The Tenth Circuit is apparently attempting to import into
fraud sentencing some version of the criminal liability doctrines of
mistake of fact or impossible attempts. Although, as will be sug-
gested below, 412 these principles have a place in sentencing law, the
Tenth Circuit does not appear to have applied them properly to the
facts of Santiago. A defendant claims mistake of fact when he wishes
to establish that he lacked the requisite culpable mental state neces-
sary to establish criminal liability. The claim will be effective only
where the mistaken belief, if honestly held, would disprove the exis-
tence of the required mental state.413 Modern law concerning the
doctrine of impossible attempts looks at the facts as the defendant be-
lieved them to be. If he did everything he could do to complete the
transaction or performed a substantial step toward completion, and
the completed transaction would have constituted a crime if the facts
were as he thought them, he is guilty of attempt.
41 4
If Santiago honestly believed that his insurance claim could
yield $11,000, he was certainly guilty of at least an attempt to defraud
the company of $11,000. At a minimum, and as the Santiago court
held, his overly optimistic goals certainly should not relieve him of
liability for the $4,800 loss that would have occurred without the
vigilance of the police. Likewise, the question in Galbraith is
whether, if the facts were as Galbraith believed them to be, he could
have succeeded in defrauding his putative victims of over $600,000.
The answer is plainly yes.41 5
In the end, Galbraith's interpretation of section 2F1.1, Appli-
cation Note 7, is not compelling, and seems to be foreclosed by
Application Note 10. Note 10 authorizes a departure "where a defen-
412. See infra Part V.E.
413. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a).
414. See id. §§ 2.04(2), 5.0(1Xc); see also United States v. Thomas, 13 C.MA 278-291, 32
C.M.R. 278-291 (1962) (finding servicemen guilty of attempted rape of deceased woman with
whom they had intercourse where they erroneously believed her to be alive but unconscious at
the time of the act). But see United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173, 189 (3d Cir. 1973)
(reversing convictions for sending letters into and out of a federal penitentiary "without the
knowledge and consent of the warden" because, unbeknownst to defendants, their courier had
the warden's consent to carry the letters).
415. The Tenth Circuit's Galbraith opinion suggests that a defendant can be sentenced
based on the amount of nonexistent narcotics he attempted to buy from a government agent, but
not on the amount of money he attempted to swindle from the same agent. The Ninth Circuit
noted this anomaly in United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1996), and cited it
as a reason to reject the impossibility argument regarding intended loss.
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dant attempted to negotiate an instrument that was so obviously
fraudulent that no one would seriously consider honoring it."416 As the
D.C. Circuit observed in rejecting Galbraith's analysis: "It would be
unnecessary to authorize such a departure if the unlikelihood of suc-
cess already limited the intended loss attributable to a defendant
under application note 7."417
2. Impossibility or Improbability
In Galbraith, the Tenth Circuit also relied on the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Watkins418 and its own work in
United States v. Smith,4 9 where it held that to meet the requirements
of section 2F1.1, "the record must support by a preponderance of the
evidence the conclusion that Mr. Smith realistically intended a
$440,896 loss, or that a loss in that amount was probable."42° Watkins
and Smith are exemplars of a line of cases that attempt to impose an
outer limit on the scope of intended loss by reference to some notion of
economic reality.421 Some of the early cases in this line, including
Smith, seem to have drawn inspiration from the reference to
"probable" loss in the pre-1991 guidelines,422 a term which has since
been omitted.423 Nonetheless, even since that amendment, some
courts have continued to consider the probability of success of defen-
dants' schemes.42
A particularly interesting example of this phenomenon is
Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit in United States
416. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 10.
417. United States v. Studevent, 116 F.3d 1559, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
418. 994 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1993).
419. 951 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1991).
420. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
421. For an excellent discussion of the economic reality doctrine, see John D. Cline, Should
the Sentencing Commission Adopt the Economic Reality Doctrine?, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP.
141, 141-42 (Nov.-Dec. 1997) (concluding that the current fraud guideline "does not include the
economic reality doctrine," but arguing that the doctrine should be incorporated in any new
economic crime guideline).
422. USSG § 2F1.1 app. note 7 (1990). See, e.g., United States v. Dozie, 27 F.3d 95, 99 (4th
Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's use of "economic reality" to limit fraud loss calculation, and
relying on reference in former version of section 2F1.1, application note 7, to "probable or
intended loss").
423. See USSG App. C, amend. 393 at 221-22 (Nov. 1, 1991).
424. In United States v. Egemonye, the First Circuit upheld the district court's assessment
of loss in a stolen credit card scheme as the aggregate credit limits of all the stolen cards, say-
ing, somewhat equivocally: "Where there is good evidence of intent and some prospect of
success, we do not think that a court needs to engage in more refined forecasts of just how
successful the scheme was likely to be." 62 F.3d 425, 429 (1st Cir. 1995).
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v. Sung.425 At the time of his apprehension in this product counter-
feiting case, the defendant had actual sales of no more that $70,400,
but had obtained counterfeit cartons that could have held products
worth $960,000.426 He was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a),
which provides, "Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic
in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with such goods or services' commits a crime."427 The dis-
trict court found a loss in the amount of $960,000.428 On appeal, the
circuit court found the defendant responsible for only $70,400 and
remanded for resentencing.429
The court apparently imposed a test requiring the sentencing
court to consider the reasonableness or feasibility of the defendant's
criminal intentions. Referring to section 2Xl.1 regarding attempts, it
asked whether the defendant had any "reasonable expectation of
being able to sell" $960,000 worth of counterfeit hair products.4 0 The
court went on to say: "It is not clear to us that 'but for apprehension'
Kim had any hope of reaping a million dollars from counterfeit hair
products... ."431 The effect of this language in Sung is unclear be-
cause a year later, in United States v. Coffman, the Seventh Circuit
expressly rejected the argument "that a loss that cannot possibly
occur cannot be intended."14 2
The current majority position on this issue, adopted to date by
the Second, Fifth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, is that the
"amount of loss that the [defendants] intended to inflict does not have
to be realistic."433
425. 51 F.3d 92 (7th Cir. 1995).
426. See id. at 94.
427. Id. at 93 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (1994)).
428. See id. at 94.
429. See id. at 95.
430. Id. at 95.
431. Id. at 96.
432. 94 F.3d 330, 336 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1426 (1997).
433. United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 94-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding face amount of fraudulent bank drafts as
loss despite very small risk that drafts would actually be honored); United States v. Studevent,
116 F.3d 1559, 1561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (intended loss need not be realistically possible); United
States v. Wai-Keung, 115 F.3d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Ismoila, 100
F.3d 380, 396 (5th Cir. 1996) ('The fact that the victims were not at risk for the charges above
their credit limit is not dispositive.").
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D. The Cross-Reference to the Attempt Guideline, Section 2X1. 1
The application note in the fraud guideline that creates the
"intended loss" rule states that "[c]onsistent with the provisions of
section 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy)," intended loss
will be used where greater than actual loss.43 While, as noted
above,435 the "intended loss" provision of section 2F1.1 exists for the
same theoretical reasons that inchoate crimes exist, the cross-refer-
ence has created no end of confusion in practice. One source of the
difficulty is the fact that section 2X1.1 gives a three-offense-level
discount for uncompleted conduct. Not surprisingly, defendants have
argued that any offense level produced by plugging an intended loss
figure into the fraud loss table should be reduced by three levels.436
There are two views on this question. The Sixth Circuit has sug-
gested that a court can determine intended loss under section 2F1.1
only by applying the attempt guidelines of section 2X1.1(b)(1).437 The
Seventh Circuit has rejected this interpretation, holding that section
2X1.1 comes into play only in the case of uncompleted crimes, and not
where the crime is legally complete but some component of the in-
tended loss was not successfully inflicted.438 The distinction is intel-
lectually tenable, but immensely difficult to apply in practice.4 9
E. Proposed Commentary on "Intended Loss"
The Sentencing Commission should retain the "intended loss"
concept, delete the cross-reference to section 2X1.1, and redraft the
provisions of the application note concerning intended loss substan-
tially as follows:
Application Notes [cont.]
8. If the defendant intended to cause a loss greater than the actual loss calcu-
lated pursuant to Application Note 7, the figure for intended loss shall be used
as the "loss" in subsection (b)(1).
434. USSG § 2F1.1 application note 7.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 394-97.
436. See, e.g., United States v. Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425,429 (1st Cir. 1995).
437. See United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192, 1195 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[F]or intended loss
to be deemed relevant under application note 7 to section 2F1.1, the defendant's conduct must
meet the requirements of section 2X1.1(b)(1).").
438. See United States v. Yusufu, 63 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1995).
439. See, e.g., United States v. Sung, 51 F.3d 92, 95 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying section 2F1.1
Application Note 7 cross-reference to section 2X1.1 to impose requirement of economic reason-




The defendant is accountable for all pecuniary harms he intended and
which might reasonably have occurred if the facts were as he believed them to
be.
b) "Sting" Operations
Intended loss includes pecuniary harms the defendant intended to cause,
even if accomplishment of defendant's goals would have been unlikely or impos-
sible because of the participation of an informant or undercover government
agent.
F. Analysis of Proposed Guideline Commentary on "Intended Loss"
Because application of the Guidelines requires a method for
ranking the seriousness of particular instances of crimes of the same
general type, intended loss or something very like it is indispensable.
There must be a way of distinguishing among inchoate (and partially
successful) economic crimes. Laws penalizing inchoate crimes exist
because such conduct is blameworthy and because it poses a risk of
actual harm. Because inchoate and partially successful economic
crimes are wholly or partially unconsummated efforts to inflict
pecuniary loss, we should rank such crimes according to the amount
of harm the defendant desired to inflict.44° A crook who sets out to
steal a million dollars is, all else being equal, both morally more
culpable and a greater social risk than one whose more modest goal is
to snitch a pack of cigarettes.
Although blameworthiness and risk of harm are both impor-
tant considerations in punishing uncompleted conduct, blameworthi-
ness is the more significant factor. Therefore, just as in the guilt
phase of a criminal trial, at sentencing the factual impossibility or
improbability of success of a criminal plan should be no defense. The
proposed application note focuses on the defendant's state of mind, on
what he intended and what he believed. It holds him responsible for
losses he intended, so long as they "might reasonably have occurred if
the facts were as he believed them to be." The goal is to hold defen-
dants responsible for their evil objectives, while taking account of risk
of harm by leaving open the possibility of subtracting from loss those
440. James Gibson, Attorney Advisor to Sentencing Commissioner Michael Goldsmith, has
argued that the proper measure of loss is not the greater of actual or intended loss, but the
average of actual and intended loss, regardless of which is greater. See James Gibson, How
Much Should Mind Matter? Mens Rea in Theft and Fraud Sentencing, 10 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 136 (Nov.-Dec. 1997).
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rare harms that simply could never have befallen even if things were
as the defendant thought them.
It might be argued that there should be a discount for unreal-
ized but intended losses as compared to loss actually inflicted. The
consolidated guideline proposed here provides for such a discount, but
it requires a moment's thought to see it. The proposed definition of
actual loss expands the universe of pecuniary harms counted in loss to
include reasonably foreseeable harms. Hence, where a criminal plan
is successful, the perpetrator will be liable, not only for the harms he
desires, but for such additional harms as are foreseeable to him. By
contrast, the unsuccessful criminal is responsible only for the losses
he desired to inflict; "foreseeability" does not enter the picture.
Therefore, the cross-reference to the attempt guideline is unnecessary
as well as confusing, and ought to be abandoned.
VI. CONCLUSION
I am a fan of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. I think they
are an improvement on the system they replaced and, in general,
work far better than their many critics believe. Nonetheless, they
remain an experiment. If the experiment is to succeed over the long
term, the Guidelines and the Commission that shepherds them must
be flexible and innovative enough to reinvent parts of the system that
do not work well. The Guidelines' machinery for sentencing economic
criminals is not broken, but it is unwieldy and inefficient; the gears
are creaking, frustration is growing, and it is time for a new model.
Whether the approach I have sketched out will be part of the blue-
print for that new model remains to be seen. At the least, I hope it




The U.S. Sentencing Commission met on April 7, 1998 to con-
sider a package of proposals which would have consolidated the theft
and fraud guidelines and redefined "loss" along the lines very close to
those proposed here. The Commission, which at the time'of the meet-
ing had three of its seven seats vacant, was unable to come to a con-
sensus on the entire package. It approved a two-level enhancement
for sophisticated means similar to that advocated above,4" but left
completion of the work of simplifying economic crime sentencing to
the next group of Commissioners and the 1998-99 amendment cycle.
441. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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Proposed Consolidated Property Crimes Guideline
§2Z1.1. Economic Crimes, Including Fraud, Larceny,
Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Receiving, Transporting.
Transferring, Transmitting, or Possessing Stolen Propergt
(a) Base Offense Level: 4
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the loss exceeded $100, increase the offense level as
follows:
Loss (Apply the Greatest)
(A) $100 or less
(B) More than $100
(C) More than $1,000
(D) More than $2,000
(E) More than $5,000
(F) More than $10,000
(G) More than $20,000
(H) More than $40,000
(I) More than $70,000
(J) More than $120,000
(K) More than $200,000
(L) More than $350,000
(M) More than $500,000
(N) More than $800,000
(0) More than $1,500,000
(P) More than $2,500,000
(Q) More than $5,000,000
(R) More than $10,000,000
(S) More than $20,000,000
(T) More than $40,000,000























(2) If the offense involved (A) a theft from the person of another,
(B) the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, or (C)
possession of a dangerous weapon, increase by 2 levels. If the
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offense involved either (B) or (C) and the resulting offense level
is less than 13, increase to level 13.
(3) If the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the de-
fendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling
stolen property, increase by 4 levels.
(4) If (A) undelivered U.S. Mail was taken, or the taking of such
items was an object of the offense; or (B) the stolen property re-
ceived, transported, transferred, transmitted, or possessed was
undelivered U.S. Mail, and the offense level as determined
above is less than level 6, increase to level 6.
(5) If the offense involved an organized scheme to steal vehicles or
vehicle parts, and the offense level as determined above is less
than level 14, increase to level 14.
(6) If the offense involved (A) a misrepresentation that the defen-
dant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious
or political organization, or a government agency, or (B) viola-
tion of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree,
or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines, increase
by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 10,
then increase to level 10.
(7) If the offense-
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a
financial institution;
or
(B) affected a financial institution and the defendant de-
rived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from the
offense, increase by 4 levels. If the resulting offense
level is less than level 24, increase to level 24.
(8) If sophisticated means were used to commit the offense, or to
impede the discovery of the existence or extent of the offense,
increase the offense level by 2 levels.
(9) If the offense involved only minimal planning or represented a
single instance of impulsive behavior, decrease by 2 levels.
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(10) If the offense involved more than one victim, increase the of-
fense level as follows:
(A) If the offense involved 2-4 victims, increase by 1 level.
(B) If the offense involved 5-20 victims, increase by 2 levels.
(C) If the offense involved 21 or more victims, increase by 3
levels.
(11) If the offense caused significant financial hardship to any vic-
tim, increase by 2 levels.
(c) Cross Reference [regarding theft of firearms-to remain same
as in present section 2B1.1(c).]
Application Notes:
1. "Loss" means all pecuniary harm caused by the acts and omis-
sions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of § 1B1.3
(Relevant Conduct) that was reasonably foreseeable to the de-
fendant at the time of such acts or omissions. "Victims" are all
persons or entities (public or private) which suffered such
harms.
(a) Pecuniary harm
The phrase "pecuniary harm" is to be given its common
meaning. Many physical and emotional harms, injuries
to reputation, etc., can be assigned a monetary value.
However, "loss" does not measure harms of this kind. Its
purpose is to measure economic harms.
(b) Causation
A harm has been "caused" for the purposes of this guide-
line if one or more of the acts or omissions specified in
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)
was a substantial factor in producing the harm. "Loss"
should not include harms that are causally remote from




A foreseeable harm is one that ordinarily follows from
one or more of the acts or omissions specified in subsec-
tion (a)(1) or (a)(2) of§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in the
usual course of events, or that a reasonable person in the
position of the defendant would have foreseen as a prob-
able result of such acts or omissions.
Examples: (1) In a case involving product substitution,
the loss includes the purchaser's reasonably foreseeable
costs of making substitute transactions and handling or
disposing of the product delivered, or modifying the
product so that it can be used for its intended purpose,
plus the purchaser's reasonably foreseeable cost of recti-
fying the actual or potential disruption of the pur-
chaser's activities caused by the product substitution.
(2) In a case of fraud involving the award of a go-
vernment contract, loss includes the reasonably foresee-
able administrative cost to the government and other
public and private participants of repeating or correct-
ing the contracting process affected, plus any reasonably
foreseeable increased cost to secure the product or service
contracted for. (3) In a case of destruction of commercial
property by fire as part of a scheme to defraud, loss
includes reasonably foreseeable added costs incurred by
local government authorities in suppressing the fire, and
reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm to the owner of
the property (if not the defendant) resulting from
interruption in his business activity.
Loss does not, however, include costs incurred by go-
vernment agencies in criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion of the defendant.
(d) Cases of theft, receipt of stolen roperty, and destruction
of property
In cases involving larceny, false pretenses, embezzle-
ment, and other forms of theft, as well as cases involving
receipt of stolen property or the destruction or damage of
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property, loss includes, but may not be limited to, the
value of the property stolen, embezzled, damaged, or de-
stroyed.
(e) Congressional intent
In determining the loss (including the identification of
the persons or classes of persons to be treated as vic-
tims), the sentencing court shall give particular weight
to congressional intent. It shall be rebuttably presumed
that pecuniary harm which was: (i) caused by one or
more of the acts or omissions specified in subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct); and (ii)
suffered by any person or class of persons whose inter-
ests Congress intended to protect by passage of the of-
fense(s) of conviction or offense(s) considered by the sen-
tencing court as relevant conduct, was foreseeable to the
defendant. For example, in a case involving diversion of
government program benefits, loss is the value of the
benefits diverted from intended beneficiaries or uses.
Similarly, in a case involving a Davis-Bacon Act viola-
tion (a violation of 40 U.S.C. § 276a, criminally prose-
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001), the loss is the difference
between the legally required and actual wages paid.
(f) Time of measurement of loss
Loss should ordinarily be measured at the time the
crime is detected. However, if the loss was higher at the
time the crime was legally complete, the loss should be
measured at that time. Likewise, if a defendant contin-
ues to engage in criminal conduct that increases the loss
after the crime is detected, the increased loss resulting
from such post-detection conduct should also be included
as loss. For purposes of this guideline, a crime is de-
tected when either a victim or a public law enforcement
agency has (at least) a reasonable suspicion that a crime
is being or has been committed and the defendant be-
comes aware that such suspicion exists. In many cases,
the crime will be "detected" at the moment of a defen-
dant's arrest. Examples: (i) In the case of a defendant
apprehended in the act of taking a vehicle, the loss is the
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value of the vehicle even if the vehicle is recovered im-
mediately. (ii) In the case of an embezzlement in which
the defendant converts to his own use money from a
bank to invest or to cover short-term cash flow problems
and then returns it before being caught, the loss is the
amount of money originally converted. (iii) In the case
of a bank fraud involving a bank officer, the crime
would be detected when defendant became aware that
bank examiners were reviewing irregularities in the
bank's books relating to the fraud, or that federal agents
were interviewing witnesses or serving grand jury sub-
poenas relating to the fraud.
(g) Net loss
The loss shall be the net loss to the victim or victims.
(i) The amount of the loss shall be reduced by the
value of money or property transferred to the victim(s) by
the defendant in the course of the offense. For example,
where a defendant sells stock to the victim by fraudu-
lently representing that the stock is worth $40,000 when
it is worth only $10,000, the loss is the amount by which
the stock was overvalued (i.e., $30,000). However, where
there is more than one victim, the loss will be the total of
the net losses of the losing victims. For example, in a
Ponzi scheme in which the defendant repays early vic-
tims their entire investment plus a profit in order to keep
the scheme going and attract new investments and in-
vestors, the defendant should be credited for repayments
to early victims only to the extent of their original in-
vestment, plus statutory interest in an amount deter-
mined by reference to Application Note 7(i).
(ii) The amount of the loss shall be reduced by the
value of property pledged as collateral as part of a
fraudulently induced transaction. Where a victim has
foreclosed on or otherwise liquidated the pledged collat-
eral before detection of the crime, the loss shall be re-
duced by the amount recovered in the foreclosure or
liquidation. Where a victim has not foreclosed on its se-
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curity interest in the pledged collateral at the time of de-
tection of the crime, the loss shall be reduced by the fair
market value of the pledged collateral at the time of de-
tection.
(iii) With the exception of amounts recovered or read-
ily recoverable by a victim through liquidation or fore-
closure of collateral pledged by the defendant as a part
of the illegal transaction(s) at issue in the case, the loss
shall not be reduced by payments made by the defendant
to a victim after detection of the crime. With the same
exception, loss shall not be reduced by amounts recov-
ered or readily recoverable by a victim from the defen-
dant through civil process or similar means after detec-
tion of the crime.
(h) Valuation
Ordinarily, loss will be calculated using the fair market
value of the property or other thing of value at issue.
Where the market value is difficult to ascertain or in-
adequate to measure harm to the victim, the court may
measure loss in some other way, such as reasonable re-
placement cost to the victim. When property is dam-
aged, the loss is the cost of repairs up to the replacement
cost of the property (plus any other reasonably foresee-
able pecuniary harms).
(i) Interest
Loss shall include interest if interest or some other simi-
lar form of return on investment was bargained for by a
victim as part of a transaction which is the subject of the
count(s) of conviction, or which is included as relevant
conduct under § 1B1.3. In such a case, loss shall
include a component of interest at the statutory rate
specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 calculated from the time at
which the money, property, or other thing of value was
stolen, embezzled, damaged, or destroyed, or the victim
was otherwise deprived of its use or benefit, until the
time the crime was detected. In all other cases, loss
shall not include interest.
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2. If the defendant intended to cause a loss greater than the actual
loss calculated pursuant to Application Note 1, the figure for in-
tended loss shall be used as the "loss" in subsection (b)(1).
a) Factual Impossibility
The defendant is accountable for all pecuniary harms he
intended and which might reasonably have occurred if
the facts were as he believed them to be.
b) "Sting" Operations
Intended loss includes pecuniary harms the defendant
intended to cause, even if accomplishment of defendant's
goals would have been unlikely or impossible because of
the participation of an informant or undercover govern-
ment agent.
3. For the purposes of subsection (b)(1), loss (or intended loss)
need not be determined with precision. The court need only
make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available in-
formation. For example, this estimate may be based on the ap-
proximate number of victims and an estimate of the average
loss to each victim, or on more general factors, such as the na-
ture and duration of the offense and the revenues generated by
similar operations.
4. The loss includes any unauthorized charges made with stolen
credit cards, but in no event less than $100 per card.
5. A victim suffers "significant financial hardship" if the offense
caused him to file for personal bankruptcy protection, to suffer
foreclosure on or eviction from his primary residence, to be
terminated from employment which was a significant source of
the victim's income, to suffer the closure, bankruptcy, or loss of
ownership interest in any business that was a significant source
of the victim's income, to lose health insurance protection for a
period of six months or more, or to pay significant medical ex-
penses during any period in which health insurance benefits
were terminated or unavailable to the victim as a result of de-
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fendant's conduct, to lose a significant portion of his pension or
retirement benefits, or to suffer any other financial deprivation
similar in scope and effect to the examples listed above. For
purposes of applying § 2B1.1(b)(11) only the term "victim"
refers only to natural persons.
[NOTE: Application Notes 5-12 of the current theft guideline, section
2B1.1, would become Notes 6-13 in the consolidated economic crimes
guideline. Application Notes 14-17 of the current fraud guideline,
section 2F1.1, are identical to Notes 9-12 in the current theft guide-
line, and so would be incorporated unchanged as Application Notes
10-13 of the consolidated guideline. Application Note 5 of the current
fraud guideline, section 2F1.1, would become Note 14 of the consoli-
dated guideline.]
15. For purposes of calculating the number of victims under subsec-
tion (b)(1O), the court should count only those victims who were
actually deprived of something of value. For example, a wire
fraud in which calls were made to three different individuals
successfully persuading each of them to invest in a pyramid
scheme would involve three victims. However, stealing a single
car would ordinarily involve only a single victim, even if the
owner were fully reimbursed for the loss of the car by his insur-
ance company.
16. "Sophisticated means," as used in subsection (b)(1O), includes
conduct that is more complex or demonstrates greater intricacy
or planning than a routine economic crime of the same type. An
enhancement would be applied, for example, where the defen-
dant used offshore bank accounts, multiple transactions
through domestic financial institutions, transactions through
corporate shells or fictitious entities, or sophisticated technical
means.
17. In cases in which the loss determined under subsection (b)(1)
does not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness of the
conduct, an upward departure may be warranted. Examples
may include the following:
(a) a primary objective of the fraud was non-monetary; or
the fraud caused or risked reasonably foreseeable sub-
stantial non-monetary harm;
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(b) false statements were made for the purpose of facilitat-
ing some other crime;
(c) the offense caused reasonably foreseeable physical or
psychological harm or severe emotional trauma;
(d) the offense endangered national security or military
readiness;
(e) the offense caused a loss of confidence in an important
institution.
In a few instances, the loss determined under subsection (b)(1)
may overstate the seriousness of the offense. In such cases, a
downward departure may be warranted.

